The acceleration and qualitative change of West European integration in the 1980s — as evidenced by the Single European Act — were big events of the world political economy of that decade. They not only paved the way for political union, but also altered the competition in the Triad — United States, Western Europe and Japan. This article analyzes the relaunch of the European Community and later European Union in the framework of conflictive evolutionary theory. Two elements of that theory are combined to explain the timing, the forces behind and the actors involved. The arguments are developed from the theory of the rise and decline of societal models and from the theory of competition among governments in the world market for social order and protection. The thesis of an elite argain among European transnational corporations and the EC-Commission is exposed ana briefly confronted with empirical evidence from the author's research. The article also reflects the competitive position of Western Europe in the Triad and draws conclusions for the future structure of the core: no hegemon similar to Britain's and America's position in the past will emerge since the systemic conditions have changed.

Contrary to political rhetorics of market economy and democracy the so-called "transformation " of the former GDR - attempted to start a quick and nevertheless extensive social change - is in reality a change with little room for spontaneous order or self-organization, for social evolution or development. Analyzing this example this essay tries to work out the structural dynamics of social evolution and to demonstrate the diverse control media and alternative steering strategies available in postindustrial societies.

Ascriptive solidarity is a fundamental relationship in human societies. Sociologists have often stated this social fact but they have seldom explained this kind of solidarity. Karl Otto Hondrich has elaborated fundamental social laws which are useful for the explanation of the evolutionary dominance of ascriptive solidarity. In the context of sociological knowledge I intend - following this account - to sketch variations of ascriptive solidarity in an evolutionary perspective and to describe structural problems of social integration in modern societies.

The difficulties of sociologists - particularly in Germany - to contribute to the political discussion about 'Nation' and (recent) national movements is suggested do be due to insufficiant theoretical clarity. It is proposed to to define ethnic identity as cultural phenomenon. Political unrest and dangerous movements, however, arise, whenever to be 'ethnic' is associated with state/government in its modern sense. The recent experience of political-cultural hegemony over against socalled minorities' makes requests for ethnic self-determination plausible and necessary.

The evolution of the nation state is described as a process of bordernisation and de-bordernisation of macro-social units. The processes of political and cultural inclusion within the formation of the nation state lea to three paradoxes of implementation. These paradoxes are analysed with the dichotomies: universal - particularistic, affirmative - critical, and traditional - modern. These three kinds of self-description are reasons for both, the contradictions and the flexibility of the evolution of the nation state.

The sociology of emotion is still in its infancy and dominated by biological or psychological and social constructivist approaches. This contribution proposes a socio-structural approach integrating structural evolution and elementary processes of structuration with a typology of differential emotions. First, a concept of structural evolution is sketched out following leads by DURKHEIM, SIMMEL and FARARO; second, elementary mechanisms of structuration are combined with the structuration of identifications and perspectives in social networks; third, the processes of structuration are employed to reconstruct the socio-structural dimension of emotions and to develop a typology of structural emotions. The approach is not intended to replace constructivist theory, but to provide a structural basis for socio-cultural conceptions of emotional codes.

It is argued that sociological evolutionary theory can be regarded as a revised and extended version of classical evolutionism which explains not only structural differentiation but any form of macro-social dynamics. This explanatory programme finds its micro-foundation in an theory of individual and social action which allows for the identification of typical social dilemmata which in turn serve as a selectors for reproducible institutional arrangements. At the same time modern evolutionary dynamics unites quite different social- scientific disciplines into a coherent theoretical frame.

After having introduced Goodman’s concept of exemplification I discuss his general argument that exemplification would be the best for comprehensible the expressive phenomena of art. But there will arise problems when making differences between features of works of art which are exemplified and which are not, and when reconstructing the variable forms of autoreflexive expressions. I try to demonstrate that Goodman’s concept of exemplification therefore ist too limited: 1. Goodman doesn’t take into account that the caracteristics of works such as colours, form etc. also can be interpreted as materials of artistic expressions. 2. He doesn’t give any idea to solve the question what would make an exemplification work effectively. Therefore I suggest to reformulate the concept of exemplification.

For the last 30 years there have been debates in philosophy about the concept of rationality. In anglo-american circles they have been primary characterized as discussions about “justified beliefs.” By contrast, the debate in Germany among discourse-theorists (Habermas, Apel) has been linked to the problem of justification of communicative speech-acts (within the concept of the entire communicative situation). Herbert Schnädelbach has modified the discours-theoretical account. His concept can be regarded along a number of dimensions. He has developed a linguistic analysis of the validity claims made in various speech-act situations (following Paul Taylor). In Schnädelbach’s view, normative characterizations of speech acts can be used descriptively, too. Furthermore, the hierarchy of justifications ends on the level of rational choice.My starting point here is: there is a fundamental distinction between justifications in everyday-life and a theoretical level of justification (discoursive justifications). Thus, I discuss the hierarchy of justifications developed by Schnädelbach.Furthermore, I evaluate Schnädelbach’s concept in a semantic perspective. I will show that Schnädelbach’s pragmatical account requires a semantic analysis. Without recourse to such analysis, we cannot understand the universe of normative language.

The ongoing discussion about a notion of pragmatic rationality has evolved in a variety of different approaches, mainly because every author tries to combine his genuine philosophical point of view with the interpretation of “rationality”. Nevertheless there is an agreement of sorts that rationality cannot proceed mereley descriptively but has also normative implications.The paper investigates the proposals of Nicholas Rescher and Herbert Schnädelbach concerning the question of a normativity of rationality. Moreover it deals with the problem of “unity of reason” and its interconnectedness with the inherent normativity of rationality.

What type of reason will work under the present conditions? To answer this question a meaningful conception of reason (as distinct from rationality) has to be developed, and is contemporary conditions (due to change in the field of rationality) have to be specified.In part I. of the paper, the radically altered structure of rationality is analysed; it turns out to be characterized by rational disorder. Part II. offers a redefinition of reason; guided by the idea of justice reason operates in transition from one rationality to another. This new kind of reason - "transversal reason " - is further elaborated in part III. It is regarded as a key-element of any type of reason.

Understanding human action is framed in a picture of the rational person. Protosociology identifies - in a hypothetical approach - generalized presuppositions (Vorverständnis) of the "objects" and "experience" of social science. Protosociology studies society (-ies) and human action from the basis of the following levels: Decentralisation and universalisation of world- picturing; Lifeworld-background and systemprocesses; Properties of structural evolution of societies; Interpersonality, structure of communicative acting and collective identity and Personality.Theorizing on these levels means mapping pictures of structural dimension of action process and the limitation of agency through culturalsocial, personal, and natural resources. So it is recognition, that no absolute disposition is given about the limitation of action and elementary social regulation, norms, and institutions. However, break-downs in these spheres can be identified.The basic-principle of Protosociology is that all creatures who have propositional attitudes and the ability to act intentionally (voluntarily) are examples of application of the standard (norm) of rationality. Hypothesizing about other persons viz. understanding their utterance and ascription of all attitudes are mediated, and given on the level of language behaviour and their utilitarized competences and abilities. The focus of mapping are such examples to whom to ascribe the procedure of any social intercourse.This level is the basis for methodical construction and reconstruction of Protosociology and the Frankfurt version of action (speech act) theory. This version starts from cognition, that the concept of meaning cannot be understood completely, independent of propositional truth, normative correctness and person as primitive concept. Beliefs, illocutionary acts (doings) and propositional structure of language (saying that ...) are fundamental features of the basic knowledge of this approach. But Protosociology does not claim that understanding social reality is committed to a sociologism or linguistic community semantic as overall viewpoint of agency, reasoning, and understanding.

For Protosociology the "Diskurs "-theory has a special significance. Validity-dimensions of speech and their evaluation in the procedure of argumentation indicate generalized presuppositions of interactive processes. These validity-dimensions can be reconstructed in lingusitic characterisations of "normative language" (P.W. Taylor). Thus it is possible to make first steps to a theory of validity. Protosociology provides a special reconstruction of argumentative speech on the level "interpersonality, structure of communicative acting and collective identity". The aim of Protosociology within a context of problems of "Diskurs"-theory would have to establish normative values for an evaluation of such validity-dimensions. A logic of "Diskurs" would have to be developed as a kind of logic of "relevance".

What make utterances and beliefs of other persons on the base of behaviour intelligible? D. Davidson gives us a possible answer in his analysis of the holistic nature of beliefs from the view point of radical interpretation. D. Davidsons argument is, that having propositional attitudes is a nesessary condition for understanding of (personal) utterances. In the context of his theory of radical interpretation will given an explication and a refutation of critics of the still not enough recipated thesis of D. Davidson.

The idea that saying it are doings is a platitude among speech act theorists.In the following I argue that the assimilations of the speakers intentions, belieft and desires to the linguistic meaning of expression types in J.R. Searles influential speech act theory precludes or explaining saying truely as doings, iE. speciftcly as linguistic actions.An adequate explanation of speech acts must treat linguistic meaning of expression type and the speakers intentions, beliefs and desires as seperate, but coordinate factors in the performance and understanding of linguistic acts.