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41. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 8 > Issue: 2
Erich Rast Harming Yourself and Others: a Note on the Asymmetry of Agency in Action Evaluations
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Principles are investigated that allow one to establish a preference ordering between possible actions based on the question of whether the acting agent himself or other agents will benefit or be harmed by the consequences of an action. It is shown that a combination of utility maximization, an altruist principle, and weak negative utilitarianism yields an ordering that seems to be intuitively appealing, although it does not necessarily reflect common everyday evaluations of actions.
42. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 8 > Issue: 2
Juliana F. Lima Herman Cappellen, Josh Dever, The Inessential Indexical
43. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 8 > Issue: 2
Thomas Hodgson Jeffrey C. King, Scott Soames, Jeff Speaks, New Thinking about Propositions
44. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 8 > Issue: 2
Shay Logan Charles Parsons, Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays
45. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 8 > Issue: 2
Emily Waddie Adrian Bardon (ed.), The Future of the Philosophy of Time
46. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 9 > Issue: 2
Jiri Benovsky ‘Nothing over and above’ or ‘nothing’?: On Eliminativism, Reductionism, and Composition
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In this article, I am interested in an issue concerning eliminativism about ordinary objects that can be put as the claim that the eliminativist is guilty of postulating the existence of something (atoms arranged tablewise), but not of something that is identical to it (the table). But, as we will see, this turns out to be a problem for everybody except the eliminativist. Indeed, this issue highlights a more general problem about the relationship between an entity and the parts the compose it. Furthermore, I am not interested in this issue only for its own sake and for the sake of understanding and defending eliminativism, but also for the way it allows me to discuss the differences and relations between eliminativism and reductionism. What difference is there between eliminating an entity and reducing it to something else?
47. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 9 > Issue: 2
Salvatore Italia Truth as One, Facts as Many: A Way to Gradual Realism
48. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 9 > Issue: 2
Kai Michael Büttner Truth Conditions and Behaviourism
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Quine tries to combine truth conditional semantics with linguistic behaviourism. To this end, he identifies the truth conditions of a sentence with the conditions that prompt speakers to assign truth or falsity to the sentence. The first problem with this conception is that truth conditions determine not when truth-value assignments are made, but when they are correct. This fact vitiates Quine’s account of observation sentences (section 2). A second difficulty pertains only to theoretical sentences. The correctness of truth-value assignments to such sentences depends not on current experiences, but on what can be experienced on other occasions. This observation militates against Quine’s general verification holism and against his account of predications (section 3 and 4). Combining truth conditional semantics and linguistic behaviourism is possible, though, if both these lessons are taken into account (section 5).
49. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 9 > Issue: 2
Yves Bouchard KK-Thesis and Contextualism
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In this paper, I defend a contextualist reading of the KK-thesis. In the first part, I present the general problem and I contrast three concepts of knowledge with respect to the KK-thesis, (Hintikka, Lemmon, and Williamson) that all rely on a univocal interpretation of the K-predicate. In the second part, I provide a contextualist framework based upon an indexical interpretation of the K-predicate and the notion of epistemic context. I show how this framework can integrate different concepts of knowledge, and how it highlights the crucial significance of the KK-thesis for epistemology.
50. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 9 > Issue: 2
Michael J. Shaffer Lakatos’ Quasi-empiricism in the Philosophy of Mathematics
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Imre Lakatos' views on the philosophy of mathematics are important and they have often been underappreciated. The most obvious lacuna in this respect is the lack of detailed discussion and analysis of his 1976a paper and its implications for the methodology of mathematics, particularly its implications with respect to argumentation and the matter of how truths are established in mathematics. The most important themes that run through his work on the philosophy of mathematics and which culminate in the 1976a paper are (1) the (quasi-)empirical character of mathematics and (2) the rejection of axiomatic deductivism as the basis of mathematical knowledge. In this paper Lakatos' later views on the quasi-empirical nature of mathematical theories and methodology are examined and specific attention is paid to what this view implies about the nature of mathematical argumentation and its relation to the empirical sciences.
51. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 9 > Issue: 2
Leszek Wroński Probability
52. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 9 > Issue: 2
Joseph Ulatowski Defending the Correspondence Theory of Truth
53. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 2
Jeff Mitscherling Aristotelian Metaphysics and the Distinction between Consciousness and the Real World in Husserl and Ingarden
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While Ingarden makes only infrequent reference to Aristotle, The Philosopher’s presence can be discerned throughout his published works. Perhaps mostsignificantly, when Ingarden returned to work on Controversy over the Existence of the World in 1938, he immersed himself in the study of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, and the entire framework of Controversy appears to have been inspired by reflection on central Aristotelian concepts. Ingarden’s understanding of the Aristotelian conception of the relation between form and matter, and indeed the Aristotelian character of Ingarden’s ontology as a whole, stands in sharp contrast not only to Husserl’s transcendental idealism, but also to the materialist orientation of current mainstream research in cognitive science. It is hoped that this brief examination might serve to introduce to this research a realist phenomenological orientation that is capable of embracing and elucidating insights from both materialist and idealist approaches to the study of cognition.
54. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 2
Arkadiusz Chrudzimski Orcid-ID Composed Objects, Internal Relations, and Purely Intentional Negativity. Ingarden’s Theory of States of Affairs
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Ingarden’s official ontology of states of affairs is by no means reductionist. According to him there are states of affairs, but they are ontologically dependent onother entities. There are certain classical arguments for the introduction of states of affairs as extra entities over and above the nominal objects, that can be labelled “the problem of composition,” “the problem of relation” and “the problem of negation.” To the first two Ingarden proposes rather traditional solutions, while his treatment of negation proves to be original and interesting. Ingarden doesn’t deny the existence of negative states of affairs altogether, but he (i) accepts only a restricted group of them and (ii) ascribes to them an extremely weak mode of being. Negative states of affairs are construed as supervenient entities, and their supervenience-basis involves two factors: on the one hand the appropriate positive states of affairs, and on the other hand certain mental acts of conscious subjects. They enjoy thus a curious “half-subjective” mode of being.
55. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 2
Victor Kocay An Evaluation of Ingardenian Values
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From recent work on Ingarden it is apparent that values are central to his philosophy, even in the context of his realist ontology. In this evaluation of Ingarden’s work we consider his principal philosophical notions (i.e. his realist ontology, his aesthetics, his reflections on language, and his consideration of values) in the light of what Nietzsche referred to in his own philosophy as the “reevaluation” or the “inversion” of all values. It is argued that two of Ingarden’s most fundamental values are the notion of communication and the aesthetic dimension of thought.
56. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 2
Jan Woleński Meaningfulness, Meaninglessness and Language-Hierarchies: Some Lessons from Ingarden’s Criticism of the Verifiability Principle
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Roman Ingarden offered a strong criticism of the verifiability principle in his talk delivered at the 8th International Congress in Prague in 1934. Ingarden argued that this principle either violates itself or smuggles a hidden sense. In this paper I show that Ingarden-like arguments about smuggled (but this pejorative qualification is skipped) meaning apply not only to the criteria of sense, but also to other semantic assertions within language-hierarchies in Tarski’s sense.
57. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 2
Ingvar Johansson Fictions and the Spatiotemporal World—in the Light of Ingarden
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The paper is an attempt to take Ingarden’s unfinished critique of idealism one step further. It puts forward a schematic solution to the external-world realist’sproblem of how to explain the fact that we can identify and re-identify fictions, entities that in one sense do not exist. The solution contains three proposals: to accept, with Husserl and Ingarden, that there are universals with intentionality (Husserl’s “intentional essences”), to accept, contra Husserl and Ingarden, an immanent realism for universals, and to accept Ingarden’s view that there is a mode of being distinct from those put forward in traditional metaphysics, that of purely intentional being. Together, these views imply that all the instances of a specific intentional universal are directed towards the same intentional object; be this object a really existing object or a fiction, a purely intentional being.
58. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 2
Władysław Stróżewski Roman Ingarden: Life and Philosophy
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My paper is devoted to the most important and fundamental issues of Roman Ingarden’s philosophy, including the contention between idealism and realism, the controversy between objectivism and subjectivism in the area of axiology, the problem of validity of cognition, and the structure and role of language. I argue for the claim that Ingarden solved several specific philosophical problems (like, for instance, the issue of causality, theory of systems, etc.) and he also frequently shed new light on various issues that had been discussed throughout the history of philosophy, showing how important and up to date they were. Moreover, it is worthy to say that his philosophy is marked by the precise and subtle character of the analyses and the range of the examined problems. It is the whole in which every specific problem finds a proper place for itself.
59. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 2
Marek Piwowarczyk Endurance and Temporality
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In the article I compare two theories of existence in time: Simons’s conception of continuants and occurrents and Ingarden’s ontology of temporally determined objects (i.e. objects enduring in time, processes and events). They can be regarded as different positions in the controversy over substantialism. The main problem of this controversy can be expressed by the question: what is the primary way of being in time—endurance or perdurance? Ingarden and Simons admit that there exist objects characterized by both ways of being but for Simons, unlike for Ingarden, perdurants are the basic objects which the world is composed of. My aim is not to assess both ontologies but to use the comparison of them as the basis of a reconstruction of the principal problems contained in the controversy over substantialism.
60. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 2
Sebastian Tomasz Kołodziejczyk Roman Ingarden: Forty Years Later