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81. The Harvard Review of Philosophy: Volume > 21
Robert Merrihew Adams No-Fault Responsibility for Outcomes
82. The Harvard Review of Philosophy: Volume > 21
Alexander George Quine’s Indeterminacy: A Paradox Resolved and a Problem Revealed
83. The Harvard Review of Philosophy: Volume > 21
Ayoob Shahmoradi A Critique of Non-Descriptive Cognitivism
84. The Harvard Review of Philosophy: Volume > 21
Cora Diamond Between Realism and Rortianism: Conant, Rorty and the Disappearance of Options
85. The Harvard Review of Philosophy: Volume > 21
Lilian Alweiss Kant’s Not so “Logical” Subject
86. The Harvard Review of Philosophy: Volume > 21
Peter Baumann Defending the One Percent?: Poor Arguments for the Rich?
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This paper discusses the philosophical view proposed by Gregory Mankiw in his recent article “Defending the One Percent” (JEP 27-3, 2013): the just deserts view in application to income distribution. Mankiw’s view suffers from three unsolved problems: the Criteria Problem, the Measurement Problem, and the Problem of the Missing Desert Function. The overall conclusion is that Mankiw’s normative “Defense of the One Percent” fails quite drastically.
87. The Harvard Review of Philosophy: Volume > 21
Simon Critchley The Tragedy of Misrecognition: The Desire for a Catholic Shakespeare and Hegel’s Hamlet
88. The Harvard Review of Philosophy: Volume > 21
Oliver Cronlinde Wenner Editor's Note
89. The Harvard Review of Philosophy: Volume > 22
About The Harvard Review of Philosophy
90. The Harvard Review of Philosophy: Volume > 22
Garrett Lam Note from the Editor
91. The Harvard Review of Philosophy: Volume > 22
Terry Horgan Newcomb's Problem Revisited
92. The Harvard Review of Philosophy: Volume > 22
Peter van Inwagen Some Thoughts on An Essay on Free Will
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In this essay I record some thoughts about my book An Essay on Free Will, its reception, and the way analytical philosophers have thought about the free-will problem since its publication 30 years ago. I do not summarize the book, nor am I concerned to defend its arguments—or at least not in any very systematic way. Instead I present some thoughts on three topics: (1) The question ‘If I were to revise the book today, if I were to produce a second edition, what changes would I make?’; (2) Aspects of the book I should like to call to the attention of readers (aspects that, in my view, readers of An Essay on Free Will, have been insufficiently attentive to); and (3) The course of the discussion of the problem of free will subsequent to the publication of the book.
93. The Harvard Review of Philosophy: Volume > 22
Eric Mandelbaum, Jake Quilty-Dunn Believing without Reason, or: Why Liberals Shouldn’t Watch Fox News
94. The Harvard Review of Philosophy: Volume > 22
Todd May From Subjectified to Subject: Power and the Possibility of a Democratic Politics
95. The Harvard Review of Philosophy: Volume > 22
Andrew Koppelman Does Respect Require Antiperfectionism?: Gaus on Liberal Neutrality
96. The Harvard Review of Philosophy: Volume > 22
Jody Azzouni Conceiving and Imagining: Some Examples
97. The Harvard Review of Philosophy: Volume > 22
Agnes Callard The Weaker Reason
98. The Harvard Review of Philosophy: Volume > 24
Taimur Aziz, Seyyed Hossein Nasr On Tradition, Metaphysics, and Modernity
99. The Harvard Review of Philosophy: Volume > 24
Martin Bernstein Introduction
100. The Harvard Review of Philosophy: Volume > 24
Juliet Floyd Positive Pragmatic Pluralism