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Haruko Inoue
The Origin of the Indirect Passions in the Treatise:
An Analogy Between Books 1 and 2
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62.
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Brian Kirby
Hume, Sympathy, and the Theater
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63.
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David O’Connor
Skepticism and Philo’s Atheistic Preference
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64.
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Robert A. Imlay
How Not to Refute Hume's Theory of Causality:
A Reply to Gray
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65.
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George S. Pappas
Hume and Abstract General Ideas
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66.
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David C. Yalden-Thomson
An Index of Hume's References in A Treatise of Human Nature
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67.
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Adi Parush
Is Hume a Sceptic about Induction?:
On a Would-be Revolution in the Interpretation of Hume's Philosophy
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68.
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M. Glouberman
Hume on Modes
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69.
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Richard P. Hiskes
Has Hume a Theory of Social Justice?
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70.
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John Immerwahr
The Failure of Hume's Treatise
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71.
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Cass Weller
Scratched Fingers, Ruined Lives, and Acknowledged Lesser Goods
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72.
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Lívia Guimarães
The Gallant and the Philosopher
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73.
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Michael B. Gill
Rationalism, Sentimentalism, and Ralph Cudworth
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74.
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Daniel A. Schmicking
Hume’s Theory of Simple Perceptions Reconsidered
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75.
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Timothy M. Costelloe
Hume’s Aesthetics:
The Literature and Directions for Research
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76.
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Ira M. Schnall
Constancy, Coherence, and Causality
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77.
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Ira M. Schnall
Hume on “Popular” and “Philosophical” Skeptical Arguments
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In section 12 of the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, Hume presents several skeptical arguments, including “popular” and “philosophical”objections to inductive reasoning. I point out a puzzling aspect of Hume’s treatment of these two kinds of objection, and I suggest a way to deal with the puzzle. I then examine the roles of both kinds of objection in leading to “mitigated” skepticism. In particular, Hume claims that the philosophical objection can lead to limiting investigation to matters of common life; but several philosophers have noted that this objection, far from leading to this result, seems to be inconsistent with it. I examine attempts to establish consistency, and I suggest a way to understand how the philosophical objection, along with the popular objections, can indeed provide reasons for mitigated skepticism.
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Christine Swanton
Can Hume Be Read as a Virtue Ethicist?
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It is not unusual now for Hume to be read as part of a virtue ethical tradition. However there are a number of obstacles in the way of such a reading: subjectivist, irrationalist, hedonistic, and consequentialist interpretations of Hume. In this paper I support a virtue ethical reading by arguing against all these interpretations. In the course of these arguments I show how Hume should be understood as part of a virtue ethical tradition which is sentimentalist in a response-dependent sense, as opposed to Aristotelian.
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Colin Heydt
Relations of Literary Form and Philosophical Purpose in Hume’s Four Essays on Happiness
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This paper examines Hume’s four essays on happiness: the “Epicurean,” the “Stoic,” the “Platonist,” and the “Sceptic.” I argue, first, that careful attention to how these essays are written shows that they do not simply argue for one position over others. They also elicit affective and imaginative responses in order to modify the reader’s outlook and to improve the reader’s understanding in service to moral ends. The analysis offers an improved reading of the essays and highlights the intimate connections between the purposes of philosophical writing and its manner of presentation. Secondly, I contend that appreciating how Hume’s essays on happiness work on the reader demonstrates the insufficiency of Hume’s categories of “anatomist” and “painter.”
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Georges Dicker
Three Questions about Treatise 1.4.2
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Why does Hume think that the “distinct existence” of sensible objects implies their “continu’d existence”? Does Hume have any reason for thinking that objects have an intermittent existence, other than that they lack a “distinct” existence? Why does Hume think that the inference from the “coherence” of our impressions to the continued existence of objects is “at bottom” considerably different from causal reasoning? The answers proposed are, respectively, that perceptually delimited objects would for Hume be causally dependent on being perceived; that Hume’s collapse of the object/perception distinction leads him to the view that objects have as “gappy” an existence as our perceptions of them, and that cases of coherence falsify the generalizations that would need to hold for inferences from coherence to qualify as causal reasoning.
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