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81. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 9
Ewing Y. Chinn A Journey Around the Cartesian Circle
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According to many critics, Descartes argued in a circle when he presumed to base the certainty (and thus knowledge) of propositions that fulfill his epistemic criterion of being “clearly and distinctly perceived” on the demonstration that God exists and is not a deceiver. But his critics say, that demonstration, as he presented it, presupposed the validity of the same epistemic criterion. I critically examine two major strategies to dispel the appearance of circularity, two ways of interpreting Descartes’ argument.My approach shares with the second strategy the contention that Descartes did adopt the principle that “whatever is clearly and distinctly perceived to be true is true,” prior to his consideration of the God question. Moreover, his demonstration of God’s existence and veracity made use of the principle. But my claim is that the knowledge of God’s existence and veracity is not used to validate the principle of clear and distinct perception (that would be unnecessary). It is used rather to defeat the sceptic’s argument that we cannot have any knowledge of the external, physical world. I proceed to present and explain Descartes’ argument centered around the thesis, “I cannot be certain that (r) any of my representational ideas of the external world are veridical, unless I am certain that (q), God exists and is not a deceiver.” That is, I prove why, for Descartes, (q) is necessary for (r). My discussion exposes some new facets to the principle of clear and distinct perception and reveals the fact that some familiar Cartesian distinctions that were not thought to be relevant to the problem of the Cartesian Circle are crucial to the solution of that problem.
82. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 9
Martin Curd Some Inconclusive Reasons Against ‘Conclusive Reasons’
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In, “Some Conclusive Reasons Against ‘Conclusive Reasons’”, Pappas and Swain have criticized Dretske’s theory that conclusive reasons are necessary for knowledge. In their view this condition is too strong. They attempt to show this by means of two purported counterexamples: the cup-hologram case and the generator case. This paper defends Dretske’s analysis against these challenges.
83. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 9 > Issue: Supplement
Jasper Hopkins A Detailed Critique of Pauline Watts' Nicolaus Cusanus: A Fifteenth Century Vision of Man
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This critique presents important textual, epistemological, and metaphysical considerations that serve to correct Pauline Watts' account of Nicholas of Cusa's "fifteenth-century vision of man."
84. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 9 > Issue: Supplement
John T. Bookman Machiavelli Scholarship: An Essay and a List of Works in English
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This bibliographic essay identifies and critically analyzes works in English on Machiavelli's political philosophy. Controversy in Machiavelli scholarship, and therefore this essay, is informed by three main questions: 1) how can the authoritarianism of The Prince be squared, if at all, with the republicanism of The Discourses? 2) does Machiavelli approach the study of politics as a scientist or a moralist? and 3) what place is to be accorded Machiavelli in the tradition of political philosophy? To the bibliographic essay is appended a select bibliography which includes 183 entries in the following six categories: "bibliography," "life and times," "works - the primary sources," "collections of secondary works," "books" and "articles".
85. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 9 > Issue: Supplement
George R. Lucas, Jr. Helsinki's Child: A Select Annotated Bibliography of Human Rights Publications Since 1975
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This bibliography attempts to assess the unprecedented outpouring of literature devoted to the question of human rights which has occurred since 1975 largely, though not exclusively, as a result of international deliberations on the implementation of the Helsinki Final Act.The bibliography encompasses published contributions to this topic since 1975 in the humanities and social sciences; specifically the fields of philosophy, political science, history, comparative literature, religious studies and theology, economics, and sociology and law. The bibliography is limited, however, to essays which focus primarily upon a broad analysis of the international human rights question. Essays discussing human rights or civil rights dilemmas in individual nation-states are included only insofar as such discussions are intended as case-studies of the broader international issues of human rights. In addition, essays which comprise primarily editorials or statements of personal opinion have been omitted in an attempt to keep this instrument within manageable bounds.
86. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 9 > Issue: Supplement
Ethel M. Kersey The Noema, Husserlian and Beyond: An Annotated Bibliography of English Language Sources
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This bibliography cites and annotates 104 English language references on the Husserlian noema. Explication i s informative rather than critical with special emphasis being placed on the controversial concept/percept status of the noema. Scholars interested In this "Gurwitschlan-Follesdallan" debate may find their research facilitated by this bibliography.
87. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 9 > Issue: Supplement
Dean M. Martin An Index for Wittgenstein's On Certainty
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This work provides a thorough index of terms found in Ludwig Wittgenstein's On Certainty. The index includes not only every philosophical term found in Wittgenstein's text, but also many non-philosophical terms when they are used in highly charged philosophical contexts. In all, there are some 575 main entries. Moreover, a concerted effort is made to indicate in what connections a given term is used by adding subordinate qualifying phrases to the main entries. For crucial terms (e.g., 'know,' 'proposition,' 'doubt,' etc.) the sub-entries indicating context are quite extensive.
88. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 9 > Issue: Supplement
Fernando R. Molina Notes by C. I. Lewis on Royce's Theory of Categories
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C.I. Lewis wrote in his autobiography that the "general tenor" of his thought --conceptual pragmatism—may have "taken shape" under the influence of Josiah Royce. This study contains excerpts from lecture notes by Lewis taken in a course on logic taught by Royce. Juxtaposed with these excerpts are references to Lewis' early works. "The similarity of content between the excerpts and points later made by Lewis can be taken as evidence that Royce indeed had a massive influence on the young C.I. Lewis.
89. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 9 > Issue: Supplement
Fernando R. Molina Fragments by C. I. Lewis on Probablity, Practical Certainty, and Congruence
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Prepared with the cooperation and assistance of Sara Timby, Stanford University Libraries, this edition contains papers that were still on C. I. Lewis' desk at the time of his death. Especially noteworthy is the fragment entitled "On Probability" in which Lewis directs his attention to the subject of past experiences, which, although now beyond recall, are regarded as having played a role in the fomation of our beliefs. Also included are notes on thought regarded as action, on the Kantian postulate of the existence of God, and Lewis' own notion of conscious life as "repository of value."
90. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 1
James L. Hudson Frege's Way Out
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I show that Frege's statement (In the Epilogue to his Grundgesetze der Arithmetic v. II) of a way to avoid Russell's paradox is defective, in that he presents two different methods as if they were one. One of these "ways out" is notably more plausible than the other, and is almost surely what Frege really intended. The well-known arguments of Lesniewski, Geach, and Quine that Frege's revision of his system is inadequate to avoid paradox are not affected by the ambiguity of Frede's statement. But a rectnt argument by Linsky and Schumm (Analysis 82 (1971-72), 5-7), intended as a very simple derivation of a contradiction within Frege's revised system, is valid only for the less plausible of the two versions of Frege's way out, and thus is not an effective attack on the revision that Frege intended to make.
91. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 1
L. Duane Willard Intrinsic Value in Dewey
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It is widely believed that John Dewey completely rejected intrinsic value. The objective of the paper is to show this belief mistaken. Several different concepts of intrinsic value have been offered by philosophers. I argue that while Dewey rejected much in these various concepts, a careful examination of his writings reveals that he still retained the view that at least some things may be worth having, doing, enjoying for their own sakes. Perhaps the major point established is that Dewey's doctrine of the means-ends continuum does not deny the possibility of intrinsic value as he conceives it. This is shown by calling attention to his discussions of ends incorporating means and of conmummatory experiences.
92. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 1
John B. Fisher The Concept of Structure in Freud, Levi Strauss, and Chomsky
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In this paper I attempt to help clarify the nature of structuralism as a philosophical approach by examining the way in which Freud, Lévi-Strauss and Chomsky use the concept of structure. I argue that in each of these thinkers there is an important tension between their attempts to develop, on the one hand, a theory within the framework of determinism and, on the other, to emphasize the meaningfulness of certain aspects of human behavior. I suggest that the ability of the term "structure" to refer either to a universal or a particular helps the two sides of their thinking from coming into conflict with one another, and that this is a magor reason why these figures were attracted to a structural approach.
93. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 1
Robert C. Schultz Sidgwick on Proof in Ethics
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The objective of the paper is to provide a critical exposition of Henry Sidgwick's theory of "proof" in ethics, by means of a restatement and a critique of relevant sections of Book IV of The Methods of Ethics and an article in the 1879 volume of Mind. It is concluded that Sidgwick's thought contains two fundamental unresolved tensions. One of these relates to whether "proof" is to be treated as a normative or an empirical matter. On the one hand, Sidgwick clearly wants to offer a ground for ethics whose epistemic force would be universal; on the other, he accepts Mill's "considerations determining the mind to accept" as a definition. The second unresolved tension relates to the question whether abstract transcendent axioms or the familiar rules of common sense morality constitute the ultimate court of appeal in ethical decisionmaking.
94. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 1
John A. Schumaker Knowing Entails Believing
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Recently Colin Radford attempted to show primarily by examples that the entailment thesis that knowing entails believing is false. Both D. M. Armstrong and Keith Lehrer replied by suggesting, in effect, that Radford cannot justify his failure to consider unconscious belief. Here I show that neither Armstrong nor Lehrer succeeded in refuting Radford. But my exploration of their suggestion about unconscious belief leads to a complete reconstruction of Armstrong's principal example in terms of belief-constituting abilities. This reconstruction not only provides grounds for defending the entailment thesis, but also renders the thesis immune to Radford's examples and arguments.
95. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 1
Norman Melchert Hume's Appendix on Personal Identity
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The reasons why Hume expressed dissatisfaction concerning his own account of personal identity in the Treatise are unclear. Hume himself states them obscurely, and commentators have disagreed about what exactly it was that puzzled him. I offer reasons for thinking the sources of Hume’s retraction have not yet been understood, and propose a reading of the text of the Appendix which explains why he was dissatisfied.The key to the proper understanding of this text lies in two insufficiently appreciated facts: (1) that, for Hume, thoughts are perceptions too, and (2) that the unifying of perceptions can only be done by a perception of a higher level.
96. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 1
Robert W. Loftin Some Logical Problems in Arthur Danto's Account of Explanation
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In this paper we examine the theory of historical explanation presented by Arthur Danto in his book, Analytical Philosophy of History (1965).Our thesis is that Danto is mistaken in his assertion that a phenomenon can be covered by a general law only insofar as we produce a description of it which contains no uneliminable particular designations of it. It is possible to cover such particular statements with general laws provided one can bridge the logical gap between the two types of sentence with other statements which need not be redescriptions of the phenomenon but can be independently established premises for a deductive argument.We further show that some of the analogies which Danto attempts to make between deduction and narrative are mistaken because of errors in Danto's understanding of logical theory, specifically, Danto's notion that no predicate may appear in the conclusion of a deductive argument which is not antecedently contained in the premises and his claim that the same variable must be replaced by the same constants throughout an argument.
97. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 1
Richard Kraut The Importance of Love in Aristotle's Ethics
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My aim is to show how Aristotle's theory of friendship supports his thesis that happiness requires virtuous activity. Ethical behavior is valuable, according to the Nicomachean Ethics, not solely because it uses reason (the immoral can use reason too), but also because it is the expression of a loving attitude towards other persons. By emphasizing this aspect of virtuous activity, I defend Aristotle against the charge that his high estimation for pure intellectual activity commits him to an unethical doctrine. I also argue that his theory of love helps explain why he considers the political life second only to the philosophical life.
98. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 1
Henry R. West Comparing Utilitarianisms
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Act Utilitarianism and Rule Utilitarianism, in one formu lation of each, are not extensionally equivalent, that is, they do not require of an agent precisely the same behavior as is shown by Gerald Barnes in "Utilitarianisms”, Ethics 82 (197I) 56-64. As a result each theory passes and sometimes fails different utilitarian tests: the comparative consequences of universal conformity by everyone (distributively) vs. universal conformity by everyone (collectively) Barnes argues that the latter is the appropriate test. I argue that the test which AU passes is the appropriate one, since everyone, collectively, does not make moral choices. Moral choices are made by everyone individually.
99. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 1
James A. Martin Proving Necessity
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It is thought that a valid inference to a logically necessary conclusion must proceed from entirely necessary premises. Counter-examples show this is false. Perhaps while the truth of a necessary proposition may follow from non-necessary premises, its necessity cannot so follow. Counter-examples show this to be mistaken. Must anyone who comes to know the non-necessary premises employed in the various counter-examples have prior knowledge of the necessity of the conclusions of the counter-examples? I argue against this. It is true that, for any necessary proposition, there must be necessary premises from which it may validly be inferred; but no one need use these, or know these, or know how to use them, in order to know the necessity of any proposition.
100. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 1
Ronald F. Perrin Freedom and the World: The Unresolved Dilemma of Kant's Ethic
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The paper argues that the issue of the Third Antinomy of Reason (the conflict between the ideas of natural and free causality) remained a central concern throughout all of Kant's ethical writings subsequent to the first Critique. In the Grundlegung, the second and third Critiques and, finally, in Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft we find Kant continually refining and modifying the concept of a transcendental freedom but never arriving at a satisfactory resolution. I argue that any such resolution (such as that attempted by Professor Silber through an analysis of Kant's explication of Wille and Willkur) would not only imply the overturning of Kant's ethical philosophy but the entire Kantian system insofar as it stands astride the twin pillars of phenomenal and noumenal reality.