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1. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 19 > Issue: 5
Lukáš Novák Orcid-ID Být v či nebýt v?: Tomistické a scotistické pojetí konstituce kategoriálního vztahu
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The purpose of this article is to compare the Thomist and the Scotist theory of relations. The main feature of the Thomist theory is an effort to minimize the ontological import of the specific essential ratio of relation as such, called esse ad, and to reduce the ontological import of its other aspect, the esse in or inherence understood as a common feature of all accidents, to the esse in of its foundation. The Scotists, on the other hand, have no tendency to deflate the esse ad of a relation. Moreover, according to Malafossa of Barge’s theory (adopted by B. Mastri and B. Belluto), a relation involves two different instances of esse in. The one, called esse in velut in subiecto, is that generic inherence common to all accidents (which, therefore, does not occur in the substantial relations of divine persons). The other, esse in velut in fundamento, belongs specifically to relation as such and reflects the fact that very relation, even a substantial one, is not only a relation towards something, but necessarily also a relation of something towards something else. In spite of the fact, therefore, that the Thomist and Scotist doctrines are usually grouped together as mere subvariants of anti-reductive realism, they must be regarded as substantially different.
2. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 19 > Issue: 6
Filomathés čili o odbornosti: (z řečtiny přeložil Lukáš Novák)
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Poznámka překladatele - Čtenář si nepochybně klade otázku po původu a historickém kontextu nově objeveného sókratovského dialogu, jehož český překlad zde prezentujeme. Tomuto oprávněnému požadavku však bohužel zatím nelze dostát. Autorství a historická povaha textu jsou stále předmětem zkoumání a zásadní nejistota zatím panuje i ohledně zcela základních otázek. Prezentovat zde jakékoliv předběžné dohady by tudíž za této situace mohlo být velmi zavádějící; čekat s prezentací dialogu veřejnosti na vyřešení techto otázek se však zdálo škoda. Proto jsem se rozhodl – po poradě s redakcí časopisu – zdržet se prozatím všech vyjádření k historickým a textově kritickým otázkám spjatým s textem a předložit jej tímto způsobem v pracovním českém překladu bez jakéhokoliv dalšího komentáře. Překlad věnuji svým kolegům. - Lukáš Novák
3. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 19 > Issue: 3
Tomáš Edl Orcid-ID V čem je kouzlo neurčenosti: Příspěvek ke sporu o (i)racionalitu racionálního kompatibilismu
4. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 19 > Issue: 1
Tero Tulenheimo Orcid-ID Three Nordic Neo-Aristotelians and the First Doorkeeper of Logic
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I discuss the views on logic held by three early Nordic neo-Aristotelians — the Swedes Johannes Canuti Lenaeus (1573–1669) and Johannes Rudbeckius (1581–1646), and the Dane Caspar Bartholin (1585–1629). They all studied in Wittenberg (enrolled respectively in 1597, 1601, and 1604) and were exponents of protestant (Lutheran) scholasticism. The works I utilize are Janitores logici bini (1607) and Enchiridion logicum (1608) by Bartholin; Logica (1625) and Controversiae logices (1629) by Rudbeckius; and Logica peripatetica (1633) by Lenaeus. Rudbeckius’s and Lenaeus’s books were published much later than they were prepared. Rudbeckius wrote the first versions of his books in 1606, and the material for Lenaeus’s book had been prepared by 1607. Bartholin calls the treatment of the nature of logic the “first doorkeeper of logic”. To compare the views of the three neo-Aristotelians on this topic, I systematically investigate what they have to say about second notions, the subject of logic, the internal and external goal of logic, and the definition of logic. I also compare their approaches with those of Jacob Martini (teacher of Rudbeckius and Bartholin) and Iacopo Zabarella (an intellectual predecessor of all three).
5. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 19 > Issue: 1
Miroslav Hanke Orcid-ID Hurtado de Mendoza on the "Moral" Modality: Part 2: Hurtado’s 1630s writings
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Puente Hurtado de Mendoza (1578–1641), Iberian Jesuit and author of one of the earliest comprehensive Baroque philosophy courses, entered the debate on the modality “moral” or “morally” in the sense of a qualifier of evidence, certainty, being, and necessity or impossibility in the first half of the seventeenth century. This paper presents his analysis of the different forms (or levels) of evidence and necessity or impossibility in 1630s, where “moral” represents the weakest degree of these properties. First, it covers the notion of moral evidence in the sense of a wise decision that is in accordance with the consensus of either the majority of mankind or of the learned community, as introduced in Disputationes de Deo. Second, it covers the notions of moral necessity and impossibility, introduced in De Deo homine in terms of a strong inclination, and developed in Hurtado’s later theological texts. Third, Hurtado introduced the notion “morally” in his De actibus humanis in frequentist terms.
6. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 19 > Issue: 2
Lukáš Novák Orcid-ID Qui melius scit exponere, exponat!: Scotus's Metaphysical Case for the Formal Distinction
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John Duns Scotus’s famous doctrine of the formal distinction has a twofold justification: a theological one, stemming from the necessity to express coherently the Christian doctrine of the Holy Trinity, and a metaphysical one, according to which formal distinction is a necessary condition of the abstraction of universal (objective) concepts from individuals. This paper is a detailed analysis of this latter argument, presented by Scotus in Questions on Metaphysics VII, q. 19. Scotus apparently demolishes the alternative theory of intentional distinction proposed by Henry of Ghent, but not without first attempting to defend it in as refined and powerful form as possible. Given that Henry’s notion of intentional distinction is substantially the same as later Thomits’s “distinctio rationis ratiocinatae”, this rises questions about the validity about the latter notion, both in the context of Scotism (such as in the thought of Bartolomeo Mastri) and in genereal.
7. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 19 > Issue: 2
Sven K. Knebel Puella est domina sui corporis: Schoolmen's Care for Women’s Rights
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Who owns the girl’s body, the parents, or the daughter herself? In Catholic casuistry, this issue has not only been occasionally touched upon, it has been topical among the commentators on Aquinas (STh II-II, q. 154, a. 6) from the 16th up to the 18th centuries. Nevertheless, modern scholarship ignores this big dispute. The distortion of early modern history in consequence thereof precludes a fair appraisal of the achievements of the Christian schools within the Habsburgian commonwealth. Whereas the Iberian Peninsula was the theatre of the endeavour here described (Domingo de Soto OP, Luis de Molina SJ, Gabriel Vázquez SJ, Juan de Lugo SJ, the Salmantine Carmelites), Jansenist France was forward in defeating it. The quarrel about this issue gains an additional interest by the observation that it represents the rare case where the schoolmen themselves had the keen feeling that the stand they took represented a divide between two ages, medieval and modern, viz. Pre-Tridentine and Post-Tridentine. The main purpose of the present paper, then, is to render a necessary piece of apologetics. Its focus is on the deplorable situation in which we presently are due to the rotten feminist convictions about how things went.
8. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
Tomáš Nejeschleba Lutheránský aristotelismus – Philipp Melanchthon: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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This article summarises the basic features of Melanchthon’s approach to Aristotle’s philosophy in the areas of logic, ethics and natural philosophy. Although Melanchthon builds upon the humanistic ideal of purifying classical heritage, his Aristotelianism should not be viewed as ‘pure’. His conception of natural knowledge (notitiae naturales) could be regarded as a significant non-Aristotelian element of his philosophy. The view consequently penetrates his logic, ethics as well as epistemology. Primarily, however, the reason behind his reception of Aristotle is a defence of Luther’s views: the aims of logic and rhetoric lie in theexegesis of the Bible within the context of the principle of ‘ Sola Scriptura’; he rejects the medieval concept of felicity and puts antropology into the dialectics of Law and Gospel; the aim of natural philosophy is the exposition of the existence of God’s Providence. Melanchthon’s reception of Aristotle is thus influenced by the theology of the Reformation to such an extent, that we might refer to it as Lutheran Aristotelianism.
9. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
Franz Schupp Odpovědí na Kanta všechno začalo Duchovně-dějinné místo teologie Karla Rahnera: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
10. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
Stanislav Sousedík Tomistické Pojetí Predikace (1) K příspěvku Lukáše Nováka: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
11. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
Stanislav Sousedík (3) Ke stati Petra Dvořáka: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
12. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
Pavel Materna Ontologie Vztahů (1) Poznámka k Sousedíkově kritice soudobé ontologie zztahů: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
13. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
Pavel Materna (3) Závěrečné vyjádření: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
14. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
Petr Dvořák Ke Gahérově analýze Tomášovy „druhé cesty“: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
15. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
M. J. Loux Nutné a možné (dokončení): A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
16. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
Stanislav Sousedík (2) Vyjádření k Maternově poznámce: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
17. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
Jan Palkoska „Corpus non est Substantia, sed modus tantum Entis“ leibniz o fenomenalitě látkového světa: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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The aim of this article is to present and analyze the argumentative structures which are decisive for Leibniz’s position regarding the issue of the ontological status of material things (or bodies) and matter. I reconstruct and thoroughly analyze (i) two different argumentative strategies of Leibniz’s – viz. an “epistemic” and a “realistic” one – for his general thesis that nothing material (and a fortiori no body) has rigore metaphysico the status of a substance, as well as (ii) the corresponding suggestions of his as to how the material world is to be construed out of substances and their modes. Throughout, I lay special emphasis onpinpointing the real key elements of Leibniz’s arguments and on articulating them in such terms that would allow for their direct confrontation with other paradigmatic positions regarding the issue in Leibniz’s times.
18. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
Tomáš Marvan Putnamovy realismy a pojmová relativita: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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The aim of the paper is twofold. First, it expounds the thesis of ‘conceptual relativity’ propounded in a series of writings of the well-known philosopher Hilary Putnam and indicates the alleged manner in which the thesis, according to Putnam, undermines the foundations of metaphysical realism (understood in a peculiar way spelled out in the paper). Second, a critical examination of Putnam’s anti-metaphysical-realist argument is offered. It is argued that Putnam offers examples only of a trivial, so-called indexical relativity, and that his strategy leaves the foundations of metaphysical realism intact.
19. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
Michal Chabada Abstraktívne poznanie podl'a Jána Dunsa Scota základné prístupy: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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According to Scotus, abstractive cognition is independent of the actual existence of its object, and must therefore rely on the intentional species. Scotus presents several arguments in favour of the necessity of the species intelligibilis for abstractive universal cognition. After discussing opinions that ascribed exclusive causality in the process of cognition either to the intellect or to the object, Scotus arrives at the conclusion that both the object and the intellect act as essentially ordered partial causes of cognition: the intelligible species is caused both by the phantasm and the active intellect. Thus results a new order of representation, in which the common nature is represented as universal. The process of cognition is described by Scotus as a dynamic succession of active and passive phases. On the basis of these and other characteristic features, Scotus’s epistemology can be described as departing from the Aristotelian tradition, and as the locus of the first appearance of the motives of modern epistemology.
20. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
Petr Dvořák Some Thomists on Analogy: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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The article is a presentation of the Thomist response to Scotist criticism of analogy; namely, the defense of St. Thomas’ teaching in some leading renaissance and post-renaissance Thomists: Thomas de Vio, better known as Cajetan, Sylvester of Ferrara, John Versor and John of Saint Thomas. The author first explains the general core of the semantic doctrine of analogy and outlines the basic terminology. Then he exposes the way Cajetan and other Thomists knit Aquinas’ dispersed remarks on analogy into a systematic doctrinal whole.