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Michael Allen Fox
Gandhi and the World Environmental Crisis
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62.
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Elizabeth A. Linehan
Knowing How to Punish Justly:
A Gandhian Reflection
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63.
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Robert L. Holmes
Understanding Evil From The Perspective of Nonviolence
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64.
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Robert Gould
Are Pacifists Cowards?:
A Consideration of this Question in Reference to Heroic Warrior Courage
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65.
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Sanjay Lal
Hume and Gandhi:
A Comparative Ethical Analysis
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Key aspects of Mahatma Gandhi’s ethical theory can be understood by way of the framework provided by David Hume’s ethics. While respecting contextual differences as well as those in over all outlook between a Sanatani Hindu reformer and a Western empiricist, I show that Gandhi and Hume mutually illuminate each other’s thought on significant ethical matters. These matters are: (1) The inability of reason to produce action (2) The relationship of reason to the emotions (3) The importance of the commonality of moral sentiments among humans (4) Identification (a kind of sympathy) as the proper starting place for morality. I hope to show that a greater viability in each thinker’s views can be noticed by those schooled in traditions different from what each respectively represent.David Hume’s ethics provide a framework for understanding key aspects of Mahatma Gandhi’s ethical theory. Indeed, for certain students of philosophy in the West, Gandhian ethics may gain status as a viable approach in moral philosophy when seen from a Humean standpoint. In what follows, I will examine four significant aspects of Gandhian ethics: (1) The limitations of reason to produce moral action. (2) The secondary status of reason in relation to the emotions in morality. (3) The importance of moral sentiments in the general population for devising a system of morality. (4) The place of identification (a kind of sympathy) for the origin of morality. I will show that all four are not only significant aspects of Humean ethics but that when understood from David Hume’s framework these parts of Gandhi’s philosophy should appear all the more plausible to those steeped in the analytic tradition.
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66.
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Andrew Fitz-Gibbon
Rehabilitating Nonresistance
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67.
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Rajmohan Ramanathapillai
Gandhi on Negative and Positive Conversions
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68.
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Wendy C. Hamblet
Beyond Guilt and Mourning:
A Critique of Postmodern Ethics
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69.
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Nalin Ranasinghe
Desacralizing Violence:
Socrates, Jesus and the Idea of Westem Civilization
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James P. Sterba
The Rationale of U.S. War-Making Foreign Policy
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Richard W. Werner
Reply to Sterba
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Paul S. Ropp
The Real Costs of War
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73.
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James P. Sterba
Reply to Richard Wemer
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74.
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Predrag Cicovacki
Nonviolence in Theory and Practice - Tribute to Robert Holmes
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Robert L. Holmes
Toward a Nonviolent American Revolution
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Predrag Cicovacki
Introductory Remarks
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77.
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Robert W. Brimlow
Beat Me Daddy, 12 to the Bar:
The Blues, Peace and Cats in a Trance
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Barry L. Gan
Reply to Brimlow
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79.
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Andrew Fiala
Pacifism and the Trolley Problem
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80.
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Jacob N. Bauer
Gandhian Nonviolence and the Problem of Preferable Violence
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