Heidegger diff erentiates the aspect of referencing from the aspect of substituting in the demonstrative pronoun “this.” This is a hermeneutic of “This” from the phenomenology of “Da.” On the contrary, Hegel determines “Da” from the logic of “This.” Through a reading of Hegel’s analysis of sense certainty in Phenomenology of Spirit, this paper tries to lay bare the free time-space of “Da,” in which the Hegelian dialectic movement of “this” or “meaning [Meinen]” could then be possible to take place. The pivot of this reading is to bring the Hegelian speculation of “meaning” or consciousness back onto the ground of lifeworld.

It is no accident that the anti-naturalistic objections to an inference from is to ought emerged in the modern era. They presuppose an extremely lean ontology. They presuppose that nothing is necessarily what it is, and accordingly that everything that occurs in sequence is similarly contingent in this sequence. In particular, they presuppose that there is no natural teleology. The objections to the foundation of the ethically good in happiness, pleasure, utility, conduciveness to life, harmony with nature, and the like are similarly guided by predilection for simple concepts. An autonomous value independent of natural desires is presupposed.

Although photography is believed to be a copy of reality and an icon for memory, it has attracted scrutiny from philosophers concerned with its semiotic structure and its phenomenological impact. Husserl, Heidegger, and Sartre have made reference to the photographic image without any detailed phenomenological analysis. With the help of Roland Barthes’s refl ection on photography, this essay attempts to give a phenomenological description of photographs as seen and on seeing in photographing.

Husserl recognized the question of the possibility of object in general as the common de jure problem of knowledge for Kant and himself. By insisting that object must be “received” (Kant) or “self-given” (Husserl), both philosophers turned to intuition as the focal point of their inquiry. However, concerning the actual function and range of intuition, their views grew apart. Kant restricted intuition to sensibility, thus erecting the barrier between phenomenal and noumenal world. Husserl, on the other hand, held essence inseparable from fact. Accordingly, intuition crosses over from a merely receptive function of fact to “ideate” or grasp the essence of fact and factual world. Husserl’s intuition is not only “intellectualized,” but also expanded in such a way as to make the division between concept and sensibility—even theory and practice questionable.

The correspondence between A. Schutz and E. Voegelin finally came into print in 2004 through the editorial efforts of Gerhard Wagner and Gilbert Weiss. Taking the comments made by the political philosopher on Schutz’s theory of multiple realities as a clue, this contribution will cast light on the political character of our daily lives possibly delineated by a phenomenological approach. We will especially turn to Schutz’s concept of familiarity which provides us a scope to grasp the political beyond the “animal” description of the life-world.

While “HIROSHIMA,” as the symbol of “Japan, the first and only atom-bombed nation in the world,” is a centripetal force that mobilizes people to nationalism, it is at the same time a centrifugal force that scatters people. HIROSHIMA exists as the arena where those centripetal and centrifugal forces encounter one another. I sauntered through HIROSHIMA as that arena on August 6, atomic bomb memorial day.

The sense of solitude is the special feeling that people have on occasion. How is the sense of solitude created? For Luhmann, the operation of conscious systems will oscillate between consciousness and phenomenon, that is, between self-reference and hetero-reference. Husserl considers that philosophy is the privacy of the meditator. This means that the meditator has to live a solitary life, because everything in question can be sought only in his mind.

It a commonplace that the English language has over the past century become the dominant lingua franca of our increasingly globalized world. In face of this dominance of English, peoples of the world can hardly aff ord to underestimate the importance of English, in whatever walk of life, if they do not want to be marginalized by the global community. Yet, while the dominance of English today is unavoidable, the world is now facing an additional challenge—the over-dominance of English. By the “over-dominance” of English, I mean the danger of individual languages being self-estranged through an overemphasis on English at the cost of the mother tongue. While dominance is an externally imposed challenge, over-dominance is largely a self-infl icted endangerment of their mother tongue by peoples of various linguistic communities. In addition to widely discussed issues of language policies and language planning, the paper makes a detour via some German experience while introducing the notion of “language care,” which was proposed by Leibniz at a time when the prospect of German as an academic language was heavily overcast by the dominance of French. In the main section, this paper refl ects on the various background factors and consequences of this socio-linguistic phenomenon of the overdominance of English and proposes some “glocal” responses for the consideration of the global educational community.

In this essay I will investigate justice, which is one of the five fundamental words in the metaphysics of Nietzsche, as Heidegger points out in Nietzsche II. Compared with the other four words, this word ‘justice’ is the one most worthy of note. Through the confrontation with Schopenhauer Nietzsche sees justice as sincerity for oneself based on superfl uous power-feelings. In this case, justice means truly knowing. Heidegger sees the justice as truth in the meaning of correctness, but this truth forgets the original sense, i.e. ‘unconcealment,’ and accordingly insists that Nietzsche is the last metaphysician.

The notion of “dance technique” is so widely used among dancers that it cannot be ignored. A few different meanings of technique are encountered in a dance practice: (1) techniques of the preparation for a dance, (2) dances might be considered as techniques for some other purposes, and, obviously, (3) the dance is distinguished from other dances by implementation of the particular technique. In this essay, the question concerning dance technique is raised following Heidegger’s reflections. Dance technique is the mode of revealing, and cannot be renounced in dance as the profanation of the sacred pureness of it. But the dance vanishes, when there is a non-conscious marionette left, instead of Consciousness of Dance as the Medium between the Music and the Body.

In this paper I attempt to connect Heidegger’s analysis of human existence in Sein und Zeit with important themes of Russian concerning the concept of personality and inherited from Byzantium Theology and Greek Patristic

In this article I will examine Stein’s discussions on alterity. In her early writings Stein develops the theme of alterity mainly in relation to the concept of empathy (Einfuhlung) and thus in relation to the other person. In her later writings the theme of alterity mainly relates to God. I will discuss the continuity and discontinuity between these two areas. I will claim that alterity in her early writings can be understood as invisibility within visibility whereas alterity in her later writings can be understood as visibility within invisibility.

The problem of truth in existential phenomenology is analyzed. The author maintains that the concept of truth is inseparable from the concept of reality. In the phenomenology of Lebenswelt (Husserl) and Dasein (Heidegger) reality is the human whole, which changes while an existential project is created. The phenomena are real as much as they take part in our being towards death. The author calls this creation of the existential whole noesis, which embraces both the harmony of human view and disharmony in the light of new project.

This research sets for itself to show up Husserl’s early theory of action in its two forms—as scientific ethics and theory of values and as phenomenology of will. The author focuses his attention on two points: a problem of parallelism between logic and ethic and the question of how independent from the conceptual and methodical presuppositions of transcendental phenomenology is Husserl in his comprehension of ethical problems and in the elaboration of the idea of practical reason—or, on the contrary, how dependent he is on these presuppositions.

The aim of this essay is mainly critical: it intends to demonstrate that despite all the promises to give account of a “deconstructive subjectivity,” Derrida failed to do so. This charge relies on the thesis that Derrida proved unable to rethink critically the concept of narcissism which he himself saw as crucial for the future philosophical understanding of subjectivity. Yet, what Derrida calls the aporia of narcissism is, in fact, not so much the Freudian version of this concept but a deconstructive version of the old Hegelian dilemma of the beautiful soul—and, theoretically speaking, a rather “defunct” one, for it explicitly prohibits any dialectical procedure that could lead us out of this aporetic predicament.

Human being considered as enigmatic relation to itself and the world centers in carnality. The carnal body as constituent of life is a challenge for our categories of human life, since its own self-awareness backs away from conceptualization. Along with carnality as a theme speaking in Merleau-Ponty’s and Levinas’ implicit dialogue, this article considers a “shared” carnal humanity given in sensual proximity, language and the diachronic style of alterity. Thus, carnality might be a threshold between ontology and ethics, where traces of Levinas’ and Merleau-Ponty’s thoughts might intertwine in structures of being together in a world.

Th e eradication of the subject in serialism and aleatory composition leads to the elimination of music itself. Proposing a way out this “empty music”, Adorno pleads for a restoration of the subjective elements at work in composition. But since his notion of subjectivity is ambiguous (sometimes it is universal, sometimes he considers it from an objectivist standpoint, that is, as psychological, arbitrary and opposed to objects) his argument fails. Against his objectivist notion of subjectivity, this article proposes a phenomenological reading of the antinomies contemporary music is confronted with, by replacing Adorno’s arbitrary subject with the universal a priori of transcendental subjectivity.

Th is paper examines Franz Kafka’s perception of Being as it is portrayed in his novel Der Prozess against the background of Heidegger’s fundamental ontology, particularly as outlined in Sein und Zeit. More specifically, it examines the notion of guilt as it focuses on the similarities and differences between Heidegger and Kafka’s project. Whereas Heidegger holds out the possibility of a non-alienated being-in-the-world, Kafka seems to suggest that this is not obtainable; that the ontological difference between beings and Being, the gap that exits between our everyday empirical knowledge of the world and a primordial truth, is beyond our reach.