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Mika Suojanen
The “Philosophy-Ladenness” of Perception:
A Philosophical Language and Perception in Husserl and Sartre
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The basic entity in phenomenology is the phenomenon. Knowing the phenomenon is another issue. The phenomenon has been described as the real natural object or the appearance directly perceived in phenomenology and analytic philosophy of perception. Within both traditions, philosophers such as Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Russell and Wittgenstein have considered that perceptual experience demonstrates what a phenomenon is on the line between the mind and the external world. Therefore, conceptualizing the phenomenon is based on the perceptual evidence. However, if the belief that perception is “theory-laden” is true, then perception can also be “philosophy-laden”. These philosophers have not noticed whether perceptual knowledge is independent of philosophies. If perceptual knowledge is not independent of philosophies, a philosopher’s background language can influence what he or she claims to know about the phenomenon. For Husserl, experience is direct evidence of what exists. The textual evidence shows that Sartre’s denial of the distinction between appearance and reality lies behind his claim to know the phenomenon, however. By examining Husserl's Ideas and Sartre's Being and Nothingness I conclude that these philosophers’ philosophical languages influence their experience of the phenomenon and perceptual knowledge. Philosophical traditions affect the thoughts of perception.
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82.
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Dionysios A. Anapolitanos
The Humean Notion of Sympathy
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83.
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Justin Mc Brayer
A Value Argument Against Incompatibilism
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Incompatibilism is the view that free will is incompatible with determinism. Combatibilism is the view that free will is compatible with determinism. The debate between the two positions is seemingly intractable. However, just as elsewhere in philosophy, leveraging assumptions about value can offer progress. A promising value argument against incompatibilism is as follows: given facts about both human psychology and the value of free will, incompatibilism is false. This is because we would want our choices to be free but we also would not want indeterminism anywhere in the process leading up to our choices. Hence freedom can’t require a lack of determinism.
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84.
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Alexiadou Anastasia-Sofia
Locke on Language, Meaning and Communication
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85.
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Mohammad Alwahaib
Al-Ghazali and Descartes from Doubt to Certainty:
A Phenomenological Approach
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This paper clarifies the philosophical connection between Al-Ghazali and Descartes, with the goal to articulate similarities and differences in their famous journeys from doubt to certainty. As such, its primary focus is on the chain of their reasoning, starting from their conceptions of truth and doubt arguments, until their arrival at truth. Both philosophers agreed on the ambiguous character of ordinary everyday knowledge and decided to set forth in undermining its foundations. As such, most scholars tend to agree that the doubt arguments used by Descartes and Al-Ghazali are similar, but identify their departures from doubt as radically different: while Descartes found his way out of doubt through the cogito and so reason, Al-Ghazali ended his philosophical journey as a Sufi in a sheer state of passivity, waiting for the truth to be revealed to him by God. This paper proves this is not the case. Under close textual scrutiny and through the use of basic Husserlian-phenomenological concepts, I show that Al-Ghazali's position was misunderstood, thus disclosing his true philosophic nature.
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86.
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Grigoriou Christos
The Concept of Catharsis in Aristotle's Poetics
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87.
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Introduction
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88.
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Emese Mogyoródi
Xenophanes and the Rise of Theology in Early Greek Thought
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89.
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Joel E. Mann
All Things Never Change:
Circular Time in Empedocles
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90.
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Michael Sevel
Is God in the Clouds?:
A Note on Xenophanes
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91.
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Barbara M. Sattler
The Notion of Continuity in Parmenides
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92.
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Iakovos Vasiliou
Conditional Irony in the Socratic Dialogues
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93.
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Mehmet M. Erginel
Non-Substantial Individuals in Aristotle's Categories
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94.
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Corien Bary
Counting Events
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95.
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John Bowin
Aristotle’s Physics 5.1, 225a1-b5
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This contribution offers an interpretation of the last half of chapter 1 of book 5 of Aristotle’s Physics in the form of a commentary. Among other things, it attempts an explanation of why Aristotle calls the termini of changes ‘something underlying’ (ὑποκείμενον) and ‘something not underlying’ (μὴ ὑποκείμενον). It also provides an analysis of Aristotle’s argument for the claim that what is not simpliciter does not change in the light of this interpretation.
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96.
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Alexander P. D. Mourelatos, Select Publications—Thematic Grouping
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97.
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Stephen Leighton
Aristotle on Fear’s Expression
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98.
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Georgia Mouroutsou
Plato in Search of a Language Without Particulars:
Timaeus 49a6-50a4 in a New Light
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The paper starts by setting the stage for two perennial pairs of problems about the receptacle: “metaphysics / physics” and “matter / space” (I.). Then it provides a close reading of 49a6-50a4 that reinforces the reconstructionist interpretation, but also deviates from Cherniss in some respect. When applying the proposals Plato makes in 49a6-50a4, it reveals a Plato in search of a feature-placing language or language without particulars (LWOP) (II. and III.): though not formulating it himself, Plato provides all necessary material for doing so. Having argued ex negativo and against the exclusivity-thesis regarding the first debate about the receptacle (in III.), the paper offers a new piece of evidence for the space interpretation of the receptacle—though not breaking new ground—because my LWOP thesis presupposes the interpretation of the receptacle as space and argues against the material-substrate reading (IV). Throughout the paper, I have consciously operated with a less Aristotle-centered framework than those most often applied, a procedure that does justice to Plato’s different ontology and semantics of the sensible phenomena. My Plato does not pave the way to Aristotle in this passage because he does not wish to do so.
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Alexander P. D. Mourelatos
Discourse as Talk and Discourse as Logos:
The Work of Philosophy
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Spiros A. Moschonas
Linguistics without Metaphysics:
On the Classification of ‘Verb Types’
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Based on A. P. D. Mourelatos's "Events, Processes, and States" (1978), an overview of the literature on „verb types‟ (or Aktionsarten) is provided in this paper;the basic conceptual, logical and grammatical tests for the identification of different verb types are also briefly reviewed.Such tests, it is argued, reveal variations in a verb’s grammatical and/or lexical aspect; accordingly, verb types should be viewed as regularities governing aspectual variation within and across sentences. Verb types are not associated with particular verbs, predicates or sentences; rather, a verb type (or a verb‟s Aktionsart) is the sum of ways in which a verb‟s aspect may vary. In other words, verb types describe the possibilities for a verb to appear in one or another of a series of interrelated constructions. Verb types are verbal possibilities or, to use B. L. Whorf‟s apt term, fashions of speaking which cut across typical grammatical classifications. It is further argued that verb types, as “mere” fashions of speaking, cannot provide a firm basis for any metaphysics of „situation types‟; i.e., the metaphysics of verb types cannot be founded on their linguistics.
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