81.
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The Harvard Review of Philosophy:
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21
Robert Merrihew Adams
No-Fault Responsibility for Outcomes
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82.
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The Harvard Review of Philosophy:
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21
Alexander George
Quine’s Indeterminacy: A Paradox Resolved and a Problem Revealed
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83.
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The Harvard Review of Philosophy:
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21
Ayoob Shahmoradi
A Critique of Non-Descriptive Cognitivism
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84.
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The Harvard Review of Philosophy:
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21
Cora Diamond
Between Realism and Rortianism:
Conant, Rorty and the Disappearance of Options
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85.
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The Harvard Review of Philosophy:
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21
Lilian Alweiss
Kant’s Not so “Logical” Subject
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86.
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The Harvard Review of Philosophy:
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21
Peter Baumann
Defending the One Percent?:
Poor Arguments for the Rich?
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rights & permissions
This paper discusses the philosophical view proposed by Gregory Mankiw in his recent article “Defending the One Percent” (JEP 27-3, 2013): the just deserts view in application to income distribution. Mankiw’s view suffers from three unsolved problems: the Criteria Problem, the Measurement Problem, and the Problem of the Missing Desert Function. The overall conclusion is that Mankiw’s normative “Defense of the One Percent” fails quite drastically.
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87.
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21
Simon Critchley
The Tragedy of Misrecognition:
The Desire for a Catholic Shakespeare and Hegel’s Hamlet
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88.
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The Harvard Review of Philosophy:
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21
Oliver Cronlinde Wenner
Editor's Note
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89.
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The Harvard Review of Philosophy:
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22
About The Harvard Review of Philosophy
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90.
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The Harvard Review of Philosophy:
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Garrett Lam
Note from the Editor
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91.
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The Harvard Review of Philosophy:
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22
Terry Horgan
Newcomb's Problem Revisited
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92.
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The Harvard Review of Philosophy:
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22
Peter van Inwagen
Some Thoughts on An Essay on Free Will
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In this essay I record some thoughts about my book An Essay on Free Will, its reception, and the way analytical philosophers have thought about the free-will problem since its publication 30 years ago. I do not summarize the book, nor am I concerned to defend its arguments—or at least not in any very systematic way. Instead I present some thoughts on three topics: (1) The question ‘If I were to revise the book today, if I were to produce a second edition, what changes would I make?’; (2) Aspects of the book I should like to call to the attention of readers (aspects that, in my view, readers of An Essay on Free Will, have been insufficiently attentive to); and (3) The course of the discussion of the problem of free will subsequent to the publication of the book.
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93.
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Eric Mandelbaum,
Jake Quilty-Dunn
Believing without Reason, or: Why Liberals Shouldn’t Watch Fox News
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94.
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The Harvard Review of Philosophy:
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22
Todd May
From Subjectified to Subject: Power and the Possibility of a Democratic Politics
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95.
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The Harvard Review of Philosophy:
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Andrew Koppelman
Does Respect Require Antiperfectionism?:
Gaus on Liberal Neutrality
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96.
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The Harvard Review of Philosophy:
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22
Jody Azzouni
Conceiving and Imagining: Some Examples
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97.
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The Harvard Review of Philosophy:
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22
Agnes Callard
The Weaker Reason
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98.
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The Harvard Review of Philosophy:
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24
Taimur Aziz,
Seyyed Hossein Nasr
On Tradition, Metaphysics, and Modernity
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99.
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The Harvard Review of Philosophy:
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24
Martin Bernstein
Introduction
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100.
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The Harvard Review of Philosophy:
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Juliet Floyd
Positive Pragmatic Pluralism
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