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41. International Studies in Philosophy Monograph Series: 2006
Julio César Díaz The Question of Being
42. International Studies in Philosophy Monograph Series: 2006
Julio César Díaz At Delphi
43. International Studies in Philosophy Monograph Series: 2006
Julio César Díaz Notes
44. International Studies in Philosophy Monograph Series: 2006
Julio César Díaz Cruelty as Imperative
45. International Studies in Philosophy Monograph Series: 2006
Julio César Díaz Family Pictures
46. International Studies in Philosophy Monograph Series: 2006
Julio César Díaz Mintage
47. International Studies in Philosophy Monograph Series: 2006
Julio César Díaz Assertions
48. International Studies in Philosophy Monograph Series: 2006
Julio César Díaz Gestures
49. International Studies in Philosophy Monograph Series: 2009
Stephen David Ross Diachrony
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A giving which gives only its gift, but in the giving holds itself back and withdraws, . . . . (Heidegger, TB, 8)the Forgotten is . . . the Law. (Lyotard, “HJ," 147)how could this thought (Heidegger’s), a thought so devoted to remembering that a forgetting (of Being) takes place in all thought, in all art, in all “representation” of the world, how could it possibly have ignored the thought of [that] which, in a certain sense, thinks, tries to think, nothing but that very fact? . . . to the point of suppressing and foreclosing to the very end the horrifying (and inane) attempt at exterminating, at making us forget forever what, in Europe, reminds us, ever since the beginning, that “there is” the Forgotten? (Lyotard, HJ, 4)[I]n witnessing, one also exterminates. The witness is a traitor. (Lyotard, I, 204)The Other becomes my neighbour precisely through the way the face summons me, calls for me, begs for me, and in so doing recalls my responsibility, and calls me into question.. . . as if I had to answer for the other’s death even before being. (83)
50. International Studies in Philosophy Monograph Series: 2009
Stephen David Ross Bibliography
51. International Studies in Philosophy Monograph Series: 2009
Stephen David Ross Notes
52. International Studies in Philosophy Monograph Series: 2009
Stephen David Ross Counter-History
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The fundamental faith of the metaphysicians is the faith in opposite values. . . .For one may doubt, first, whether there are any opposites at all, and secondly whether these popular valuations and opposite values on which the metaphysicians put their seal, are not perhaps merely foreground estimates, only provisional perspectives, perhaps even from some nook, perhaps from below, frog perspectives, as it were, to borrow an expression painters use. For all the value that the true, the truthful, the selfless may deserve, it wouldstill be possible that a higher and more fundamental value for life might have to be ascribed to deception, selfishness, and lust. . . .Maybe! (Nietzsche, BGE, #2)
53. International Studies in Philosophy Monograph Series: 2009
Stephen David Ross Introduction: The Forgotten
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What we can forget we must remember.What we cannot remember we must not forget.The Forgotten is the Law. (Lyotard, HJ)
54. International Studies in Philosophy Monograph Series: 2009
Stephen David Ross Index
55. International Studies in Philosophy Monograph Series: 2009
Stephen David Ross Body and Image
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The phenomenology of memory proposed here is structured around two questions: Of what are there memories? Whose memory is it? (Ricoeur, MHF, 3)in the margins of a critique of imagination, there has to be an uncoupling of imagination from memory . . . . (5–6)
56. International Studies in Philosophy Monograph Series: 2009
Stephen David Ross Disaster
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The disaster ruins everything, all the while leaving everything intact. It does not touch anyone in particular; “I” am not threatened by it, but spared, left aside. It is in this way that I am threatened;. . . .The disaster is separate; that which is most separate.When the disaster comes upon us, it does not come. The disaster is its imminence, but since the future, as we conceive of it in the order of lived time, belongs to the disaster, the disaster has always already withdrawn or dissuaded it; there is no future for the disaster, just as there is no time or space for its accomplishment. (Blanchot, WD, 1–2)
57. International Studies in Philosophy Monograph Series: 2009
Stephen David Ross Pain
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Physical pain has no voice, but when it at last finds a voice, it begins to tell a story, and the story that it tells is about the inseparability of these three subjects, their embeddedness in one another. (Scarry, BP, 3)
58. International Studies in Philosophy Monograph Series: 2009
Stephen David Ross Enlightenment
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Without the mind of a seer, I now maintain that I can predict (vorhersagen) from the aspects and precursor—signs (Vorzeichen) of our times, the achievement (Erreichung) of this end, and with it, at the same time, the progressive improvement of mankind, a progress which henceforth cannot be totally reversible . . . a phenomenon of this kind in human history can never be forgotten (vergisst sich nicht mehr). (Kant, CF; quoted in Lyotard, SH, 408)
59. International Studies in Philosophy Monograph Series: 2009
Stephen David Ross Re-membering
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Memory is, therefore, neither perception nor conception, but a state or affection of one of these, conditioned by lapse of time. As already observed, there is no such thing as memory of the present while present; for the present is object only of perception, and the future, of expectation, but the object of memory is the past. All memory, therefore, implies a time elapsed; consequently only those animals which perceive time remember, and the organ whereby they perceive time is also that whereby they remember. (Aristotle, OM, 449b24–30)
60. International Studies in Philosophy Monograph Series: 2009
Stephen David Ross Re-calling
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[T]here is that theory which you have often described to us—that what we call learning is really just recollection (anamnēsis). If that is true, then surely what we recollect now we must have learned at some time before, which is impossible unless our souls existed somewhere before they entered this human shape. So in that way too it seems likely that the soul is immortal. (Plato, Phaedo, 72e–73a)Thus the soul, since it is immortal and has been born many times, and has seen all things both here and in the other world, has learned everything that is. So we need not be surprised if it can recall the knowledge of virtue or anything else which, as we see, it once possessed. (Plato, Meno, 81cd)