In the acquisition of verbal knowledge, the Nyāya school outlines four conditions of a linguistic utterance that must be met: āsatti (temporal proximity), ākāṅkṣā (syntactic expectancy), tātparya (speaker intention), and yogyatā (semantic fitness). I will follow the traditional Nyāya view that is it one of the four necessary conditions that enable a hearer to gain verbal knowledge. The reasoning behind retaining tātparya as a condition (or cause) of verbal knowledge, is that it provides a resource with which to clarify ambiguity when contextual factors cannot. It also provides a context for a hearer so that the primary (abhidhā) or secondary (lakṣaṇā) meaning of the word, or sentence is understood. In this sense, tātparya imparts the meaning of a work. Examples such as “Bring saindhava” or “Hari” make the case for the importance of tātparya in that the meanings of these terms are ambiguous unless the context is provided or the speaker intends to mean one referent rather than another. In this paper, I present the case that tātparya is the most important component of an accurate paraphrase, and it must be retained in order to preserve the original intention of the work. In other words, tātparya should be the primary constraint of an acceptable paraphrase. As a side comment to my aim, I discuss the notion of why paraphrase only needs to be sufficiently similar to the original work.

As against the Buddhist view that everything is momentary Udayana argues that recognitive perception, such as that this is the same pot I saw before, provides evidence for permanence. Such recognitive perception is common experience and cannot be set aside without compelling evidence. The Buddhist objects that such experience is not reliable; even a burning flame is recognized to be the same, but it is clear from fuel consumption that it is not. Udayana agrees that in the case of a burning flame it cannot be the same flame because then it would have to have opposed features (such as being fueled by more oil before and less oil now). But there is no compelling evidence for the claim that the pot or I would have to have opposed features if enduring. The Buddhist claim that anything enduring must have opposed features such as being both capable and incapable of being productive is groundless. Such features are not opposed and may be explained as being due to availability or non-availability of auxiliary causal conditions and so on.

Rene Descartes (1596-1650) and Patanjali, author of the Yoga Sutras (c. 400 CE?), are both famous for articulating paradigmatic expressions of substance dualism, the view that the true self or mind is a fundamentally different kind of substance than the physical body. Typically, each is cited as the case study of dualism, for the Western tradition and for the Indian tradition respectively. This paper examines Desartes'and Pataiijali's conceptions of the self, the methods for how to discover it, and what its purpose and limitations are. It explores to what extent these two conceptions of the self are reconcilable and in the process of doing so, tries to illustrate the way in which such comparative philosophy, across traditions, helps to illuminate each tradition.

The Vedas, the Hindu scripture, make it clear that God is one, not only everywhere but also everything, has no name or form and prescribes a monistic and pantheistic perspective. Still devotees of different preferences and inclinations have the option to choose different names and forms for worshipping God. Thus, Hindus worship a very large number of gods and goddesses as aspects or powers of God promoting a distinctive monotheism. The most prominent goddesses are Durga and Kali both of whom are demon-slayers with unlimited power, Parvati a great wife and mother who is highly learned, Lakshmi, the goddess of wealth and Sarasvati, the goddess of learning. The most prominent gods are Brahma, the creator who supervises the beginning of each creative cycle, Vishnu, the god of preservation and Siva, the god of destruction. Vishnu has the largest following followed by Siva, a close second and Brahma, a distant third in following. Vishnu has many incarnations who come to the world to restore righteousness and order when there is great trouble. The two most popular reincarnations are Rama and Krishna, the lead characters respectively of the great epics Ramayana and Mahabharata.

Religion consists of a set of beliefs about supernatural; heaven, hell, afterlife, understanding acts of sin and piety, and belief in the existence of God through which people relate to the non-nnaterialistic world. Economics, on the other hand, deals with ways and means through which people make money and spend it to satisfy their materialistic needs. Evidences suggest that the former influences the latter and economic performance can be related to religiosity. In this situation can religion be used as an instrument for bettering economic and social performance in India? If so, are there any specific observed modalities for this phenomenon? The paper reviews and analyses selected studies and research from the West and one study from India which can help answer the million dollar question stated above. The paper concludes that a systematic study on assessing the role of religion in shaping economic performance in India is needed before a debate on the issue can start. A future research agenda is suggested in this regard.

The astronomical knowledge codified in the Vedaanga Jyotisha is entirely traceable to Vedic sources. Furthermore, in view of the works of Seidenberg on the ritual origin of geometry, and of Kak on the astronomical code in the Vedas, it is argued that the Mesopotamian origin for Vedaanga Jyotisha proposed by Pingree is not justified.

Our aim is to give an idea of the Nyaya and Advaita theories of perception and to note metaphysical or ontological elements in them. We shall consider whether it is possible to sieve out features of the theories without such elements with a view to formulating a commonly acceptable platform for dialogue regarding a theory of perception. In recent times scholars have attempted to pick up common elements in the two theories. In our account we may, however, be allowed to use Sanskrit philosophical words in original. This is perhaps useful for philosophizing freely in a comparative setting.

The aim of this article is to provide an epistemological account of the concept of a point of view. To clear the ground for such an account, the following questions must be addressed: What are points of view? What roles or functions do points of view play in human thinking and information acquisition? Why do points of view have such roles or functions? The distinction between the different components of points of view helps us to identify, diagnose, and understand ways in which various points of view direct and define human thinking. The second part of the article tests the credibility and functionality of the concept of a point of view developed in the first part. The testing takes place by applying the concept in question to the analysis of a classical Indian text, The Law Code of Manu.

Largely unnoticed in textbook accounts of classical Indian philosophic schools is Nyāya's advocacy of yoga and its alliance with teachings of the Yoga-sūtra. Yoga and Nyāya differ sharply in how nature is viewed, its components and causal laws. But on the side of subjectivity, purusa and atman, there is more convergence than difference. The two world views have distinct theories of action, cognition, and the body, but concerning the subject or self himself or herself, including God or the īsvara (and argumentation so directed), the conceptions advanced are surprisingly similar. Moreover, the traditions converge in the commen taries of the tenth-century philosopher Vācaspati Miśra who often shows influence from one or the other direction in his Yoga-sūtra and Nyāya-sūtra commentaries. The key bridge ideas are expressed in the Nyāya-sūtra literature under a substantial and remarkable stretch of sutras in the fourth chapter devoted to yoga practice and liberating self knowledge: NyS 4.2.38-51. Among other jewels, here we find an implicit assimilation of philosophic debate as a yoga practice.

This article deals with the pros and cons of the Mādhva-Vaiṣṇava tradition of Hinduism. On the pros sideMadhva’s interpretations of the 3rd question of Naciketas to Yama in the KaṭhaUpaniṣad as well as his interpretation of the statement tattvamasi as atattvamasi in the ChāndogyaUpaniṣad are unique. On the cons side flaws are pointed out on the much marveled concept of viśeṣa the doctrine of the gradation of the gods and the Viṣṇusahasranāma.

This paper will analyze a specific stylistic issue in the Śrautasūtras, namely, the mark of quotation vijñāyate. In literature, a quotation is often introduced with a specific mark that shifts the attention of the reader to a specific work or paper from which the quotation originates. In the ancient manuals about ritual in Vedic culture we find a verb - vijñāyate. The ancient composers seem to use this verb to stress a connection to another text, i.e. to the maxima auctorictas in the Vedic world, the śruti. Our contention is that the link between the verb and what is being introduced by the verb is not always clear. Our survey covers a restricted selection of data; however, we believe that it may provide some interesting insights into one of the most important elements which served to build the concept of the Vedic and Hindū tradition.

This paper brings together two bodies of scholarly literature.It is a study in the nature and development of moral thought, but it is also an inquiry into the interpretation of the Mahabharata. The two subjects come together when we ask the question, “Do works like the Mahabharata contain within them the history of our ethical coming to awareness?”A philosophical archeology of the Mahabharata indicates that it was originally a war story or group of war stories that evolved over time into a moral and religious text. The Mahabharata is an excellent candidate for this kind of moral archaeology since it is a text that has developed over a long period of time, a long enough period of time to see the reenactment of different stages of ethical awareness.

In the Buddhist view there can be no affirmation without negation and positive universals that in the Nyaya view are independent and eternal common characters shared by all members of a natural class should be replaced by difference from others that is a negative entity and a non-entity, e.g. what is meant by a cow is not that it is possessed of cow-ness but that it is not a non-cow. Udayana points out that cognition of a negative entity presupposes cognition of what is negated, the negatum. Thus, cognition of cow if the same as not-not cow presupposes cognition of not-cow, but cognition of not-cow presupposes cognition of cow; hence the Buddhist view is open to the charge of mutual dependence. This difficulty does not arise in the Nyaya view. Even if there is no affirmation without negation, negation is not necessarily the content of affirmation. So far as common experience goes, cognition of positive entities does not always require cognition of negative entities, e.g. a cow may be recognized as a cow and possessed of cow-ness without reference to non-cows.

This article explains precisely in what sense the Nyaya philosophers promote a correspondence theory regarding the nature of truth. It also explains how truth may be inferred from successful effort and argues that successful effort can be produced only by true awareness. While successful effort is the major test of truth, other tests of truth in the Nyaya view should be recognized as and when appropriate. Thus, that if the pervaded belongs to something, the pervader too belongs to that thing may be known to be true by the mind alone without reference to the inferential test of truth. Truth is in most cases extrinsic in the sense that truth of an awareness is determined with reference to another awareness. This does not lead to a vicious infinite regress; in some cases, as in the pervaded-pevader case or in the case there is cognition where there can be no cognition that there is cognition unless there is cognition, truth is intrinsic and may be determined without reference to another awareness.