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61. Hume Studies: Volume > 29 > Issue: 2
Haruko Inoue The Origin of the Indirect Passions in the Treatise: An Analogy Between Books 1 and 2
62. Hume Studies: Volume > 29 > Issue: 2
Brian Kirby Hume, Sympathy, and the Theater
63. Hume Studies: Volume > 29 > Issue: 2
David O’Connor Skepticism and Philo’s Atheistic Preference
64. Hume Studies: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
Robert A. Imlay How Not to Refute Hume's Theory of Causality: A Reply to Gray
65. Hume Studies: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
George S. Pappas Hume and Abstract General Ideas
66. Hume Studies: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
David C. Yalden-Thomson An Index of Hume's References in A Treatise of Human Nature
67. Hume Studies: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
Adi Parush Is Hume a Sceptic about Induction?: On a Would-be Revolution in the Interpretation of Hume's Philosophy
68. Hume Studies: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
M. Glouberman Hume on Modes
69. Hume Studies: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Richard P. Hiskes Has Hume a Theory of Social Justice?
70. Hume Studies: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
John Immerwahr The Failure of Hume's Treatise
71. Hume Studies: Volume > 30 > Issue: 1
Cass Weller Scratched Fingers, Ruined Lives, and Acknowledged Lesser Goods
72. Hume Studies: Volume > 30 > Issue: 1
Lívia Guimarães The Gallant and the Philosopher
73. Hume Studies: Volume > 30 > Issue: 1
Michael B. Gill Rationalism, Sentimentalism, and Ralph Cudworth
74. Hume Studies: Volume > 30 > Issue: 1
Daniel A. Schmicking Hume’s Theory of Simple Perceptions Reconsidered
75. Hume Studies: Volume > 30 > Issue: 1
Timothy M. Costelloe Hume’s Aesthetics: The Literature and Directions for Research
76. Hume Studies: Volume > 30 > Issue: 1
Ira M. Schnall Constancy, Coherence, and Causality
77. Hume Studies: Volume > 33 > Issue: 1
Ira M. Schnall Hume on “Popular” and “Philosophical” Skeptical Arguments
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In section 12 of the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, Hume presents several skeptical arguments, including “popular” and “philosophical”objections to inductive reasoning. I point out a puzzling aspect of Hume’s treatment of these two kinds of objection, and I suggest a way to deal with the puzzle. I then examine the roles of both kinds of objection in leading to “mitigated” skepticism. In particular, Hume claims that the philosophical objection can lead to limiting investigation to matters of common life; but several philosophers have noted that this objection, far from leading to this result, seems to be inconsistent with it. I examine attempts to establish consistency, and I suggest a way to understand how the philosophical objection, along with the popular objections, can indeed provide reasons for mitigated skepticism.
78. Hume Studies: Volume > 33 > Issue: 1
Christine Swanton Can Hume Be Read as a Virtue Ethicist?
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It is not unusual now for Hume to be read as part of a virtue ethical tradition. However there are a number of obstacles in the way of such a reading: subjectivist, irrationalist, hedonistic, and consequentialist interpretations of Hume. In this paper I support a virtue ethical reading by arguing against all these interpretations. In the course of these arguments I show how Hume should be understood as part of a virtue ethical tradition which is sentimentalist in a response-dependent sense, as opposed to Aristotelian.
79. Hume Studies: Volume > 33 > Issue: 1
Colin Heydt Relations of Literary Form and Philosophical Purpose in Hume’s Four Essays on Happiness
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This paper examines Hume’s four essays on happiness: the “Epicurean,” the “Stoic,” the “Platonist,” and the “Sceptic.” I argue, first, that careful attention to how these essays are written shows that they do not simply argue for one position over others. They also elicit affective and imaginative responses in order to modify the reader’s outlook and to improve the reader’s understanding in service to moral ends. The analysis offers an improved reading of the essays and highlights the intimate connections between the purposes of philosophical writing and its manner of presentation. Secondly, I contend that appreciating how Hume’s essays on happiness work on the reader demonstrates the insufficiency of Hume’s categories of “anatomist” and “painter.”
80. Hume Studies: Volume > 33 > Issue: 1
Georges Dicker Three Questions about Treatise 1.4.2
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Why does Hume think that the “distinct existence” of sensible objects implies their “continu’d existence”? Does Hume have any reason for thinking that objects have an intermittent existence, other than that they lack a “distinct” existence? Why does Hume think that the inference from the “coherence” of our impressions to the continued existence of objects is “at bottom” considerably different from causal reasoning? The answers proposed are, respectively, that perceptually delimited objects would for Hume be causally dependent on being perceived; that Hume’s collapse of the object/perception distinction leads him to the view that objects have as “gappy” an existence as our perceptions of them, and that cases of coherence falsify the generalizations that would need to hold for inferences from coherence to qualify as causal reasoning.