Displaying: 41-60 of 2100 documents

0.092 sec

41. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 19 > Issue: 2
Robert Frodeman Inhabiting the Earth: Heidegger, Environmental Ethics, and the Metaphysics of Nature
42. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 19 > Issue: 2
Erazim Kohák Varieties of Ecological Experience
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
I draw on the resources of Husserlian phenomenology to argue that the way humans constitute nature as a meaningful whole by their purposive presence as hunter/gatherers (nature as mysterium tremendum), as herdsmen/farmers (nature as partner), and as producer/consumers (nature as resource) affects the way they respond to its distress—as to a resource failure, as a to flawed relationship, or asto a fate from which “only a god could save us.” I find all three responses wanting and look to a different experience, that of nature as an endangered species, as the ground for a more adequate response of accepting responsibility for our freedom, with the consequence of imposing ethical limits on the way that humans relate to all being, not to humans alone.
43. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 19 > Issue: 2
Damian Cox On the Value of Natural Relations
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
In “A Refutation of Environmental Ethics” Janna Thompson argues that by assigning intrinsic value to nonhuman elements of nature either our evaluations become (1) arbitrary, and therefore unjustified, or (2) impractical, or (3) justified and practical, but only by reflecting human interest, thus failing to be truly intrinsic to nonhuman nature. There are a number of possible responses to her argument, some of which have been made explicitly in reply to Thompson and others which are implicit in the literature. In this discussion I describe still another response, one which takes Thompson’s concerns about value seriously, but does not assign nature intrinsic or nonanthropocentric value. I suggest a relational environmental ethic as the basis for a genuinely ethical stance toward nature in which our relations to nature are a principal object of ethical concern.
44. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 19 > Issue: 2
Don Sherman Grant, II Religion and the Left: The Prospects of a Green Coalition
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Religionists and leftists have aligned themselves with several green causes, but have yet to engage each other in a real discussion of environmental issues. In this paper, I try to establish the basis for a dialogue between those segments of the religionist and leftist traditions that appear to have the most promise for forging a united green front. I label these two subgroups constructive postmodern religionistsand constructive postmodern leftists. I summarize the key ideas shared by each group, discuss how each can rectify some of the weaknesses of the other, and consider some potential philosophical barriers to their union. I conclude by issuing a call for dialogue on the issues presented here.
45. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 19 > Issue: 2
Patrick Hayden Gilles Deleuze and Naturalism: A Convergence with Ecological Theory and Politics
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Some philosophers in recent discussions concerned with current ecological crises have attempted to address and sometimes to utilize poststructuralist thought. Yet few of their studies have delineated the ecological orientation of a specific poststructuralist. In this paper, I provide a discussion of the naturalistic ontology embraced by the contemporary French philosopher Gilles Deleuze, one of the most significant voices in poststructuralism. I interpret Deleuze as holding an ecologically informed perspective that emphasizes the human place within nature while encouraging awareness of and respect for the differences of interconnected life on the planet. I also suggest that this view may be joined with Deleuze’s innovative ethical-political approach, which he refers to as micropolitics, to create new ways of thinking and feeling that support social and political transformation with respect to the flourishing of ecological diversity. Finally, I briefly show how Deleuze’s ecological orientation compares to several versions of ecological theory and politics.
46. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 19 > Issue: 3
Brian K. Steverson On Norton’s Reply to Steverson
47. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 19 > Issue: 3
Jim Cheney Naturalizing the Problem of Evil
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
I place my analysis and naturalization of the problem of evil in relation to (1) Holmes Rolston’s views on disvalues in nature and (2) the challenge posed to theology by environmental philosophy in the work of Frederick Ferré. In the analysis of the problem of evil that follows my discussion of Rolston and Ferré, I first discuss the transformative power for the religious believer of reflection on the problem of evil, using the biblical Job as a case study. I point out difficulties with Job’s particular resolution of the problem of evil and suggest that these difficulties can be satisfactorily addressed by naturalizing spirituality.
48. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 19 > Issue: 3
Priscilla N. Cohn Animals, Property and the Law
49. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 19 > Issue: 3
Laura Westra Why Norton’s Approach is Insufficient for Environmental Ethics
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
There has been an ongoing debate about the best approach in environmental ethics. Bryan Norton believes that “weak anthropocentrism” will yield the best results for public policy, and that it is the most defensible position. In contrast, I have argued that an ecocentric, holistic position is required to deal with the urgent environmental problems that face us, and that position is complemented by the ecosystem approach and complex systems theory. I have called this approach “the ethics of integrity,” and in this paper I show why this perspective suggests better solutions to difficult cases, for which “weak anthropocentrism” fails to provide an answer.
50. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 19 > Issue: 3
Raymond Chipeniuk On Contemplating the Interests of Fish
51. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 19 > Issue: 3
Peter S. Wenz Environmental Pragmatism
52. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 19 > Issue: 3
Bryan G. Norton, Bruce Hannon Environmental Values: A Place-Based Approach
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Several recent authors have recommended that “sense of place” should become an important concept in our evaluation of environmental policies. In this paper, we explore aspects of this concept, arguing that it may provide the basis for a new, “place-based” approach to environmental values. This approach is based on an empirical hypothesis that place orientation is a feature of all people’s experience of their environment. We argue that place orientation requires, in addition to a home perspective, a sense of the space around the home place and that this dual aspect can be modeled using a “hierarchical” methodology. We propose a “triscalar,” place-oriented system for the analysis of environmental values, explore the characteristics of place-orientation through several examples, and employ these characteristics to distinguish acceptable and unacceptable aspects of the NIMBY (not-in-my-backyard) idea.
53. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 19 > Issue: 3
Rudi M. Verburg, Vincent Wiegel On the Compatibility of Sustainability and Economic Growth
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
It is generally assumed that sustainable development and economic growth are compatible objectives. Because this assumption has been left unspecified, the debate on sustainability and growth has remained vague and confusing. Attempts at specification not only involve clarification of the interrelation of the two concepts, but also, we argue, require a philosophical approach in which the concepts of sustainability and economic growth are analyzed in the context of our frame of reference. We suggest that if the notion of sustainability is to be taken seriously, the conflicting conceptual and normative orientations between the two concepts require the reconsideration of our frame of reference.
54. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 19 > Issue: 3
Sara Ebenreck Earthcare
55. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 19 > Issue: 3
NEWS AND NOTES
56. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 19 > Issue: 3
Teresa Kwiatkowska-Szatzscheider From the Mexican Chiapas Crisis: A Different Perspective for Environmental Ethics
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The social unrest in Chiapas, a southern Mexican state, revealed the complexity of cultural and natural issues behind the idealized Western version of indigenous ecological ethics and its apparently universal perspective. In accordance with the conventional interpretation of traditional native beliefs, they are often pictured as alternative perspectives arising from challenges to the scientific worldview. Inthis paper, I point toward a more comprehensive account of human-environmental relation rooted in the particular type of social and natural conditions. I also discuss changes of place, changes of identity related to changes of place, and respective changes in modes of environmental sustainability. I conclude that modernization endangers two fundamental ethical insights: “openness” to the environment and respect for nonhuman living beings.
57. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 19 > Issue: 3
David R. Keller Wild Ideas
58. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 19 > Issue: 3
Charles J. List On Angling as an Act of Cruelty
59. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 19 > Issue: 4
Robert Kirkman Why Ecology Cannot Be All Things to All People: The “Adaptive Radiation” of Scientific Concepts
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
On the basis of a model of the development of scientific concepts as analogous to the “adaptive radiation” of organisms, I raise questions concerning the speculative project of many environmental philosophers, especially insofar as that project reflects on the relationship between ecology (the science) and ecologism (the worldview or ideology). This relationship is often understood in terms of anopposition to the “modern” worldview, which leads to the identification of ecology as an ally or as a foe of environmental philosophy even as ecological concepts are freely appropriated to inform speculation. I argue that ecology does not fit into the intellectual framework of such an opposition and that its concepts cannot readily be made to serve purposes outside of their specialized context without a loss of meaning. Finally, I suggest that environmental thought might do well to divest itself of its ecologistic commitments, adopting instead a skeptical approach to human-environment relations.
60. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 19 > Issue: 4
REFEREES 1997