I challenge the assumption in the debate on the conventionality of simultaneity that a simultaneity relation of special relativity should be defined relative to a single inertial observer, not relative to multiple inertial observers as such. I construct an example of a simultaneity relation relative to two inertial observers, and demonstrate that it is explicitly definable in terms of the causal connectibility relation and the world lines of the two observers. I argue that, consequently, thesimultaneity relation of special relativity is not uniquely definable from the causal connectibility relation.

The success of a scientific theory T is not an all-or-nothing matter; nor is a theory something one can usually accept or reject in toto (i.e. one may take T as being "approximately true", or take as true just certain "parts" of it, without necessarily affirming every posit and claim specific to T as being either completely right or completely wrong). This, however, raises questions about precisely which parts of T deserve to be taken as approximately true. on the basis of its success. A line of thinkers, particularly Kitcher, Leplin and Psillos, variously look for parts of a theory they can claim to have been "essentially" implicated in its distinctivesuccess, which they regard as primary candidates for realist truth ascription. But, how is one to determine which parts of any theory are "central" or "peripheral", "essential" or "idle" in the required sense? Attempts at spelling out relevant synchronic links between successful predictions and correct partial theorizing increasingly look like a misguided effort. As an alternative, this paper proposes a weaker, but arguably powerful enough, version of the realist relation between success and truth. Focusing on a pivotal case study in recent debates between realists and anti-realists (the conceptual changes undergone by theories oflight in the 19th century), a promising link between success and partial theoretical representation is located in the expansion and stabilization of approximately correct partial theoretical models of the theory's intended domain. The realist link is then formulated accordingly. In the resulting approach (a) predictive success is preserved as a marker of cumulative theoretical gain, but (b) specification of the latter is a diachronic rather than synchronic matter (i.e. gains become clear only after generations of theory change; specification of the particular loci of theoretical gain in connection with a given line of predictive success is not assumed to be generally possible at the time of the success in question). The truth ascriptions that get licensed are partial-of a piece-meal and retrospective sort, focused on methodologically specifiable theoretical subplots from past science.

Mechanism is a conception of the world according to which all can be explained by mechanics expressed by its fundamental concepts and principles. I’ll firstly show that, following Poincaré’s discussion on mechanical explanation, the very foundation of classical mechanics implicates that all just can’t be explained. Next, I’ll discuss the principles of mechanics as they are viewed by Poincaré, especially the principle of relativity that has a particularity in its form of “pseudo-universal”argument, as well as in its fundamental role for experiences. It will be finally revealed that, the mechanism can be used as a convention, because, by the principle of relativity, we can have only local experiments but never on the universe, and consequently, non of our experiences would never lead us to any phenomenon irreducible to mechanics. Nevertheless, it doesn’t exclude the contrary possibility: experiences can reveal that it is not to commode as it used to be, without disapproving it.

Modern physics asks: how do the objects exist? This kind of question inevitably touches upon philosophy; to be precise, it involves metaphysics that traditionally deals with these problems. There are grounds to assume that a quantum object in a certain sense does not exist until it is registered. Thus, one of the conclusions says, “Photon is a photon if it is a registered photon”. This is a paraphrase of well-known Wheeler’s words about the essence of quantum phenomenon. These effects cannot be understood if we come from the assumption that all existing (‘real’) and quantum objects in particular, is only being of the actual. To explain quantum mechanics phenomena we need to realize that there exists another modus of being. Quantum mechanics refers to some sort oftranscendence. Such conclusion is based not only on the analysis of the testing of Aspeckt’s experiments. The whole structure of quantum mechanics confirms it. The revision of the New European paradigm leads to the return of such conception of existence that brings us to the traditional metaphysical understanding of the being and implies its study on several levels of existence. The conclusion of this kind leads to a serious correction of the philosophical model of the world built by modern natural science.

The notion of chance plays an important role in some philosophical analyses and interpretations of scientific theories. The most obvious examples of that are the theories of evolution and quantum mechanics. This notion, however seems to be notoriously vague. Its application in such analyses, more often than not refers to its common-sense understanding, which, by definition, cannot be sufficient when it comes to sound philosophical interpretations of scientific achievements. The paper attempts at formulating a ‘typology of chance’. It distinguishes eight different meanings of this notion. Those meanings can be found in classical philosophical accounts of chance, in the common usage of this term, or form logical possibilities of its understanding. Subsequently, the paper points to those forms of the notion in question which may and may not be properly applied to scientific theories and ideas – given usual characteristics of natural sciences. It also shows – by the examples of particular theories mentioned above – which of the distinguished forms of the notion of chance are actually applicable in the context of these theories.

Ethics is a device which is produced by the human consciousness to regulate the human behaviour or society in a sound manner. Organisms are manipulated by techniques of molecular biology these days. Then, it is so difficult to recognize the problems of life manipulation by the ethical principle raised by our sensing level. To regulate the society greatly influenced by modern life sciences, it is time to utilize the mechanistic knowledge about organisms as a basic principle of ethics (Molecular ethics). Molecular ethics is not an ethics produced only by the humane logic, but adopts the property of genome operating system (OS) as a core principle clarified by the molecular biology. It is substantiated by life sciences, but is not a simple scientific decision-making means. It promotes scientific experiments with the integrity to knowledge. Scientific knowledges are projections of the rule of life. Molecular ethics is an ethics which seeks for the rules of evolution; i.e. rules for transcending human being. On the other hand, traditional ethics (individual ethics; ethics based on indivisualism) is an ethics which regards present human being as a terminus of evolution. In this respect, this is against the principle of genome OS (system of evolution). Life sciences and technologies has been developing to meet our wants, however, those activities nowadays seem to be against those rules of genome OS. Therefore, it is extremely important for us to consider the ethics applicable for the life manipulation era.

Mechanism is a conception of the world according to which all can be explained by mechanics expressed by its fundamental concepts and principles. I’ll firstly show that, following Poincaré’s discussion on mechanical explanation, the very foundation of classical mechanics implicates that all can’t be explained. Next, I’lldiscuss the principles of mechanics as they are viewed by Poincaré, especially the principle of relativity. I’ll show that this principle has a particular feature by its form of “pseudo-universal” argument, as well as by its fundamental role for experiences. It will be finally revealed that, mechanism can be used as a convention, because, by the principle of relativity, we can have only local experiments but these can never be extended to the universe as a whole, and consequently, none of our experiences would lead us to any phenomenon irreducible to mechanics. Nevertheless, it doesn’t exclude the contrary possibility: experiences can reveal that it is not to commode as it used to be, without disapproving it.

Analytical reflections on tasks and functions of philosophy in the modern world, as well as, efforts deriving novel vision of practically all areas of the philosophical thought may become sound only after consideration of the innovations with which modern natural science has crossed the 20—21 centuries boundary. Discoveries in astrophysics at the end of the 20th century offer new and unprecedented perceptions of our world. In this world only 4% of the total Universe energy is attributed to the known forms of the matter, 20% constitutes “dark matter” and 76% is in “dark energy”. The first decade of the 21st century will go on record inhistory of the civilization as the one associated with breakthrough experiments shedding light on the nature of the mysterious types of the matter, and construction of the unified theory of field. It is safe to regard modern science to be on the verge of profound transformations. These changes are bound to alter our outside world comprehension, redefining human being’s place in it. That advances a set of new serious requirements to philosophy as a science that must present ability to adapt to provide adequate and meaningful methodological interpretations to anticipated discoveries. This article addresses the characteristic features of modern conceptual knowledge of the world, with an attempt of offering their philosophical and methodological comprehension.

The "object theoretic operational view" suggests a new structure of physical knowledge. This view takes branches of physics as basic units. Its main concepts are primary (PIO) and secondary (SIO) ideal objects with the explicit definition of SIO through PIO and the implicit definition of PIOs within appropriate systems of statements, called a "nucleus of a branch of physics" (NBP). Within an NBP (which has a definite structure) the focus shifts from discovering "laws of nature" to definition of a physical object (system) and its states, and the distinct notion "measurable" replaces the vague notion "observable". On this basis the roles of physical models and measurements within physics, as well as two types (PIO- and SIO- type) of theories, activity, and experiment are discussed, and a different junction of "realism” and "constructivism" is presented.

According to the traditional requirement, formulated already by William Whewell in his account of the “consilience of inductions” in 1840, an explanatory scientific theory should be independently testable by new kinds of phenomena. A good theory should have unifying power in the sense that it explains and predicts several mutually independent phenomena. This paper studies the prospects of Bayesianism to motivate this kind of unification criterion for abductive confirmation.

Fundamental notions Husserl introduced in Ideen I, such as epochè, reality, and empty X as substrate, might be useful for elucidating how mathematical physics concepts are produced. However, this is obscured in the context of Husserl’s phenomenology itself. For this possibility, the author modifies Husserl’s fundamental notions introduced for pure phenomenology, which found all sciences on the absolute Ego. Subsequently, the author displaces Husserl's phenomenological notions toward the notions operating inside scientific activities themselves and shows this using a case study of the construction of noncommutative geometry. The perspective in Ideen I about geometry and mathematical physics includes points that are inappropriate to modern geometry and to modern physics, especially to noncommutative geometry and to quantum physics. The first point relates to the intuitive character of geometrical objects in Husserl. The second is linked to the notion of locality related to the notion of extension, by which Husserl characterizes the essence of physical things. The points show that the notion of empty X as a substrate, developed in “Phenomenology of Reason” in Ideen I, is helpful for considering the notions of physical reality and of geometrical space, especially reality in quantum physics and space in noncommutative geometry. The salient conclusions include the proposition that aphilosophical study of the relationship between the physical object X, which imparts a unity to what is given to sensibility, and the geometrical space X, which imparts a unity of sense to various mathematical operations, opens a reinterpretation of Husserl’s interpretation, supporting an epistemology of mathematical physics.

This paper is an outline of micro-epistemology as a philosophical reflection of "quantum wealth" as well as an anthropological analysis of the nature of human cognition in the scale of quantum. It covers the problems of the observation in and the trueness of micro-cognition, the perception of quantum phenomena, the relations between micro-cognition and practice as well as between macro-subject and micro-object, the descriptive turn in micro-cognition, the description of micro-world and some special descriptive problems in micro-cognition, etc. Micro-cognition, just as quantum theory shows, relates to a scale out of ordinary for human being. Quantum theory means a farther clarification of the background of human person’s existence and the human-world relation. It means anenormous extending of the framework of scientific theory, and thereby the rebuilding of the foundation of philosophy. It also means the refining and the rationalization of our conceptual tools and, in a certain extent, the reconstruction of the foundation of epistemology.

The problem of a final theory concern prospects of the contemporary science development. Arguments the adherents and opponents of the final theory idea appeal to philosophical and methodological beliefs. In my paper I am going, firstly, to analyze critically philosophical ideas lying on the basis of denying of the final theory project, and, secondly, to show that defense of that project demands reconsideration beliefs about a structure of a scientific theory and discussion a meaning of scientific laws.

This paper discusses Hacking’s experimental realism and suggests a concept of realization to the issue about realism. I first rephrase Hacking’s experimental realism by reconstructing them into two theses and three arguments. Then I consider that Resnik’s objection to Hacking’s experimental realism. According to my understanding of Hacking’s experimental realism, Resnik’s objection failed because of his position at theory realism. Nevertheless, I think that there are still two problems about the experimental aspect of the experimental realism. They are the pessimistic induction of experimental science argument and the combination of apparatus argument. I attempt to give a new perspective on the realism issue by proposing a set of related concepts containing categorization, model, and realization. Last, I show that this conceptual scheme can give a better solution of the two problems and cast a new light on the realism issue.

The paper analyzes the role of epistemology in contemporary science study. According to the representatives of cultural approach to scientific cognition the latter should be considered regardless of the issues of falsity or truth, which excludes epistemology from the sphere of science investigation. The paper argues, that though the inquiry of science as an aspect of human culture is quite possible, this sort of analysis is insufficient. In order to understand the nature of scientific cognition one has to supplement it by the results of epistemological consideration.

Glennan (2002) argues for the mechanism theory of causation that it explicates both type-level and token-level causation in terms of mechanism. I argue against the mechanism theory that it is not sufficient for explicating cause-effect relations at the token-level. I put forth two counterexamples (first, absence of causes and second, a cause preempting another cause) to the theory, and show that descriptions of a mechanism are inert in explicating cause-effect relations at the token level. I point out that the problems with the mechanism theory are due to explicating cause-effect relation in monolithic ways.

Philip Kitcher’s ‘gory detail’ argument aims to prove that molecular biology does not always have an explanatory primacy over higher-level functional biology. Explanations of higher-level biological discipline – functional biology – are completely adequate for explaining higher-level biological phenomena, and none of the gory molecular details of biological processes improve our understanding of these biological facts. I dispute Kitcher’s arguments by pointing out three problems embedded in his accounts. First, his view of molecular biology does not aptly reflect the nature of molecular biology that continuously provides richer and richer causal explanations about biological phenomena as well as information on their molecular level. Second, having this feature, molecular biology canhardly be deemed explanatorily irrelevant in explaining higher-level biological facts. Nor are explanations of molecular biology unexplainable. Third, functional biology fails to offer accurate and complete explanations about biological phenomena that are caused by the changes occurring at the molecular level. Functional biology does not remain stable in its ability to provide reliable explanations and thus loses its explanatory primacy to molecular biology. After all, molecular biology generates precise explanations of biological phenomena with reliable predictive power.

Explanation of the reason of ecological crisis – a key to development of a valuable paradigm new to the western mentality. The western variant of development has led to accident of self-destruction of the person or its exit on autotrophic stay out of the Earth. The dream cosmists (Tsiolkovsky, Vernadsky, Teilhard de Chardin, etc.) is half carried out, say, in connection with an exit racketeers in space. In traditional culture this exit was always: «Dao», the Buddhism, and shamanism. In traditional culture the relation to an inhabitancy was regulated always by the developed system of a taboo and the restrictions producing internalinterfacing space unities. Time puts a problem of judgement of this unity for an exit from environmental problems.

Author tried in this paper to deduce the principles of subjective world from some new concepts on objective world. I believe, through a full understanding of the objective world, we may easily approach to a general understanding of our subjective world – the human mind itself. One of the major obstacles to achieving this goal is that we still do not have a theoretical system that can describe both the worlds with the same concepts. In this paper I will put forward some of such concepts first and then try to deduce mind’s general organization and activities on the basis of those concepts.

The paper presents the reflection on philosophical foundations of contemporary physical concepts of global history and global structure of Universe. It shows that Democritus's dualism of "matter and void" is changed now in dualism of "matter and energy" in the frame of the strings theory, where anything what looks like "a void" is absent. At the same time the Poincare-Perelman's theorem calls to rethink Democritus's philosophy in the light of "space and hole" discourse and call it to come back. On the level of philosophy doctrines for contemporary fundamental physics it in necessary to combine dialectically the concept of "matter and void/hole" and the concept "matter and energy" (or "matter and singular conditions"). It is possible to do on the way of rethinking of H. Bergson's ideas presented in his book "Matter and memory". The conclusion is that fundamental dualism consists the relation "visible matter - invisible historical memory" inside of Universe.