This paper is not a study in the history of ideas; rather, it is an interpretation of the Phenomenology of Spirit, guided largely by the commentaries of Alexandre Kojeve and Jean Hyppolite, and written from the standpoint of an existential phenomenology. It opens with an exposition of Hegel’s concepts of consciousness and experience and a statement of his conception of the phenomenological method. Then, arguing that the Phenomenology of Spirit is a concrete idealism which offers a cogent philosophy of human existence, the paper examines the closely related themes of death, freedom, intersubjectivity, action, and speech in Hegel’s phenomenology. Finally, it closes with remarks, suggested by Hegel’s analysis of action in the intersubjective world, on the interpretation of philosophical works.

The present study aims at giving factual support to the thesis that the Parmenides is serious in intention, rigorous in logical demonstration, and stylistically meticulous in its original composition. While this consideration may be tedious, still it is useful. Against a past history which has claimed to find the tone hilarious, the logic fallacious, the work inauthentic, the text in need of bracketing by divination, the whole incoherent— against these eccentricities a certain firm sobriety seems called for. I hope that my conclusions find support and persist through fluctuations of philosophic and philological styles.The main difficulty with my thesis is that the text as we now have it (in Burnet's and Dies' editions) shows exceptions to every rule that might apply to style and even to logical structure. Thus it is almost but not quite uniformly true that each theorem opens with a theorem statement; that each is marked by a "questioning" response; that each deduction is valid when formalized in propositional calculus; and so on. Are the exceptions the result of careless composition; are they deliberate warnings not to take the proofs too seriously; or are they the result of errors in transmission? One way to test this is to reconstruct early versions of the text: if these show more logical rigor than the later versions the notion of a wholly valid original is supported; if they do not, the result may point toward the need for a less serious interpretation. A second thing to look for is the possibility that, here and there, parts of a coherent original text are uniquely conserved in sources other than the principal mss, B,T, and W. This assumes, of course, that the "original" text in question is the one with the best logical form, and that assumption seems justified. As a matter of fact, later copyings almost universally show deterioration, not improvement in style and logic.My textual findings are more compatible with some lines of interpretation than with others. Thus I offer some reasons for not accepting treatments of the work as a joke, mystical revelation, or abrupt metaphysical revision. The structure of the dialogue is best explained, I think, by reading it as an indirect proof that some non-Platonic interpretations of the theory of forms are unsatisfactory. In particular, these are the Megarian version (represented in the first part of the dialogue by Zeno, in the second by the First Hypothesis), and the Anaxagorean version put forward by Eudoxus (represented in the first part by Cephalus and his friends from Clazomenae, in the second by the Second Hypothesis). At the same time, the dialogue shows the need for a philosophic method other than the "hypothetical— deductive" way of dianoia; presumably this other method is the "dialectic" discussed in Republic VII. It also follows that any interpretation of the Phaedo which falls into either the Eudoxian or Megarian difficulties was not— at least at the date of the Parmenides—Plato's intended reading.Findings concerning the relations and reliability of the manuscripts of this dialogue also apply to the texts of the other Platonic dialogues which these mss contain.Further, the Parmenides is such an important work both historically and intrinsically that any insight which textual study can bring to its interpretation is a contribution to Western philosophy.

The 'Bibliography on Propositions and Truth-Bearers' is intended to be a virtually comprehensive list of the works on propositions and truth-bearers which have appeared since the time of Frege and are relevant to the problem of propositions and truth-bearers found in the Anglo-American philosophical tradition. The bibliography lists relevant books, chapters and smaller sections of books, journal articles , and encyclopedia and dictionary entries. It includes works which are either historical or philosophical treatments of the problem o f propositions and truth-bearers. In addition, it lists some important works which bear on that problem in a rather indirect but nonetheless significant manner, such as the works on intentionality and the general problem of meaning. Although a large number of the entries are concerned primarily with the ontological status of propositions and truth-bearers, many of the works are concerned also with the related semantic and epistemological issues. Thus the bibliography should be an aid to anyone working on either the ontological or the epistemological issues related to the problem of propositions and truth-bearers.

This bibliography, though not "complete," is nonetheless extensive. With respect to editions, translations and secondary literature appearing after 1900 it is virtually complete in several languages. It also includes the important editions and translations from the nineteenth century as well as a good deal of the philosophical and philological literature on the dialogue from that period. The works which have been cited fall into five main sections: I) Editions and Translations; II) Discussions devoted to a Comprehensive Interpretation of the Cratylus; III) Special Topics; IV) Historical Sources; and V) Other Secondary Literature which discusses the Cratylus only in Passing. Section III, "Special Topics," includes these subsections: a) Names vis-a-vis Knowledge and Reality; b) Truth and Falsity; c) The Etymologies; d) The Alphabet, Orthography, Onomatopoeia and Mimesis; e) The Personae: Cratylus and Hermogenes; f) Date of the Cratylus; g) Other Philological and Textual Issues; h) Miscellaneous Topics.

In a rather obscure moment in James Joyce’s Portrait of an Artist as a Young Man, Stephen Dedalus enters into a conversation with an equally obscure character named Ghezzi. The conversation concerns the Nolan, Giordano Bruno. Ghezzi recalls that Bruno was a “terrible heretic,” and expresses “some sorrow” that he was burned at the stake.For the history of philosophy, there may similarly be “some sorrow” that little more is known about Bruno than that which is contained in Joyce’s reference. He certainly has not come to be viewed as being as important as Galileo or Copernicus, and all things considered, probably is not. However, the views ahout an infinite universe which they expounded with no little fear and intimidation, Bruno bullishly popularized.From time to time, historians of philosophy will touch base with Bruno, recall his ideological martyrdom, and again try to interpret some of his odd speculations. This article attempts to serve two functions in this regard. First, it acts as a basic primer on Bruno for those who may not be especially aware of his contribution to the history of Western philosophy. Then, for those well-versed in philosophy, it acts as a review of Bruno based on some of the latest materials that have been written on his life and thought.

What ultimately exists for Locke is the solid. Reading this ontology in light of the atomist tradition elucidates and relates a number of important issues in the Essay: the analysis of space and related concepts, the distinction between simple and complex ideas, the distinction between primary and secondary qualitie the analysis of power and causation.

Kripke has noted that possible worlds are stipulated, not discovered, and that the stipulation of these worlds allows us to separate accidental from essential properties. In this paper I argue that possible worlds theory gives us an important tool for analyzing what Descartes is doing in the Meditations. The first Meditation becomes a thought experiment in which possible realities are stipulated in a search for one or more essential properties. Viewing the doubt in this manner sheds new light on the cogito and sum res cogitans and shows the limitations of some contemporary discussion of the cogito, namely, the positions taken by Ayer and Hintikka.

I argue that though a satisfactory semantics for the logic of inexact reference may assign no truth value to some statements, it should not assign truth (or falsity) of various degrees. Well-formed assertions are simply true or not. Inexactness does not “ramify.” I distinguish inexactness from other sorts of vagueness, including nonspecificity. I show that arguments from (i) use of quantifiers, (ii) the existence of properties which can be construed as a series of properties (as, e. g., red can be construed as a set of shades of red), (iii) the constructability of apparently paradoxical sorites arguments, and (iv) the presence of prototypes in the extension of a predicate do not show that there are degrees of truth.Much of the alleged evidence that inexactness ramifies is, in fact, a misreading of the undeniable evidence that there may be uncertainty about the truth value of a claim. In support of my claims, I discuss how cases of deeming that a predicate applies relate to its actually applying. A distinction between predicates of “pure” and “impure” function is essential to this.

This article offers a resolution of Kripke’s well-known belief puzzle.

Much of the literature on the question “Is a human essentially distinct from every possible machine?” proceeds on the assumption that we know what a man essentially is, namely a living body with such attributes as consciousness, freedom, feeling and linguistic competence. Is a man essentially that? The paper contrasts that picture of man with Kierkegaard’s account of man as essentially self. Hard limits of machine subjectivity begin to appear in the failure of certain everyday concepts involving ‘self’ to engage at all with the concept ‘machine’.

Bergmann has proposed an ontology that contains an entity many find strange: particularity. And in fact, Bergmann, too, seems to find it strange. He proposes a phenomenological method in ontology, and holds, as he therefore should, that particularity is presented. Nonetheless, he also holds that it is ineffable, that its presence in a particular is an unsayable state of affairs, and that it is something which is not a thing and yet is also not nothing. Bergmann’s position has been long developing, but especially in three recent essays. The aim of the present essay is to explore these views. We shall examine Bergmann’s method, and some criticisms of it by Rosenberg, in order to see whether we cannot get a better grasp of particularity. Specifically, we shall try to see whether it is not, after all, effable. It will turn out that this disagreement on the effability of particularity is really three disagreements: one concerning whether a particular can be thought apart from particularity, a second concerning the analysis of intentionality, and a third concerning whether, in the ontologically important sense of ‘different’, entities that are different are separable.

C. Stanley Kane’s book, Anselm’s Doctrine of Freedom and The Will, is the only monograph in English on this topic. It will therefore influence a wide array of students and scholars. The book advances five theses: (1) that Anselm operates with a general ontological principle to the effect that the essential nature of anything is determined by its purpose in existing; (2) that Anselm’s theory of the will is not determinist but a variant of indeterminism; (3) that human freedom, for Anselm, consists in the ability either to do or not do what is unjust; (4) that, on Anselm’s view, God alone directly causes all just volitions in human beings; and (5) that Anselm regards the imparting of grace as solely dependent upon God’s offer and man’s response, without regard to the influencing effect of circumstances.I show that Anselm does not adhere to a single one of these allegedly Anselmian theses.

The author examines Scheffler’s extensional alternative to the usual notion of belief and shows that it is necessarily inadequate to serve the purpose for which it was designed. This point is established by showing that Scheffler’s proposed substitute for psychologically intensional verbs like ‘believes’ can not deliver philosophers from the classical puzzles over propositional attitudes and can not be used in all cases even to provide materially equivalent extensional substitutes for ordinary belief-statements.

Sellars’ verbal behaviorism demands that linguistic episodes be conceptual in an underivative sense and his theoretical mentalism that thoughts as postulated theoretical entities be modelled on linguistic behaviors. Marras has contended that Sellars’ own methodology requires that semantic categories be theoretical. Thus linguistic behaviors can be conceptual in only a derivative sense. Further he claims that overt linguistic behaviors cannot serve as a model for all thought because thought is primarily symbolic. I support verbal behaviorism by showing that semantic categories are in the first instance teleological explanatory categories and consequently can be observational. And I show how theoretical mentalism can be maintained even though thought is primarily symbolic.

W.V.O.Quine’s doctrine of referential inscrutability (RI) is the thesis that, first, linguistic reference must always be determined relative to an interpretation of the discourse and, second, that the empirical evidence always underdetermines our choice of interpretation--at least in principle. Although this thesis is a central result of Quine’s theory of language, it was long unclear just how much force RI actually carried. At best, Quine’s discussions provided localized examples of RI (e.g., ‘gavagai’), supplemented merely by arguments for the (in principle) constructability of more general referentially divergent manuals. In defense of Quine, Gerald Massey provides a method for generating large-scale referentially divergent manuals for a complex language. I argue that, while Massey’s rival manuals do meet Quine’s translational criteria, they are demonstrably inferior to their commonsensical “homophonic” competitor. This result provides a clear indication of seminal deficiencies in Quine’s behaviorial approach to the theory of language. Next I argue that Quine’s acceptance of standard assumptions about the nature of perception strongly influences the shape of his semantical theory. Finally, I suggest how an alternative to the standard account of perception might provide grounds for a more adequate understanding of language.

Berkeley construes his own immaterialist philosophy as facing a serious competitor, namely, what he often termed ‘materialism.’ He tries on several grounds to eliminate materialism from the competition, thus leaving immaterialism as the most plausible metaphysical theory of perception and the external world. In this paper these grounds are explored, and it is found that Berkeley’s method for rational choice between materialism and immaterialism involves consideration of a host of criteria for choice between competitive theories.

Philosophy as a “way of life” is singularly unsatisfactory as a definition of the subject. Inspired by Kant, we examine six alternative formulations: philosophy may be seen as (1) a search for the conditions governing possible experience, (2) an attempt to derive ultimate categories of ontological or else psychological analysis, (3) the discovery (or erection) of synthetic a priori truths, coupled with making the notion of “S.A.P.” coherent, (4) resolving fundamental antinomies of thought, (5) finding, and/or explicating, the role of regulative principles in human enterprises, (6) “reconstructing” the domain of other disciplines, as Kant does throughout the three Critiques. We conclude with a synoptic suggestion about philosophy as self-criticism (of propositions normally accepted unthinkingly), and ponder its implications for the status of the profession.

This paper is a contribution to the history of ethics, being an account of an episode in the detachment of ethics from religion. According to certain 17th century Jesuits, a person who does not know or think of God can commit only a ‘philosophic or moral’ sin which cannot deserve eternal punishment. Arnauld’s attack on this ‘Philosophism’, and on the idea that to deserve blame one must know one is doing wrong, touched on voluntariness, intention, conscientiousness, sincerity, the justice of God’s helping some and not others, the requirement to do the right thing for the right reason, and other matters related to wrongdoing, blame, punishment and excuses.

Hany metaethicists have all but abandoned the possibility that ordinary value language has any sort of universal logic. But careful phenomenological reflection indicates that we call something “good” only if we tacitly believe that it is disposed to be “pragmatically attractive” in some way. Conversely, “bad” things must be “pragmatically repellent”. Linguistic and phenomenological evidence supports these observations. Differences in the meanings of diverse value judgments seem to be due to variations in the practical context in which the attraction or repulsion is judged. The fact that we can legitimately request clarification regarding each of five practical dimensions tends to indicate that a common structure underlies all senses in which something can be said “good” or “bad.”

A chronic difficulty for functionalism is the problem of instantiations of a functionalist theory of mind which seem to lack some or all of the mental states--especially qualitative--we want to attribute to minds the theory describes. Here I discuss one such counterexample, Block’s system S, consisting of the population of China organized to simulate a single mind as described by some true, adequate, psychofunctionalist theory. I then defend a version of functionalism against this example, in part by an adaptation of Dennett’s notion of “stances”. A true, adequate theory, as Block understands it, would be appropriate to Dennett’s “design” or (at best) “intentional” stance; but a genuinely true and adequate theory should instead coincide with a “personal” stance. Hence, if system S does instantiate such a theory, we must impute to it mental states, even qualitative, whether or not it “really" has them. Hence Block’s counterexample lacks force.