In my paper I examine the question of temporality in Merleau-Ponty’s later phenomenological ontology. The aim of this discussion is to show that Merleau-Ponty’s earlier model of temporality, displayed in his Phenomenology of Perception, is not totally rejected but significantly reworked. While in his earlier work Merleau-Ponty maintains the substantial coincidence of temporality and subjectivity, thus bringing together Husserl’s and Heidegger’s analyses into a creative synthesis, in his later development Merleau-Ponty is no longer satisfied with this result. Accordingly he deepens the aspect of passivity and the bonds that attach the subject to (Raw) Being.

In this paper, I discuss about two major Romanian philosophers: Constantin Noica and Alexandru Dragomir. I narrate their spectacular biographies, in order to show how powerful can be the resistance through philosophy, even in the hard times of political totalitarianism, as they were, for the Eastern Europe, under the communist dictatorship. It is true that Noica and Dragomir are two of the most infl uential personalities for the history of phenomenology in Romania. However, their lives also seem to be exemplary for the philosophical life as such, which reveals its intrinsic value when facing the asperities of misfortune.

Painting paints the conditions of visibility in accordance with their historical modalities and not the conditions of the reproduction of the real. That is why the whole Phenomenology, speaking about Painting, speaks of “phenomenon,” i.e. of “appearing” of that which appears.

The concept of intersubjectivity has undergone a strong critique for the fact that the other appears to be constituted by a singular ego through extrapolation from its own “sphere of originality.” Our hypothesis is that the difficulty does not regard the theory of constitution itself, but the fact that the other and the community are thought only in terms of representation. In order to transcend the supposed representational framework of Husserl’s phenomenology, we shall consider the concept of intersubjectivity as an interplay of representational and non-representational modes of encounter.

Th is paper proposes a phenomenological approach to the constitution of biological objects of inquiry. It argues that such an approach can be built upon an extended version of Heidegger’s existential conception of science. Five main thematizing projects of constituting biological objects of inquiry are under examination. Finally, the paper suggests the view that despite the disunity of biology on the level of the main thematizing projects, there is a dynamic and mosaic unity of interrelated practices of scientific research.

In this communication we have tried to underline the main ideas in the constitution of the system of relevances, using as a support Alfred Schutz’s approach. Their importance in the consolidation of experience at the subjective and especially intersubjective level is to be understood as well in terms of a continuous constitution that they engender. They entertain a relation of interdependence with types and the typification processes. This aspect is also important because it confirms the mobility of the significative “organization” of the consciousness, and more than that, the interaction between this one and the surrounding world, where the other subjects are as well to be included.

In this essay the author will try to show that the transition from Otherwise than Being to The Essence of Manifestation has necessarily been done under the influence of Henry’s philosophy of immanence, which is highly appreciated by Levinas.

The essay explores the thought of Alfred Schutz with regard to his position on Husserlian transcendentalism. Comparing the “paradox of communication” formulated by Schutz in 1945 with Husserl’s treatment of the life-world in §34 of the Crisis, it arrives at the question of practicing the phenomenological method (the reduction) in the field of the social sciences. As this problem pushes the phenomenological paradigm to its limits, Schutz is seen as a borderline figure between the paradigm of perception and the paradigm of action. Th e transition is illustrated in the example of his idea of “stock of knowledge.”

On the route towards a philosophy of translation inspired by Paul Ricoeur’s phenomenological hermeneutics, my working hypothesis is that thinking about translation is fertile for a deeper understanding of the meaning of interpretation and of phenomenology. Language, languages, and translation enter into the very heart of the constitution of sense. The free gift of language and of languages permits us to have access to the world and to meet the other. In this way a phenomenological hermeneutics of translation can help us to realize that humanity, just like language, exists only in the plural mode.

This essay suggests that it is possible to develop a phenomenology of moral action modeled upon Aristotelian ethics. Focusing on the debt owed by phenomenology to Heidegger and his hermeneutics of Aristotelian ethics, we will argue for the two following theses: a) One of the main contributions of Aristotelian ethics is that it provides an account of moral action in terms of perception; b) Heidegger pointed out this contribution, but to the extent that he concealed its perceptual character, he did not prove faithful to the project of a phenomenology of moral action.

It is sometimes claimed that Husserl’s writings provide an inspiration for considering art today. More specifically we ask here whether Husserl’s description of the aesthetic attitude is rich and original. The comparisons he draws between the aesthetic attitude and the phenomenological attitude always aim to clarify the phenomenological attitude and thus take it for granted that the typical features of the aesthetic attitude are well known. In this way Husserl presupposes and retrieves the teaching of Kant, although in certain working notes he clarifies and intensifies the formal characteristics of Kant’s description of the aesthetic judgment.

Th e aim of this contribution is to think about contemporary phenomenology in comparison to its vanguard between 1910 and 1935. This encounter would have been fruitful and possibly transgressive for Husserl’s Phenomenology and that of others. Husserl and Heidegger provided an immense “openness of phenomenality,” the consequences of which were not noticed by themselves with enough lucidity. For this reason, today it would be interesting to think that this encounter, which in fact never took place, between contemporary phenomenology and its vanguard, that is, between phenomena and manifestos, is an attempt to pay an historical debt.

This article tries to explain the relationship between transcendental phenomenology and psychology, particularly phenomenological psychology, in the work of Aron Gurwitsch. Following Husserl, Gurwitsch shows the paradoxes of phenomenological psychology and the necessity to perform the transcendental reduction in order to overcome them. This technical issue will help us to see in a very clear way why Gurwitsch is a transcendental phenomenologist and why, from a Husserlian and Gurwitschean point of view, every philosophy that remains in the natural attitude—and for the author of The Field of Consciousness this is the case of the philosophy of existence (Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty)—is not philosophy in the more radical sense of the word.

From The Structure of Behavior to his later philosophy, Merleau-Ponty reflected on the unconscious. This paper first points out the topological concepts in Merleau-Ponty’s later philosophy. Then, the paper traces how Merleau-Ponty defines the unconscious. In this regard, concepts concerning “negativity” plays an important role in his topological way of thinking. Freud’s and Heidegger’s ideas will also be examined with regard to this negativity. We will recognize that the key concepts in Merleau-Ponty’s later philosophy such as flesh, hinge, and hollowness result from the topological structures created by reversibility between negation and non-negation. Finally, the paper confirms that the structures found in the unconscious and dreams should be understood based on structural ontology in Merleau-Ponty’s last writings.

The local healing modes in Taiwan for psychological suffering can be called as “ethical care,” i.e., they emphasize people’s suffering in their ethical predicaments and, therefore, find ways to re-order the interpersonal constellations. In accordance with ethical care, psychotherapy practiced in Taiwan should focus on the “self for being ethical,” the acting agent concerned mostly with the interpersonal ordering in its life. To advance the significance of ethical care, the assumption of the individuality of the most dominant theories of psychotherapy, which mostly target on ego functioning, is discussed, and an illustration of psychotherapy as ethical care is also provided.

The idea of the Other is mainly a phenomenological invention. Its significance in ontology, ethics, and political philosophy has come to be recognized generally. In theoretical sociology, such recognition is yet to be established. As a first attempt, the paper treats social structure as an otherness. Bayesian duality and Simmelian formalism will be invoked in the course of argument. It is hoped that the sociological demand for technicalities does not suffocate an appreciation of its phenomenological comportment.