Whenever we analyze the issue of spiritual activities, we can never lay aside of the macro-background of “spirit service to life”. Spirit is” software” of life. It is essentially to carry out determination of self life and a nervous system which make the information processing and feedback between self life and outside world. It has reasonable structure system and systematical work mechanism. The basic structure system of the spirit of human beings is like this: self is the core and leading of spirit running, which has properties in three aspects which are will, needs and motility. These properties formed a unity. Will mainly shows theessential property of self, which is in the domination and core position. Needs mainly shows the main part of life requesting and demanding for objective outside, which is in the conditional and secondary position. If we put the Needs in the key position, it will blaspheme the meaning of life and lose the value of life. Motility is a centralized reflection of life activity, which could be a means for the implementation of self Will and acquisition of self needs. In the tangible world, it is displayed as colorful life activity. In the intangible spiritual world, it is displayed as the information processing ability and information feedback ability of self life. Motility has four different levels: emotion, subconsciousness, consciousness, cognition. Correspondingly, the development of spirit could also be divided as four levels. In each level, self, activity, requested development degree, property characteristics and main content have certain of differences. In structure system of spirit, there is a correlation among each part and each element, which will interact with own characteristics to form an organic whole. In fact, it is an essential sublimation of tangible body and an intangible life existed with information form. The following figure shows the relationship of each element:[*Electronic Editor's Note: Figure in PDF of article*]This structure system of spirit, which isn’t a simple frame but an abstract mechanism of spirit running, is life active system of informatization. This system and mechanism make the changeable spiritual activity clear and orderly, and make the abundant and various life activities systematic and vivid. This system’s self isdeveloping, whose development still comply with the law of life development, symbolizing the development and extension of vitality. This development could be considered as continuance of life progress. In the low-grade life, it is mainly displayed as biological stress stage of promoting the favorable and avoiding the unfavorable as well as blind and instinctive affective response stage; in the highgrade animals, it is gradually displayed certain of psychological activity ability and study cognition ability. In human beings, it is gradually displayed awake of consciousness and mature of reason, making human beings to control themselves and change all things to become the soul of the world. Through this structure system and running mechanism, we could get a systematical explanation for theessence of emotion, mystery of psychological activity, process of consciousness awake, occurrence mechanism of dream. Meantime, we put forth that human beings must experience the second awakerational awake to become the true society human when human beings become the humans with souls after consciousness awake.

Explaining phenomenal consciousness may be the scientific and philosophical problem of our time, the last frontier of knowledge. This is not at all an easy task. For any serious attempt at finding a place for consciousness within the natural world was not successful so far. There is a conceptual tension here which makes this business of coming up with a unified (monist) explanation of mind and physical world one of the most intriguing mystery. The most predominant image of the natural world is one of a physicalist type, whereas the mind, and especially the conscious subjective experience seem not to fit well within that physicalistexplanation. That explanatory failure may require a dualist metaphysical scheme (probably of a neo-Cartesian type). It may seem very well that we are caught in a dilemma, for we either embrace a physicalist explanation, but then it seems that we leave out consciousness from the big picture we are looking for, or else we face the huge task of conceiving a dramatic change of our scientific outlook about the natural world, and we don’t quite see how that would be possible or desirable. But then, should any attempt at understanding consciusness be a dead-end, something doomed to fail from a theoretical and explanatory point of view? In my paper I explore some philosophical underpinnings of contemporary dualism, focussing on the modal facets of the conceivability (neo-Cartesian) arguments. I will asses both the prospects and the moot points of this type of arguments. Of particular interest is the role that two-dimensional semantics plays in nowadays discussions of this topic.

Teleosemantic theories of content constitute a mixed family of different proposals and accounts about what consists mental content. In the present paper, I would like examine the scope and limits of a particular and well defined teleosemantic theory such as Millikan’s account. My aim entails presenting arguments in order to show how her theory of mental content is unnable of giving a complete account of the whole mental life almost for adult human agents without commiting certain adaptationist assumptions. I am going to present my arguments in the following order. In section 1 I present an outline of the Millikan’s theory of mental content. In section 2, after defining useless content I pay attention to her treatment of it. In section 3 I set out my queries concerning to the fixation of useless content defended by Millikan. Finally, I conclude that the theory about useless content doesn’t identify content in terms of sufficient and necessary conditions.

The strong programme in the sociology of science is officially "inductively" based, generalizing a number of highly acclaimed case studies into a general approach to the social study of science. However, at a critical juncture, the programme allies itself with certain radical ideas in philosophical semantics, notablyWittgenstein's "rule following considerations". The result is an implausible, radical conventionalist view of natural science which undermines the empirical programme.

In modern physics nonlinear systems with a lot of heterogeneity and anisotropy which are in strong fields and processes of crossings of electromechanical, spinor-mechanical, termo-magnetic and other ones are actual. Correct building with the help of mathematics of the given theories is possible only with the attraction geometry of the stratified spaces. The geometry of the stratified spaces chow its power by examining these systems and processes. Noncontradictional, covarianty theory of the single whole field of matter can be built only with the attraction the geometry of the stratified spaces. Introduction the stratified spaces into physics of geometry is a continuation of works of Hamiltone, Langrange, Aler and other scientists. The problem is multivariate spaces of internal degrees offreedom. The ideas, positions of geometry of stratified spaces and their supplements demand a new philosophical sense of understanding.

Thomas Kuhn’s theory of paradigm reveals a pattern of scientific progress, in which normal science alternates with scientific revolution, but he underrated too much the function of scientific test in his pattern. Wesley C. Salmon pointed out that, on criticizing the so-called testing pattern of science, Kuhn focused all his attention on a single testing model, namely hypothetico–deductive (H–D) schema. However, as a matter of fact, many philosophers of science had already abandoned that schema and taken Bayesian schema as a proper testing model. The main difference between Bayesian schema and the H–D schema lies in that the former is a testing model for more than one theory while the latter just for a single theory. Since Kuhn, multi-theoretical testing model has become aconsensus among experts, that is, a theory and its rivals should be faced with testing together, rather than a theory being tested in isolation. Kuhn was correct in finding the H–D schema not appropriate to scientific test, but didn’t catch the propriety of Bayesian schema in this field. This led to his disapproval of the logic or method of scientific test. I agrees largely with Salmon’s appraisal of Kuhn’s view on scientific test, and gives a further argument for it. I’ll employs Bayesian schema to re-examine Kuhn’s theory of paradigm, uncover its logical, or rational, components, and thereby illustrate the tension structure of logic and belief, rationality and irrationality, and comparability and incommensurability in the process of scientific revolution.

In this paper, I will take advantage of the controversy on the legitimacy of adaptationism in evolutionary biology to further investigate the nature of adaptationistic thinking, or biological explanations in general. To this end, first I will look at the famous and provocative criticism made by Gould and Lewontin (1979) against then-prevalent adaptationism --- a research strategy for accounting for the origin of traits of organisms seemingly adapted to the environment by appealing primarily to natural selection. Then I will consider its counterarguments put forward by Dennett (1995), one of the proponents of adaptationism, in order toscrutinize the intrinsically hypothetical character of adaptationistic thinking. By amplifying Dennett’s points, I will finally reach the conclusion that there are two senses --- objective and subjective --- in which adaptationistic thinking is said to be hypothetical, which nonetheless do not prevent it from qualifying as scientific practice. In the process, I will also gain an insight into the sense in which the theory of natural selection is said to be mechanistic, as a spin-off.

Recent scholarship (by mainly Michael Friedman, but also by Thomas Uebel) on the philosophy of Rudolf Carnap covering the period from the publication of Carnap’s’ 1928 book Der Logische Aufbau der Welt through to the mid to late 1930’s has tended to view Carnap as espousing a form of conventionalism (epitomized by his adoption of the principle of tolerance) and not a form of empirical foundationalism. On this view, it follows that Carnap’s 1934 The Logical Syntax of Language is the pinnacle of his work during this era, this book having developed in its most complete form the conventionalist approach to dissolving the pseudoproblems that often attend philosophical investigation. My task in this paper, in opposition to this trend, is to resuscitate the empiricist interpretation of Carnap’s work during this time period. The crux of my argument is that Carnap’s 1934 book, by eschewing for the most part the empiricism he espouses in the Aufbau and in his 1932 The Unity of Science, is led to a form of conventionalism that faces the serious hazard of collapsing into epistemological relativism. My speculation is that Carnap came to recognize this deficiency in his 1934 book, and in subsequent work (“Testability and Meaning”, published in 1936/37) felt the need to re-instate his empiricist agenda. This subsequent work provides a much improved empiricist epistemology from Carnap’s previous efforts and, ashistory informs us, sets the standard for future research in the theory of confirmation.

科学追求真理，古希腊哲学家柏拉图认为精确的理念和数学就是 真理。本文对现代科学和数学进行了深入的反思，论证了理念和数学不 是真理。与真气同在的理念和数学是真理，与骄气同在的理念和数学是 谬误，人所得到的理念和数学只不过是在真气和骄气之间的模糊值。本 文试图在耶稣的真气中，建立三位一体的真气科学，让自然科学和社会 科学在真气的本形耶稣里得以贯通。本文的目的是通过这三位一体的真 气科学，让人在真气本形耶稣里自由地追求各自的真理。尽管各自的真理是模糊值，但模糊真理胜过精确谬误。真气和道，阴阳一体，是中华 文明的根基。《圣经》讲：“上帝是灵。”《圣经》所讲的“灵”的希 伯来字是ruagh。ruagh 的原意有气、风、生命力、等等含义。所以根据 希伯来字原意，这“灵”可以直译为中国古老的《黄帝内经》所述的 “真气”，上帝就是真气。耶稣就是道，是真气的本形，与真气同在。真气看不见，属阳；真气的形看得见，属阴。真气和真气的形，阴阳互 根，合为一体，在不同的时空彰显，就是道。真气、耶稣、道，三位一 体，是宇宙的独一真神。中国道家所述的阴阳关系，是宇宙万物的根本 关系，是超对称关系。万物都与耶稣的真气，构成阴阳关系。耶稣是真 气的本形，耶稣就是真气，万物始于他，归于他，依靠他。一切神学、哲学、科学、经济学、医学、等等，也始于他，归于他，依靠他。

A major realist response to Laudan-type historical arguments against scientific realism by seeking to identify parts of a successful scientific theory one can claim to have been "essentially" implicated in the theory’s distinctive success, which they regard as primary candidates for realist truth ascription. But, how is one to determine which parts of any theory are "central" or "peripheral", "essential" or "idle" in the required sense? Attempts at spelling out relevant synchronic links between successful predictions and correct partial theorizing increasingly look like a misguided effort. This paper proposes a weaker, but arguably still powerful version of the relation between success and growth of cumulative truth. Focusing on a pivotal case study in recent debates between realists and anti-realists (theories of light in the 19th century), a promising link between success and partial theoretical representation is located in the expansion and stabilization of approximately correct partial modeling of intended domains. The realist link is then formulated accordingly. In the resulting approach (a) predictive success is preserved as a marker of cumulative theoretical gain, but (b) specific gain identification is a diachronic rather than synchronic matter (i.e. specification of particular loci of theoretical gain associated with a given line of predictive success is not assumed to be generally possible at the time of the success in question). The truth ascriptions that get licensed are partial-of a piece-meal and retrospective sort, focused on methodologically specifiable theoretical subplots from past science.

In his article “Constructive Empiricism Now” van Fraassen chooses an extremely interesting example to defend his thesis that scientific theories are only representations, so that the aim of science is to give us reliable, empirically adequate, descriptions of the observable aspects of the world. For him, there is no continuum of observable/unobservable, as he draws a line of distinction at a point that eliminates from his ontology such cases as fields of forces and sub-atomic particles. As a result, he puts forward the position that electronic images in the microscope and subatomic particles are “public hallucinations” and not “real things”. What I thus propose to do is to examine van Fraassen’s anti-realism through the looking class of realism, my aim being to defend a realist view of science: To this purpose, I will focus on two main issues: (a) the question of representations in science and in particular of images we “see” through a microscope and (b) the question of the criteria for defining physical reality. In this context, I will argue that van Fraassen’s definition of the “real” is an anti-realist version of the positivist trend, which cannot fit in the picture of science that emerges today. To understand, thus, the world of physics we need to re-examine our definition of reality and make space for an ontology that goes beyond the well-defined spatio-temporal existence of what van Fraassen calls a “real thing”.

In this paper, we present an argument showing why the general properties of a self-organizing system (e.g. being far from equilibrium) may be too weak to characterize biological and proto-biological systems. The special character of biological systems, tell us that its distinctive capacities could have been developed in pre-biotic times. In other words, the basic properties of life would be better comprehended if we think that they were much more likely early in time. We developed a conceptual proposal on the origins of pre-biotic world, a kind of protocellular system which is made up of simple molecular compounds interconnecting three different types of processes. The interrelation of these processes characterizes the “Informational Dynamical System” (our conceptualprotocell proposal) as an autonomous dynamical system that can maintain by itself in far from equilibrium state, as opposed to those that depend on external causes. Consequently it follows that, in the dawn of pre-biotic world, there was no DNA or RNA or proteins to begin with. As well, our proposal implies the separation of biological evolution from the kind of open-ended evolution that gave rise to first breed of animate matter.

In this article, I firstly show that, following Poincaré, it turns out that the very foundation of classical mechanics implicates that all just can’t be explained. Next, I discuss principles of mechanics as they are viewed by Poincaré. This will reveal the particularity of the principle of relativity in its form of “pseudo-universal” argument.

It is said that the theory of relativity and quantum theory are independent of each other. Their relationship is like water and oil. Now, it is very important for modern physics to synthesize them. In Physics and mathematics, Super String theory is studied, but instead of it, the tendimensional world appears. Our world is a three-dimensional world . What is the ten-dimensional world? It is more difficult than the string which is of Plank length. In the ten dimensional world, physics is facing darkness and nothingness which man can not explain with the traditional physical words.The solution depends upon philosophy. I tried to synthesize themand succeeded.The following is an outline of my synthesis. 1. Utility and relativity of mathematical truth Mathematical truth is not absolute but relative. In the universe ( outside the solar system ), there is no perfect line. Because, by the gravitation of large astronomical bodies, space and lines are curved. Mathematical figure and numeration depend upon the promise of mankind. These are not absolute. Physics, which is grounded upon mathematics in certainty, is also relative. It expresses not the whole of the universe but a part of the universe. 2. Community and difference between the theory of relativity and quantum theory Community is the negation of absoluteness of physical attributes. Difference is the assessment for mathematics. The theory of relativity relies on mathematics but quantumtheory does not always rely on it. According to circumstances, Niels Bohr and quantum physicists abandoned a frame of reference. 3. The origin of the theory of relativity 4. The origin of quantum theory In short, the theory of relativity and quantum theory are not perfect, they only irradiate a part of the universe. Man can reach the whole of the universe only by the philosophical intuition of nothingness and infinite (the principle of nothingness and love).

The present thesis, compatible with Darwinian theory, endeavours to provide original answers to the question of why the evolution of species leads to beings more complex than those existing before. It is based on the repetition of two main principles alleged to play a role in evolution towards complexity, i.e. "juxtaposition" and "integration". Juxtaposition is the addition of identical entities. Integration is the modification, or specialisation, of these entities, leading to entities on a higher level, which use the previous entities as units. Several concrete examples of the process are given, at the genetic level (introns), at the anatomical level and at the social level. Structures where integration at one level leaves the units at a lower level in a state of relative autonomy can be describedusing the metaphor of the "mosaic", and the description can also be applied to the human brain and functioning of thought, where essential functions such as language or memory have a mosaic structure.

Postpositivist epistemology treats science as merely a matter of consensus. The main reason for that is the lack of objectivity. We argue that objectivity is not an essential claim for a scientific methodology. Science as an institutional enterprise is characterized mainly by progressive discourse and not by objectivity. In turn, progressiveness depends on a set of norms and regulative principles. This view of science as progressive discourse provides a more adequate basis for dealing with opinion conflicts, scientific methodology, and questions of authority in science than does the consensus view.

I challenge the assumption in the debate on the conventionality of simultaneity that a simultaneity relation of special relativity should be defined relative to a single inertial observer, not relative to multiple inertial observers as such. I construct an example of a simultaneity relation relative to two inertial observers, and demonstrate that it is explicitly definable in terms of the causal connectibility relation and the world lines of the two observers. I argue that, consequently, thesimultaneity relation of special relativity is not uniquely definable from the causal connectibility relation.

The success of a scientific theory T is not an all-or-nothing matter; nor is a theory something one can usually accept or reject in toto (i.e. one may take T as being "approximately true", or take as true just certain "parts" of it, without necessarily affirming every posit and claim specific to T as being either completely right or completely wrong). This, however, raises questions about precisely which parts of T deserve to be taken as approximately true. on the basis of its success. A line of thinkers, particularly Kitcher, Leplin and Psillos, variously look for parts of a theory they can claim to have been "essentially" implicated in its distinctivesuccess, which they regard as primary candidates for realist truth ascription. But, how is one to determine which parts of any theory are "central" or "peripheral", "essential" or "idle" in the required sense? Attempts at spelling out relevant synchronic links between successful predictions and correct partial theorizing increasingly look like a misguided effort. As an alternative, this paper proposes a weaker, but arguably powerful enough, version of the realist relation between success and truth. Focusing on a pivotal case study in recent debates between realists and anti-realists (the conceptual changes undergone by theories oflight in the 19th century), a promising link between success and partial theoretical representation is located in the expansion and stabilization of approximately correct partial theoretical models of the theory's intended domain. The realist link is then formulated accordingly. In the resulting approach (a) predictive success is preserved as a marker of cumulative theoretical gain, but (b) specification of the latter is a diachronic rather than synchronic matter (i.e. gains become clear only after generations of theory change; specification of the particular loci of theoretical gain in connection with a given line of predictive success is not assumed to be generally possible at the time of the success in question). The truth ascriptions that get licensed are partial-of a piece-meal and retrospective sort, focused on methodologically specifiable theoretical subplots from past science.

Mechanism is a conception of the world according to which all can be explained by mechanics expressed by its fundamental concepts and principles. I’ll firstly show that, following Poincaré’s discussion on mechanical explanation, the very foundation of classical mechanics implicates that all just can’t be explained. Next, I’ll discuss the principles of mechanics as they are viewed by Poincaré, especially the principle of relativity that has a particularity in its form of “pseudo-universal”argument, as well as in its fundamental role for experiences. It will be finally revealed that, the mechanism can be used as a convention, because, by the principle of relativity, we can have only local experiments but never on the universe, and consequently, non of our experiences would never lead us to any phenomenon irreducible to mechanics. Nevertheless, it doesn’t exclude the contrary possibility: experiences can reveal that it is not to commode as it used to be, without disapproving it.

Modern physics asks: how do the objects exist? This kind of question inevitably touches upon philosophy; to be precise, it involves metaphysics that traditionally deals with these problems. There are grounds to assume that a quantum object in a certain sense does not exist until it is registered. Thus, one of the conclusions says, “Photon is a photon if it is a registered photon”. This is a paraphrase of well-known Wheeler’s words about the essence of quantum phenomenon. These effects cannot be understood if we come from the assumption that all existing (‘real’) and quantum objects in particular, is only being of the actual. To explain quantum mechanics phenomena we need to realize that there exists another modus of being. Quantum mechanics refers to some sort oftranscendence. Such conclusion is based not only on the analysis of the testing of Aspeckt’s experiments. The whole structure of quantum mechanics confirms it. The revision of the New European paradigm leads to the return of such conception of existence that brings us to the traditional metaphysical understanding of the being and implies its study on several levels of existence. The conclusion of this kind leads to a serious correction of the philosophical model of the world built by modern natural science.