Robert Lassalle-Klein’s paper has provided an examination of how Ignatio Ellacuría, working with philosopher (and fellow Basque) Xavier Zubiri, both used and criticized some of Karl Rahner’s key ideas for the purpose of finding a philosophical framework for working out Ellacuría’s own theological vision, rooted in his experiences as a Spanish Jesuit serving in Latin America. While the technical work in this adaptation receives some commentary here, most of my remarks are observations about the impact of this work on Rahner scholarship more generally. Ellacuría’s use of Rahner is in marked contrast to Metz’s critique that saw Rahner’s transcendental method incapable of dealing with historical realities. Ellacuría’s work can be understood as supplying a particularity to Rahner’s austere structures that, I argue, is intrinsic to those structures. As such, Ellacuría’s (and Zubiri’s) work should be adopted into the canon of mainstream Rahner scholarship.

This work initiates a dialogue between pre-enlightenment mystic Julian of Norwich and post-modern philosopher Jean-Francois Lyotard. The first section of this paper gives an account of the post-modern subject for Lyotard and of how he renews the “unknown” and the “un-mastered,” in opposition to Kant’s autonomous subject. The second section shows the outer and inner strata of Julian’s treatise. The outer portion evidences the paradigm shift that places Julian’s reflections more prominently within Lyotard’s configuration of the sublime. The inner section examines the shifting emphases within Julian’s work between vision and speculation and the meaningful parallel this yields for the understanding of the sublime.

This article seeks to discern how, in spite of our fallenness, we can come to desire what is good. Judging desire and vision to be inter­dependent faculties, it finds that human reason alone is incapable of generating ‘good’ desire. Rather, desire must be transformed gradually and in relation to human vision. To this end, and drawing on James Alison and Iris Murdoch, particular practices are offered whose strength lies in focusing less on altering the objects than the quality of human vision and desire.

An examination of Rahner’s theology and cognitive linguistics shows that the two are basically in accord concerning sacramental efficacy. This article also puts cognitive linguistics into conversation with Rahner’s theologies of expression. In Rahner’s theology of the symbol, he argues that all beings express themselves in that which is not themselves. Furthermore, Rahner noted the existence of uniquely powerful “primordial words” (Urworte), which mediate the reality to which they point. Cognitive linguistics sees all human knowing as mediated by the “embodied mind,” and characterized by concept integration, wherein a given thing comes to be known in terms of another. This understanding of embodied mind, poses a significant challenge to the Christian tradition. This challenge is answered, though, by Rahner’s distinctive anthropology and christology.

At the heart of Karl Rahner’s ecclesiology is a sacramental understanding of the church. This approach, which has its grounding in Rahner’s trademark theology of grace, connects the church with both God’s self-communication in history and human freedom. Sacramental ecclesiologies, however, are subject to the criticism that they do insufficient justice to “mission” as formative of the church’s identity and purpose. Determining whether Rahner’s theology articulates adequately the mission of the church in the world is a primary concern of this paper. As part of its exploration, the paper identifies the echoes of Rahner’s sacramental approach in contemporary Protestant sacramental ecclesiologies.

A contrast is developed between the educational views of van Schurman and Astell, revolving around their sense of Christian piety and their stance on women’s place in the social and political sphere. The work of Irwin, Hill, and others is cited, and it is concluded that important differences between the views of the two thinkers can be delineated, and that doing so helps us to understand the intellectual and philosophical milieu of the seventeenth century. In addition, the debate sheds light on today’s gender-essentialism controversies in education, and the extent to which intellectual rationality is a general human virtue.

Plato’s Euthyphro presents a puzzle about priority: is deity prior to morality, or vice versa? A Neoplatonic solution identifies God with the Good, claiming the dilemma to be illusory. If we treat the orders of being and power as distinct, however, the God of Genesis 1 may seem to be prior in one order, while goodness is prior in the other; the picture becomes complex, with the various senses of priority apparently balancing out. Without being either Neoplatonic or following other ancient theologies, therefore, Genesis 1 challenges Plato’s dichotomy, highlighting the potential for finding philosophical resources in theological texts.

In his excellent book Natural Signs and Knowledge of God: A New Look at Theistic Arguments, C. Stephen Evans argues that what underlies the classical theistic arguments are theistic natural signs. The awareness of our own contingency underlies the cosmological argument, beneficial order underlies the teleological argument, our experience of feeling moral obligations underlies the moral argument, and the intrinsic value of human beings underlies the axiological argument. Natural signs point to an entity without forcing belief in this entity upon the perceiver. Therefore, natural signs can be interpreted in different ways. Understanding the classical theistic arguments as an expression of underlying theistic natural signs explains why the reactions to the arguments have been so different.

Advances in scientific study of the brain now enable the examination of nature and grace in human rationality’s embodiment in the brain’s biological processing. I model the brain’s biology using the dispositional tendencies of nature—characterized by Jonathan Edwards, C. S. Peirce, and the Jesuit philosophical theologian Donald Gelpi—to examine gracing of the mind’s habit formation (habitus) in terms of memory, learning, and decision making. This turn to tendency suggests a shift from understanding soul as Aristotelian act to instead emphasizing the potentiality informing the body and clarifies a scientifically plausible Rahnerian interpretation of obediential potency.

A potential proselyte asks Hillel to explain the Torah “while I stand on one leg.” The Talmudic anecdote is always read as critical of those who want a Torah for Dummies. I offer an alternative. The Torah’s position rests on one principle alone, God. “Won’t an account of the creation that rests only on one principle teeter, like a person on one leg?” Hillel’s response homes in on what God does and what pagan deities cannot do. But God’s contribution, while needed to account for the human sector of the creation, cannot manage the extra-human sector. Required for that is a pagan principle. The whole can stand steadily only on two legs. So the proselyte’s conversion cannot be unreserved.

This article reconstructs and evaluates Josiah Royce’s treatment of the problem of evil. I begin with an explanation of how Royce understands Job’s situation in the biblical account to be representative of the human predicament with respect to God and evil (§1). Next, I assess Royce’s account of three relatively familiar responses to the problem of evil he means to reject (§2), and then I provide an analysis of his own proposal for addressing the problem (§3). In the final section of the paper, I raise four objections to Royce’s idealist theodicy (§4).

Drawing upon the works of I. A. Richards, Max Black, and Paul Ricoeur, Sallie McFague’s metaphorical theology aims to recover the central role of metaphor within biblical narrative-parables. This paper claims that metaphorical theology is not just a constructive approach to religious discourse but is linguistically unavoidable. The scope of this paper is an in-depth review of Sallie McFague’s metaphorical theology while demonstrating its valuable contribution to the growing conversation regarding the limits and possibilities of religious discourse. Through expositions on narrative, parable, and metaphor, Sallie McFague challenges contemporary theology to move beyond self-imposed boundaries though the power of linguistic critique and embodied imagination.

This article highlights some of the difficulties that accompany any attempt to articulate an understanding of forgiveness that is at once coherent, just and desirable. Through a close examination of Charles Griswold’s book Forgiveness: A Philosophical Exploration, I suggest that there are good reasons to think that forgiveness is intrinsically ambiguous, both conceptually and morally. I argue that there is an underlying tension between the concerns that shape the definition, and those that are invoked when affirming the good of forgiveness. Using Charles Taylor’s A Secular Age, I then provide some commentary concerning this ambiguity and make some brief suggestions about how this ambiguity might be theologically fruitful.

Among theologians and philosophers in the American tradition, the idea of Hell is understood best through the works of Jonathan Edwards and William James. Both Edwards and James understood the idea of Hell as part of a worldview in which humans were humbled by their fallible nature. There are important differences between the views of Edwards and James, however, and these differences involve how each of them apprehends the suffering of other people. Edwards remains aesthetically aloof regarding the suffering of others, while James remains tragically tied to such suffering.

In this article, I draw on Kierkegaard’s often over-looked work, The Concept of Anxiety, to gain deeper insight into the tenor of melancholy. We discover that Kierkegaard labels anxiety, due to its connection to hereditary sin, as the source for melancholy. Thus, contrary to the usual interpretation of Kierkegaard, I argue that melancholy is more than an individual’s struggle with existence, but is intimately tied to the historical environment, because it is steeped in an ever-increasing, ever-deepening anxiety. This link be­tween anxiety and melancholy clears away misunderstandings about Kierkegaard’s description of melancholy and suggests implications in psychology, philosophy, and theology.

This article proposes to elaborate aesthetic judgment. The context is John Dadosky’s call for such an elaboration in light of the theological and philosophical import of a recovery of beauty. Following Dadosky’s suggestion that this be set within Lonergan’s appeal to interiority, the article signals two points in Dadosky’s program: patterns of experience and the role of cognitional operations. The article turns to Mikel Dufrenne’s work on the phenomenology of aesthetic experience. Based on this work, data is presented on behalf of configuring a pattern of cognitional operations that is specific to aesthetic experience and that exemplifies Lonergan’s general empirical pattern of cognitional operations: experience, understanding, judgment.