Hypothetical Consent Situations are widely employed in normative argument as if they help to justify normative claims or to explain normative facts. Historically, however, there is plenty of suspicion about them. In this light, there is a tendency to prefer theories of political obligation that do not depend upon hypothetical consent to explain political obligations – those that appeal, for instance, a general moral principle (like a natural duty) or to actual consent. This paper makes no full-throated defense of hypothetical consent. But it does try to identify more carefully than is usually done what sorts of cases they represent and to show that at least two concerns about them are unwarranted.

This paper explores the integration of John Rawls’s (1921–2002) theory of “justice as fairness” into corporate social responsibility (CSR). It accentuates the shift from solely focusing on profit maximization to a model that prioritizes ethical governance and sustainable development. The paper reinterprets Rawls’s theory for corporate ethics and governance, asserting that businesses have a moral obligation to uphold fairness and equity beyond mere compliance or public perception. It acknowledges the role of the government in this integration. It recognizes the challenges in aligning Rawlsian principles with corporate objectives while balancing economic and societal obligations. The fusion of CSR with Rawlsian ideas can potentially bring transformative impacts to businesses, paving the way for a more equitable form of capitalism that combines economic goals with a strong commitment to social justice and ethical practices.

Several European and North American states encourage or even require, via good Samaritan and duty to rescue laws, that persons assist others in distress. This paper offers a utilitarian and contractualist defense of this view as applied to corporations. It is argued that just as we should sometimes frown on bad Samaritans who fail to aid persons in distress, we should also frown on bad corporate Samaritans who neglect to use their considerable multinational power to undertake disaster relief or to confront widespread social ills such as those currently befalling public health (obesity) and the environment (climate change). As such, the corporate duty to assist approach provides a novel justification for sustainable business practices in such cases. The paper concludes by arguing that traditional stakeholder approaches have not articulated this duty of assistance obligation, though a new utilitarian stakeholder theory by Thomas Jones and Will Felps may be coextensive.