61.
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International Studies in Philosophy Monograph Series:
2009
Stephen David Ross
Inheritance
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How does one desire forgetting? How does one desire not to keep?How does one desire mourning (assuming that to mourn, to work at mourning does not amount to keeping . . .)? (Derrida, GT, 36)Jacques Derrida died Friday night, October 8–9, 2004.
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62.
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International Studies in Philosophy Monograph Series:
2009
Stephen David Ross
Everyday Life
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[T]he common character of the mildest, as well as the severest cases, to which the faulty and chance actions contribute, lies in the ability to refer the phenomena to unwelcome, repressed, psychic material, which, though pushed away from consciousness, is nevertheless not robbed of all capacity to express itself. (Freud, PEL, 146)
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63.
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International Studies in Philosophy Monograph Series:
2009
Stephen David Ross
Unremembering
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Into those things from which existing things have their coming into being, their passing away, too, takes place, according to what must be; for they make reparation to one another for their injustice according to the ordinance of time . . . . (Anaximander fragment; Simplicius Phys., 24, 18 [DK 12 B 1]; trans. Robinson, EGP, 34)[T]o remember and to bear witness to something that is constitutively forgotten, not only in each individual mind, but in the very thought of the West. (Lyotard, “HJ,” 141)To bear witness to the differend. (Lyotard, DPD, xiii)[I]n witnessing, one also exterminates. (I, 204)Reality is composed of the différend.
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64.
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International Studies in Philosophy Monograph Series:
2009
Stephen David Ross
Past and Future
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By submitting to the primacy of the question “What?” the phenomenology of memory finds itself at the outset confronting a formidable aporia present in ordinary language: the presence in which the representation of the past seems to consist does indeed appear to be that of an image. We say interchangeably that we represent a past event to ourselves or that we have an image of it, an image that can be either quasi visual or auditory. . . . Memory, reduced to recall, thus operates in the wake of the imagination. . . .As a countercurrent to this tradition of devaluing memory, in the margins of a critique of imagination, there has to be an uncoupling of imagination from memory as far as this operation can be extended. (Ricoeur, MHF, 5–6)
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65.
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International Studies in Philosophy Monograph Series:
2009
Stephen David Ross
Counter-Memory
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there is something else to which we are witness, and which we might describe as an insurrection of subjugated knowledges. (Foucault, 2L, 81)a whole set of knowledges that have been disqualified as inadequate to their task or insufficiently elaborated: naive knowledges, . . . . (82)What emerges out of this is something one might call a genealogy, or rather a multiplicity of genealogical researches, a painstaking rediscovery of struggles together with the rude memory of their conflicts. (83)Let us give the term genealogy to the union of erudite knowledge and local memories which allows us to establish a historical knowledge of struggles and to make use of this knowledge tactically today. (83)If we were to characterise it in two terms, then “archaeology” would be the appropriate methodology of this analysis of local discursivities, and “genealogy” would be the tactics whereby, on the basis of the descriptions of these local discursivities, the subjected knowledges which were thus released would be brought into play. (85)
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66.
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International Studies in Philosophy Monograph Series:
2008
Tahseen Béa
Memory of Touch
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Is the memory of touching always disguised by senses that forget where they come from? Creating distancethrough a mastery that constitutes the object as a monument built in place of the subject’s disappearance.The memory of touching? The most insistent and the most difficult to enter into memory. The one that entailsreturning to a commitment whose beginning and end cannot be recovered.Memory of the flesh, where that which has not yet been written is inscribed, laid down? That which has a place,has taken place, but has no language. The felt, which expresses itself for the first time. Declares itself to theother in silence.One must remember this and hope that the other remembers. Lodge it in a memory that serves as its bedand its nest, while waiting for the other to understand. Make a cradle for him inside and out while leaving himfree, and keep oneself in the memory of the strength that revealed itself, that acted. (Irigaray, 215–16)
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67.
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International Studies in Philosophy Monograph Series:
2008
Tahseen Béa
For Love of the Other
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No memory can follow the traces of the past. It is an immemorial past—and this also is perhaps eternity, whose signifyingness obstinately throws one back to the past. Eternity is the very irreversibility of time, the source and refuge of the past. (Levinas, “Meaning and Sense,” 30)Keeping the senses alert means being attentive in flesh and in spirit. (Irigaray, Ethics of Sexual Difference, 148)
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68.
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International Studies in Philosophy Monograph Series:
2008
Tahseen Bea
Preface
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69.
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International Studies in Philosophy Monograph Series:
2008
Tahseen Béa
Bibliography
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70.
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Phenomenology 2005:
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Marek Maciejczak
Terms Denoting Natural Kinds:
Prototype’s Effect and Consciousness
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This essay shows links between linguistic (mental) meanings and perception, and proposes that cognitive theories of language acquisition should find some foundation in phenomenological evidence. A need for the sharp distinction between linguistic and extra-linguistic is questioned because regularities of categorization processes, manifested in the meanings of terms denoting natural kinds, are the regularities of perceptual processes and language. In this the role of language as the one and only determinant of the structure of experience is limited. The first part deals with Merleau-Ponty’s theory of immediate perception to show the place for spontaneous normalization and its norms. The second part takes into account a more general view on consciousness in order to show the domain where the connection between perception and language is being created.
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B. M. Mezei
Plato, Husserl, and Theistic Intentionality
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In what follows I offer a comparison between two significant instances of the doctrine of intentionality, the view of Plato, and that of Edmund Husserl. My purpose is to show four things. (1) I shall argue that the notion of intentionality goes back to Plato. (2) I argue too that the notion of Platonic intentionality entails the notion of personal intention. (3) While Platonic intentionality is theistic in a certain way, Husserlian intentionality is not. (4) This omission in the Husserlian conception of intentionality is due to an unsolved problem in Husserlian metaphysics.
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72.
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Victor Molchanov
Experience and Fictions:
Stream of Consciousness and Hypertrophy of Ego
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The hypertrophy of Ego or “I” is a deformation of experience differentiation, which leads to the formation of the fictive center claiming to rule all of our mental life. The Ego is rather a designation of the lacuna in experience, which represents the hypertrophied unity of consciousness. Husserl’s various attempts to describe the unity of the consciousness in terms of “flux” and “I” (Ego) are instructive for the investigation of the Ego-hypertrophy. The differentiation of fore- and background, whole and parts, and simple and complex are relevant for preventing of any hypertrophy of Ego.
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73.
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Joona Taipale
Perceiving the Other:
Husserl and Merleau-Ponty on the Genesis of Intersubjectivity
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The Husserlian phenomenology of intersubjectivity has gained increasing interest in recent years. However, some aspects of the traditional interpretation still obstruct the meaning of Husserl’s views and block the access to the phenomenological theme of intersubjectivity. This essay aims to disclose and unravel some of these obstacles.The constitution of the other is still often understood as being, for Husserl, merely a matter of empathy, of a relation between two full-fledged egos. This misreading connects to the interpretation according to which the constitution of the ego is independent of the constitution of the other. It will be argued that both these notions are untenable in the light of Husserl’s writings.
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Peter Reynaert
A Nonrepresentationalist Approach to Phenomenal Consciousness
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The question of a naturalistic explanation of human existence ultimately means naturalizing conscious embodiment. This requires two steps. First we need a sound definition of the socalled phenomenal consciousness that is typical of embodiment. Secondly, we need to clarify the nature of a naturalistic explanation of this phenomenal consciousness. The paper argues that classical phenomenological analyses of embodiment (Husserl and Merleau-Ponty) can be relevant here.Phenomenology’s noetico-noematic analysis can help to distinguish phenomenal consciousness from so-called qualia. In accordance with recent representationalism, qualia are to be understood as phenomenal properties of the perceived object, and are elements of representational or intentional content (noema). Noematic phenomenology of the experience of the lived body further permits an identification of the phenomenal properties of the lived body, and a complementary noetic phenomenology identifies a specific bodily self-awareness as the proper phenomenal consciousness (subjective experience) of embodiment. Phenomenology thus leads to the clarification of several central issues in the actual discussion about the possibility of naturalizing consciousness, and more precisely to a defense of a nonrepresentatonalist conception of phenomenal consciousness. This clarification substantiates the claim for a more radical naturalistic explanation of conscious embodiment.
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Michael Staudigl
The Many Faces of Violence A Phenomenological Inquiry
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This article investigates phenomenology’s potential to deepen our understanding of violence. Its major aim consists in elaborating an integrative approach to the many faces of violence, i.e. to physical, psychic, social, and cultural violence. Approaching these various forms from the unifying viewpoint of the subject’s embodiment opens a renewed perspective on understanding violence. Displacing the very architectonics of Husserl’s “constitutive analysis,” this undertaking requires far reaching revisions of phenomenological method, which will be explicated respectively.
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76.
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Hans Rainer Sepp
Urpraxis der Epochē
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This is an attempt to analyze the process of practising a non-theoretical epochē by a phenomenology of transcendental-bodily emotion. It will be realized in four steps pointing out 1. the possibility of epochē within the scope of the structure of the life-world; 2. the conditions to carry out the epochē; 3. the response of the epochē to the threats for life; and 4. possible results of a non-theoretical epochē.
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77.
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Notes on Contributors
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78.
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Andrzej Leder
Borders of Consciousness in Husserl’s Logical Investigations:
Can Husserl’s Concept of Consciousness Serve as a Starting Point for the Development of a Th eory of Not-Conscious?
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We intend to prove that the concept of consciousness is impossible without assuming the existence of what is not conscious. And that the need of such assumption stems from a rigorous analysis of intuitive data. We wish to put phenomenology to its own test and to demonstrate that in its essence Husserl’s analysis radically goes beyond the sphere of what is understood as “conscious”. Our argument is that in his studies on the structure of the object of consciousness Husserl developed highly creative and important ideas which may be used as a starting point for the reformulation of the concept of the unconscious which has so dominated contemporary thinking, and the relation between conscious and what is not conscious.By viewing an intentional act, or even its ideal object, as a certain phenomenon of consciousness, we entirely change its nature and its ontological status. It ceases to be an act by which an object was constituted and it turns to be an object constituted by another act. We shall demonstrate that Husserl was, at least partly, aware of that.We wish to demonstrate that the metaphor of the absence, an empty space in which an object of consciousness is constituted corresponds with Husserl’s notion of the intention which he developed in his “Logical Investigations”. It is also a metaphor which makes one recognise some intentional space, the space where an intuitive object of consciousness constitutes itself, the space which is a prerequisite for the object to be constituted, the space which is itself not intuitive and not conscious.
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79.
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Phenomenology 2005:
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Kim Hongwoo
Living in the Risk World:
Ulrich Beck in the Shadow of Husserl and Heidegger
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Th is essay is an attempt to inquire into the recent literature on risk and bring out a fundamental category of humanity, which is the unpreparedness of man’s Being-in-the-World. It will begin with Ralph Nader’s Unsafe at Any Speed (1965) and follow through to Ulrich Beck’s Risk Society: Toward a New Modernity (1986). These points will then be related to the arguments of Husserl and Heidegger. In this way, the fundamental category of modern man is disclosed in its Being-in-the-World-for-which-no-one-Being-prepared.
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80.
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Kohji Ishihara
Reductionism in the Synthetic Approach of Cognitive Science and Phenomenology:
Rethinking Dreyfus’ Critique of AI
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Drawing on Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, Hubert Dreyfus criticized classical AI in 1970s. While classical AI was based on symbolic manipulation, AI research of recent years has been based on the neural network approach and the synthetic approach. In this essay I would like to reexamine Dreyfus’ critique of AI and his Heidegger interpretation to suggest another aspect of Heidegger’s thought and Husserl’s phenomenology of reciprocal recognition which would provide a perspective from which to resist the reductionism in the recent approaches in cognitive science.
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