INVESTIGATING HINTIKKA

Edited by
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Wittgenstein’s critique of solipsism is explained as a development in three stages. In the first, which appears in the *Notebooks 1914-16* and *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, he criticizes the solipsist for not identifying his ego and, therefore, leaving the objects presented to it unidentified. He argues that this is like trying to identify the eye without using any psychological facts. In the second stage, which appears in The Blue Book and Notes for Lectures on “Private Experience” and “Sensations”, he assumes that the solipsist does not even try to identify his ego but merely points at the objects of which he is directly aware. The critique of this inward pointing is based on a development of the original analogy between ego and eye. The third stage is the argument against the possibility of a sensation-language without any connections with the physical world. This appears in Notes for Lectures on “Private Experience” and “Sense Data” and in *Philosophical Investigations*. Here the focus is not on the ego but on the objects presented to it. However the criticism is similar: those objects and their types need criteria of identity but would not have sense if they were not connected with the physical world.

| Allan JANIK: How Did Hertz Influence Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Development? | 19 |

In his efforts to demonstrate graphically that alternative modes of presentation of the principles of mechanics could eliminate the difficulties surrounding such problematic notions as “force” in mechanics that tormented scientists and philosophers alike, Heinrich Hertz delivered Ludwig Wittgenstein with a highly original hermeneutic technique, which would influence all of the latter’s thinking, and in fact became the cornerstone of his mature philosophical method. All of the features of Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy in fact emerge from his early scientific background only to be complimented and embellished, but in no sense fundamentally altered by his later encounters with the likes of Bertrand Russell, G.E.
Moore or Frank Ramsey. The Hertzian origin of Wittgenstein’s philosophizing clearly indicates 1) why Wittgenstein was never tempted by positivism and at the same time 2) why he remained a “scientific” philosopher his whole life long and 3) reduce the charges of irrationalism that have been raised against him to absurdity.

Ilkka NIINILUOTO: Hintikka and Whewell on Aristotelian Induction .............................................. 49

According to the standard interpretation, Aristotle has two accounts of induction (epagoge): intuitive induction (which is not an inference) and complete induction (which is not a kind of non-demonstrative inference). Hintikka has challenged the usual interpretation of Aristotle’s “official account” in *Analytica Priora II*, 23. In this paper, Hintikka’s view is compared with a similar, but in some respects perhaps even more plausible, interpretation that William Whewell gave already in 1850. Both Hintikka and Whewell argue convincingly that Aristotellean induction is connected to concept formation. According to Whewell, the key to Aristotle’s account is not the exhaustiveness or completeness of the sample of special cases, but rather its representativeness for the purpose of generalization.

Jan VON PLATO: Illustrations of Method in Ptolemaic Astronomy .................................................. 63

Mathematical Astronomy as the most developed branch of ancient exact sciences has been widely discussed—especially epistemological issues e.g. concerning astronomy as a prime example of the distinction between instrumentalist and realist understanding of theories. In contrast to these the very methodology of ancient astronomy has received little attention. Following the work of Jaakko Hintikka and Unto Remes Aristarchus’ method of determining the distance of the Sun is sketched and Ptolemy’s solar model is discussed in detail.

Peter SIMONS: New Categories for Formal Ontology .......... 77

What primitive concepts does formal ontology require? Forsaking as too indirect the linguistic way of discerning the categories of being, this paper considers what primitives might be required for representing things in themselves (noumena) and representations of them in a thoroughly crafted large autonomous multi-purpose database. Leaving logical concepts and material ontology aside, the resulting 32 categories in 13 families range from the obvious (identity/difference, existence/non-existence) through the fairly obvious (part/whole, one/many, sequential order) and the surprisingly familiar (illocutionary modes, mass/count, indexical/descriptive) to the
controversial (moment/fundament, transparent/opaque) and the arcane (modes of class delimitation, taxonomic rank, aspects of designators). Any such list is speculative and tentative, but the test of this one will be in its implementation, a new departure for philosophical category theories.

Henri LAUENER: How to Use Proper Names

According to relativized transcendentalism, the meaning of expressions, consisting in their intension and extension, is provided by a set of (syntactical, semantical and pragmatical) rules which prescribe their correct use in a context. We interpret a linguistic system by fixing a domain (of the values of the variables) and by assigning exactly one object to each individual constant and n-tuples of objects to predicates. The theory says that proper names have a purely referential role and that their meaning is therefore limited to the individual they designate. Since all singular terms must refer to exactly one referent there are no so-called empty names. A proper name is defined as a syntactically unstructured term in a language L used in a context C such that the truth condition for a sentence (Φα in L and C consists in the fact that, in accord with the rule which maps items from the set of individual constants into the set of objects, α refers to an object x and x satisfies Φ. It is shown how – by using this theory – puzzling problems concerning Frege’s morning star and evening star, allegedly empty names, changes of name etc. can easily be solved.

Matti SINTONEN: Knowing and Making: Kantian Themes in Hintikka’s Philosophy

Jaakko Hintikka’s Kantianism in philosophy of logic and mathematics is known to go further than Kant’s own, for he argues that mathematical reasoning involves the “language-games” of seeking and finding. Therefore, logic mirrors the structure of this activity. But Hintikka also pushes the Copernican Revolution further to epistemology and philosophy of science. He agrees that “reason has insight only into what which it produces after a plan of its own”, but gives the idea a new logical turn. Kant thought that reason imposes certain architectonic constraints on the possible outcome of inquiry, but Hintikka’s interrogative model of inquiry also emphasizes the activity of and therefore the strategy in, putting questions to Nature.

Paul WEINGARTNER: A Note on Jaakko Hintikka’s “Knowledge and Belief”

Jaakko Hintikka’s concept of belief (aBp) as presented in his Knowledge and Belief is such that in his epistemic logic aKp → aBp