Opening speech on the evening dedicated to the life and work ethics and historian of philosophy, associate professor Karel Hlavoň (January 21, 1930 to July 30, 2009).

Condemnation of 1277 was an intervention in the scientific research of many scholastic authors. Duns Scotus worked after 1277. The aim of this paper is to identify the philosophical motives in which the philosophy of Duns Scotus and Condemnation of 1277 over­lap, and to examine if Scotus’ thinking was under a direct influence of the Condemnation. The author of this paper maintains that the main motivation for Scotus’ philosophy was the Franciscan tradition, and that the influence of Condemnation of 1277 was not significant.

Understanding of the term of crisis significantly influences the main argumentation line of the philosophical conceptions stimulated by the reflection of the crisis. The deep ecology of A. Naess belongs to these philosophical concepts. The term of crisis in his thinking appears in a form of a threat as well as opportunity, necessity to make important decisions. It also has a meaning of historical and political crisis, i.e. situations in which under the pressure the basic imperatives and organizational principles of the society are reformulated. Such a broad semantic spectre of the crisis concept is connected with the fact that Naess wants to address not only ecologists, environmentalists and philosophers, but also political scientists and social activists by which he greatly contributed to the constitution of environmentalism as a political movement as well as a political ideology

The archaic poets were the first witnesses and also intellectual generators of process­es led to the constitution of social-political structures of classical Greek poleis. Tyrtaios (1st half of 7th century BC) is one of the oldest. In his elegy (fr. 12) he set thouridos alkē (furious valour) as an ultimate virtue. This phrase can be already found in Homer who uses it as a name for one of the many warriors’ aretai. The aim of the paper is to give a complex analysis of fr. 12, explore the meaning of the phrase used by both poets, and show a new context in which it was set by Tyrtaios. Consequently, we try to grasp one of the origins of the “new rational-political order” and show the way, how the lyric trans­formed the old epic values into the new political ones.

This paper examines one of the current approaches to metaphor which views meta­phor more as figure of thought than figure of speech, and puts it into perspective with philosophical discussions of the structure of thought. After reviewing conceptual meta­phor and root metaphor, we focus on the significance and prevalence of metaphors un­derlying our thinking. We argue that both of these theories support a view of metaphor as cruical for rational and conceptual thinking, hence metaphor holds an important position in philosophy. Furthermore, we analyze the influence of metaphorical thinking on con­tents and forms of philosophical problems and we argue that this opens up the possibility of new interesting research-worthy topics.

The article deals with the problem of induction in the philosophy of science. The aim of this paper is to present the problem of induction, types of induction, which are reliable in science and to point out that the problem of induction is not just a problem of scientific realism, but it also strikes the Bayesian theory. The central attention is paid to the discussion if subjective probability account could help with problematic nature of induction and if justification of induction is really a deal. The paper concludes by claim­ing that even though no Bayesian thesis allowed us to think that probability is a solution to Hume’s problem of induction and there are several attempts in history to dismiss the problem, the history of science is connected with inductive inferences and the problem of justifying induction remains for philosophy of science

This year prof. Pavel Materna celebrates his 85th birthday (born April 21st 1930 in Hněvkovice, a village near Ledeč n/Sáz). His “Brno years” began 1965 when he came to the department of philosophy of Masaryk University (then “University of J. E. Purkyně”). He became a candidate of sciences in 1957 (having defended the Thesis Zu einigen Fragen der modernen Definitionslehre in the Prague department of logic (prof. Zich) and having already published some articles). His colleagues soon recognized that he loved not only his theoretical research but also pedagogical activities. In Brno he defended the Thesis On Problems and became ´docent´ (Assistant Professor). During the communist ´nor­malisation´ was deprived of the possibility to do his pedagogical and theoretical work, he however unofficially collaborated with some linguists, including the Prague Sgall seminar. He was then essentially influenced by Transparent intensional logic (TIL) founded and developed by his friend Pavel Tichý, then professor in the Otago University in Dunedin (New Zealand), who has emigrated in sixties. Without the possibility to teach and work in the Brno university he went to Prague and began to work in a Design Institute in 1976. He tried to exploit his leisure time by studying and developing TIL. The Velvet Revolu­tion caused that Materna began to work in the department of logic in Prague Institute of Philosophy of Academy of Sciences where he has worked up to now. He did not forget Brno however and Brno did not forget him. So he began to teach logic in Brno Masaryk University and – this time officially – make some research in TIL. In Brno he became professor of logic and has tutored some doctorands, one of which (J. Raclavský) is his pedagogical successor and another the highly successful Danish doctorand B. Jespersen, who did his PhD in Brno. So TIL began to be partially developed in Brno, and a fruitful collaboration with Ostrava (M. Duží) led to the situation where we can speak about the TIL (or Czech) school. Materna loved to collaborate with Slovak colleagues and many of them are active members of this school. Materna has authored some Czech and some English books (especially concerning the TIL theory of concepts) and has written many articles with Marie Duží and together with Jespersen and Duží this “Big Three” authored a Springer book Procedural Se­mantics fir Hyperintensional Logic (2010). He has been awarded three medals, one by the Ministry of education, one by Masaryk University, one medal was given to the Big Three for the mentioned Springer book.As a teacher Materna finished his work in Masaryk University in June 2015. Being a retiree he does not forget his Brno years and does not intend to stop working.

Existují dva druhy logických chyb. Buď je užito neplatné schéma argumentace, nebo je naše analýza premis chybná. Žádná extenzionální ani intenzionální teorie nemůže vyřešit následující problém spojený s analýzou výrazů přirozeného jazyka: Leibnizův princip substituce identického za identické obsahuje podmínku a = b. Jak extenzionální, tak i intenzionální systémy (alespoň jsou-li intenze definovány jako funkce z možných světů) se při analýze této podmínky formulované v přirozeném jazyce spokojí s tím, je-li a nahodile nebo logicky či analyticky ekvivalentní s b, zatímco to nemusí stačit pro aplikaci Leibnizova principu. Uvádíme příklady, ukazující, jak je v takových případech absurdní aplikovat tento princip. Je myslitelná následující náprava: mohli bychom se pokusit formulovat nějaké axiómy nebo snad metasystémová pravidla, která by elimi­novala kritické případy. To by však znamenalo, že vzniká nová teorie jen proto, aby bylo zabráněno nesprávné aplikaci Leibnizova pravidla. Místo toho nabízíme procedurální analýzu (výrazů) přirozeného jazyka, která umožní určit jednoznačně jejich smysl a tedy i denotaci tak, že zmíněné kritické případy nemohou nastat. Ukážeme, že hyperinten­zionální systém, který definuje Transparentní intenzionální logika, dokáže obecně řešit hlavní problémy spojené s užitím výrazů přirozeného jazyka.

The paper summarizes the development of logical semantics, in particular Tichý’s Transparent Intensional Logic, since late 1960s till now. We concentrate on Materna’s procedural theory of concepts, which is a unique logical theory built within TIL. The goal is to introduce the contribution of Czech and Slovak logical school to logical se­mantics and show its significance. At the same time the paper critically discusses strong as well as weak issues of this theory, and calls attention to open problems. One of the most important open problems is the problem of hyperintensional individuation, which is closely related to the problem of synonymy.

In our contribution we remind the original cooperation with Prof. P. Materna which started in sixties of last century and led to the creation of the Ordered-Triple Theory of Language whose authors are P. Materna, K. Pala and A. Svoboda. The papers on this theory were published in 1976 and 1979, however, Materna‘s name could not appear in the paper‘s titles - the communist regime in this way punished him for being expelled from the Communist Party.Ordered-Triple Theory, as the title suggests captures thre fundamental compo­nents of a languge system, i. e. syntax, semantics and pragmatics, and is fully com­parable with similar enterprises abroad. It become a starting point for further in­terconnection of logic, linguistics and informatics thanks to the intensive mutual cooperation of K. Pala and P. Materna at the newly established Faculty of Infor­matics from 1995. This cooperation attracted students of the Faculty, among themespecially Aleš Horák, whose essential contribution is the computer implementation of the transparent intensional logic (TIL) in relation to the natural language processing (primarily Czech).

Inferentialism idealizes the process of obtaining of the meaning in a communicati­on. It is easy to find a counter-argument. There is a lack of an analysis at all especially a conceptual one. And there is no decision-making meta-rule for obtaining the meaning.

Nahlédnuto filozoficky bylo umění, a zejména literatura, vždy nějak spojováno s pravdou. Cílem každého dobrého umělce bylo a je sdělit cosi podstatného o světě, ne­boli říci pravdu. Kdo ze spisovatelů chtěl kdy záměrně lhát či mást? Uměleckému dílu, považovanému za pravdivé, je běžně připisován atribut realistické. Znamená řečené, že pojem realismu jako něčeho, co je spojováno s pravdou, náleží všem uměleckým dílům? Je v tomto smyslu realismus triviální pojem? Cílem příspěvku je pokus o vyjasnění pojmu umělecký realismus. Po citátech vybraných autorů či filozofů k věci je učiněn krátký pokus o vyjasnění realismu pomocí sémantiky možných světů. Je zjištěno, že čím širší by reprezentace světů byla, tím méně by byla informativní. Nejrealističtější dílo by v posledku neříkalo nic. Sémantika možných světů proto není shledána vhodným ná­strojem pro explikaci pojmu umělecký realismus. V poslední části je krátce představen smysluplný pojem realismu.

Slovo πρηστήρ vyvolává zmatek a spory, téměř kdekoli se objeví. Jeho slovníkové heslo bylo v LSJ několikrát významně přepracováno, problémy se však stále vyřešit nepodařilo. Nejasnost výrazu spočívá také v tom, že popisuje tornádové, ohnivé a zářící meteorologické jevy. Nedávná diskuze o výrazu πρηστῆρος αὐλός u Anaximandra tento problém opět nastolila. Tato studie objasňuje význam výrazu πρηστῆρος αὐλός stejně tak jako slova πρηστήρ na základě zkoumání veškerých známých výskytů tohoto slova. Studie vylučuje význam „měchy“, význam „blesk“ se potvrzuje spíše pro pozdní texty, základní význam „tornádo“ je typický zejména pro autory spojené s námořnictvím a meteorologií. Πρηστῆρος αὐλός je trychtýř tornáda. Na základě současných meteorologických znalostí (s ohledem na oblast Řecka) je také vysvětleno, proč bylo tornádo často vnímáno jako ohnivé.

In the final speech before the vote on his guilt or innocence Plato´s Socrates reminds the judge that he has a family including a teenage son and two small boys. In this case he refers to the verse of Homer´s Odyssey to point out that he was not born „of an oak or a rock” (34d). The aim of the article is to analyze and interpret the meaning of that quote. The first part will focus on the comparison of Homer´s verse with its form in Plato’s Apology. In the second section I will examine what strategy Socrates followed when he made reference to that line. The final section will focus on the question why Plato´s Socrates quotes Homer despite his previous statement that poets do not have wisdom.

The main theme of this article is the dispute on the meaning (destruction) of the history of metaphysics on the background of a reflection of Parmenides’ philosophical message. The leitmotif of the problem relates to the meaning (of destruction) of history of metaphysics considered as Western ontology (Heidegger’s position); with the identification of Platonic (metaphysical) tradition considered as a false knowledge perceiving being existing in truth, which, in the light of the thesis about nonexistence of absolute truth and its explication, becomes a concrete effort of temporal and endless human being (Nietzsche’s position). Nietzsche and Heidegger show that the first moment we must think about is our (metaphysical) ability to ground theoretically the meaning of the universe. This ambition then grounds whole spiritual tradition. Nietzsche’s critique of Parmenides’ thought means most probably his critique of the development of his basic assumptions in Platonic version of metaphysics. This form of critique is acceptable for Heidegger, too. A disagreement develops only concerning the final meaning of the history of metaphysics – while Nietzsche sees them as a completion of the moral perspective of universe and as a problem of critique of metaphysically masked nihilistic dimension of morality, Heidegger sees the completion of history of metaphysics as essential forgetting (more precisely masking) of the question of Being, therefore as an ontological problem. What Heidegger refuses to bring to consequences are the nihilistic consequences of his ontology, uncovered and thematised through Nietzsche’s critique of morality, in which the forgotteness of Being is unmasked in its (finally) nihilistic dimension.

Turning (Kehre) in Heidegger’s thinking reaches not only his search of the question of Being (Seinsfrage) but also the change of the status of human being in relation to Being. This change can be displayed also through Heidegger’s interpretation of pre-Socratic philosophy. While during the period before turning human being as being-there (Dasein) is able to understand Being and he is connected to it, in the period after turning this relationship changes completely. For Heidegger Being after turning becomes Being with the character of non-temporality or pre-temporality and it has its own history. Knowledge of the truth of Being happens not to be a matter of human being but it depends on the fact whether Being hides or unhides.

The goal of this study is to analyse Rorty’s classification of Heidegger as an ironical theoretic. Rorty claims that the main task of philosophy is its critique of its tradition, whereas Heidegger is his inspiration in this role. But the problem is that Heidegger is not concerned with historical-philosophical interpretation of history of philosophy but only with philosophical one and that he conforms to his own philosophical interests. For an accountable research of our main problem it is necessary to know Rorty’s definition and demarcation of theoretical ironic who has doubts about function, directivity and privileged status of vocabularies and about the existence of final vocabulary, too. It is necessary to show an anthropological and moral-axiological dimension of Neopragmatic thinking, which is far away from Heidegger after the turn, as well as the problem of Socratic justice, which is far away from rortyan ironic too. The important characteristic of a theoretical ironic is his rejection of traditional metaphysics and his concentration on metaphysics in different sense, thus comprehend the metaphysical (theoretical) urge so much that one eliminates it. But this does not hold for Heidegger, either. Rorty’s challenge to philosophy as fulfilment of humanity is in absolute contradiction to Heidegger’s Letter about humanism, in which he reduces humanism to the history of Being and he does not care about the man or human dignity, but only about the thought of Being.

The aim of the essay is to commemorate J. B. Kozák (1888–1974) and to recall the value of his lectures given in the years 1949–1952 at the Charles-University in Prague. These lectures were important in connection with the new political situation after the communist putsch in 1948. The life of J. B. Kozák was deeply influenced by his clergyman education. Nevertheless he finally obtained the position of professor of philosophy at Charles-University in Prague. As a prominent representative of Czech cultural life he became an active member of a small circle founded by the writer K. Čapek (1890–1938) and supported by T. G. Masaryk (1850–1937). J. B. Kozák defended the democratic ideas but he was also sympathetic with the socially oriented leftists (see e. g. his friendship with professor Z. Nejedlý, 1878–1962). Before the war J. B. Kozák left Prague. He began to lecture philosophy at Oberlin College in Chicago (USA). The end of the war saw him back in Prague. In summer 1945 he got his chair with the possibility lecturing immediately. In the animated discussions with the Marxists he defended the ideas of humanity and freedom. He got the sympathy of students and became their moral authority. This esteem remained also in the hard times of political purges when many of his friends were discharged. Nevertheless his stay in the university employment did not harm his authority. He was protected because of his leftist views before the war. In spite of all the respect for him the authorities at university restrained his lecturing heavily. A small part of his „history of philosophy“ is enclosed as an exemplum of his university lessons.

On 31st July 2013, Dr. Josef Zumr gave an interview concerning his long-time friend and co-worker Karel Kosík. Dr. Zumr acquaints reader with the 60’s and recalls how he first met Karel Kosík and what they have experienced. He describes Kosík’s youth and reasons that have led Kosík to the decision to study philosophy. Political situation in former Czechoslovakia is described as well as different instruments of political persecution that affected many employees of the Department of Philosophy of Czechoslovak Academy of Science and many others. Dr. Zumr also recounts how he himself and Karel Kosík dealt with persecution. He also comments on different receptions that The Dialectics of the Concrete and other Kosík’s works have elicited.