Studies the doctrine of providence of the Neoplatonic philosopher Porphyry of Tyre (c. 234‑c‑304 AD). Following a survey of Hellenistic theories of fate and providence, the doctrine of destiny ex hupotheseos, developed on the basis of Plato’s dialogues, is examined : according to it, our acts are free, but their consequences are necessary. As an integral part of Middle Platonic philosophy, this theory was probably transmitted to Late Antiquity by Porphyry. We then move on to examine Porphyry’s treatise On what depends on us, which contains an interpretation of Plato’s Myth of Er, and develops the doctrine of the twofold choice of lives. Nemesius and Proclus react, each in his own way, against the individualism of Porphyry’s approach. In conclusion, the theory of fate and providence in Boethius’ Consolation of Philosophy is briefly examined.

Commentando Aristotele, Phys. II 4, 6 e 8, Filopono assume costantemente Empedocle come modello di tutta una tradizione filosofica che individua nella materia e nel caso i principi sia dell’universo sia degli enti particolari. Filopono e d’accordo con Aristotele nel ritenere assurda la posizione dei materialisti, che considerano il caso non soltanto come causa degli enti che divengono sempre o per lo piu allo stesso modo, tra i quali talvolta si verificano casi di enti che si generano contro natura, ma anche come causa dei corpi celesti, che si muovono di movimenti sempre identici e tra i quali non si osservano casi di contro natura. Ma se nella Fisica Aristotele ha opposto a questa posizione teorica la sua nozione di natura come causa finale, Filopono oppone al caso dei fisiologi materialisti la provvidenza, che egli chiama anche “provvidenza della natura” e che differenzia come natura universale e natura particolare. Pur utilizzando un concetto non aristotelico, gli argomenti di Filopono sono il frutto di un’eccellente esegesi di Aristotele, e persino l’esclusione del contro natura nell’ambito della natura universale sembra riconducibile a quanto Aristotele insegna nel De generatione animalium.

L’article se penche sur l’opposition bi‑l‑majāz (par extension) vs. bi‑l‑ḥaqīqa (en verite/realite) qu’on rencontre dans plus d’un traite d’al‑Kindī. Il s’agit de determiner si l’usage qu’en fait al‑Kindī se situe sur le plan lexical, voire semantique, a savoir l’opposition ‛sens propre’ vs. ‛sens figure’ ou devrait plutot se lire sur le plan ontologique, ḥaqīqa s’appliquant alors a tout ce qui est propre a Dieu et majāz a ce qui est cree par lui et donc en derive. S’appuyant sur les conclusions de Wolfhart Heinrichs au sujet de la genese de la dichotomie ḥaqīqa ‑ majāz, l’auteure montre que l’usage qu’al‑Kindī en fait releve de l’ordre ontologique, ce en quoi il s’accorde avec les milieux mu‛tazilites contemporains du philosophe. Cette interpretation est relayee par un temoin plus tardif, a savoir le theologien et philosophe andalou Baḥya Ibn Paqūda (XIe s.) dont le traite al‑Hidāya ilā farā’iḍ al‑qulūb («Guide des devoirs du coeur») fait d’importants emprunts a la Philosophie Premiere d’al‑Kindī.

Our «universal» perception of Parmenides’ poem is biased by traditional readings to a considerable degree, at least if the poem actually included two different doctrinal bodies, one on being and another peri physeōs properly, the latter encompassing a number of short treatises on the physical world and (some) living organisms.What I plan to offer in support of this claim is, to begin with, an inventory (the first ever prepared) of the topics dealt with in the section devoted to physical world and living creatures (§ 2). Something on Parmenides’ way of studying and understanding different aspects of the physical world and living organisms follows (§ 3).Once acknowledged the above (a point which is not particularly controversial, I presume), the poem comes to look quite differently and some principles of interpretation are likely to collapse : first of all, the customary assumption that frgs. 1‑9 include definite ideas on the doctrines to be found in the second main body, and tell us that they are not of great value. Indeed, the very high quality of several among these doctrines seems to imply that no devaluation of the second main doctrinal body is tenable.Several corollaries are likely to follow. Among them : (a) once concluded the section on being, no further group of verses, meant to establish a convenient relation between the first and the second main doctrinal body, surfaces ; (b) Parmenides was a polymath, and he may have been aware of that, or at least some evidence in support of the awareness thesis is available.

The article is dedicated to the study of the origins of Christian cosmogony. Christian authors of the 2nd century are known for their enigmatic or ambiguous positions on the issue. The problem concerns mainly the apologists, but it first appears in Ignatius of Antioch (†180) and continues in Bardesanes (†222). Although they all confess God as the Creator, their ways of presenting the act of creation are strongly marked by philosophical doctrines, primarily by Platonism, or by Stoicism in the case of Bardesanes. The Christian Creator receives the characteristics of a demiurge and an artisan. This approach has implications for the notions of universe and matter. But first and foremost, the idea of God as a demiurge and an artisan determines the role assigned to the Logos in the act of creation. Those concepts are later abandoned in favour of a doctrine based more on the Bible, but they give us a better understanding of the relationship between young Christianity and Platonism.

Very early after the discovery of the first manuscripts of Qumran in Cave 1, the scholars were agree to describe the Essene world‑view as dualistic. The close study of each document reveals today a more complicated literary situation. The manuscripts of Qumran attest to three kinds of dualism : cosmic dualism, relative dualism, and human dualism. This taxonomy is not to take too strictly because the dualisms can be combined inside a text to reinforce and justify the Essene world‑view, especially the sectarian perspective. The combination is also a proof of the multiple state of dualism in Ancient Judaism. Moreover, we note the relationship between dualism and apocalypticism. The apocalyptical literature may be a source of diffusion of different types of dualism.

Plutarch is often seen as a dualist philosopher. Yet, when one studies the texts which are most often quoted to back such an opinion, the so‑called dualist doxographies in De Iside et Osiride and in De animae procreatione, one is actually lead to think otherwise. When they are replaced in their context, it so happens that these texts describe the conditions to obtain harmony and the mixing of the contraries which are both necessary to the birth and to the very existence of the universe. However, harmony and mixing cannot be obtained without the receptacle of the contraries that constitute them. Far from being a simple intermediary, this receptacle, which takes different aspects in the different treatises, is indeed a constituent principle according to Plutarch. Without it, there can be neither encounter nor opposition of the contraries, and so, paradoxically, precisely because it is a guarantee of dualism, it makes dualism disappear. Dualism then turns out to be a mere preparatory step in the elaboration of a really triadic philosophy.

In this response, we discuss Professor Seng’s proposal according to which the Chaldaean Oracles call the matter πατρογενής («derived from the Father») and not πρωτογενής («primordial»). We first explain the philosophical problem raised by this philological reading and we formulate an objection to it ; secondly, we take into consideration the Late Neo‑Platonic tradition as an eventual confirmation of the πατρογενής hypothesis.

Aristotle’s main grievances against his forebears, in the first instance Plato, but also Empedocles and Anaxagoras, rely on three theoretical standpoints : the status of the whole and the one, the separation or the immanence of the principle and its ability to act as a cause or not, and finally the possibility of engendering or producing from contraries. An analysis of the criticisms developed in Metaphysics Lambda 10 brings to light both the purpose and the flaws of the Aristotelian indictment. Arguably, Plato has brought things to existence from a secondary dualism, not from an immutable and separate principle, since, according to the Stagirite’s critical reading, the status of that principle remains ambiguous on the grounds that it is used both as an efficient cause and a universal predicate. From the encounter between the theory of causes and of being advocated by Aristotle against Plato and what Aristotle introduces as the Platonic theory of the principle, Ideas and Numbers, emerges a “dualistic” vision of Plato’s thought. However when one endeavours to locate and contextualize in the Dialogues the theses attributed to Plato by his rebellious disciple, that “dualistic” vision not only does not appear to be founded, but one can even find a criticism of the aptness of such interpretation. The example given is that of the fight of the Gods and the Giants in The Sophist ; in that fight between philosophers around the status of the being can be found a great many of the themes and positions mentioned in what is called in Lambda 10 a criticism of the forebears. Isn’t the “dualistic” interpretation of ancient philosophies ultimately the projection of a modern type of reading, sensitive to the mythologizing interpretation fashioned owing to the late popularity of Platonism ?

This paper summarises the issues of dualism in the philosophy of Hans Jonas. Dualism was a central topic for him to understand gnosticism in late antiquity, and it became also a key concept to understand moral nihilism of the XXth century. Jonas demonstrates that Heidegger’s thought in Sein und Zeit ‑ which enables him to elaborate the heuristic method to shed light on gnostic dualism ‑ was in fact itself based on a dualistic anthropology. On the one hand, Jonas attempted to reply to it with a philosophical biology ; on the other hand, his reply to the cosmological dualism thanks to his speculative and mythical concept of the weak God.

Augustine is a particularly interesting author for anyone who wishes to question the topic of dualism, because of the diverse and complex way this topic is adressed in his writings. After having been listening to the Manichean as an “auditor” for almost ten years, he raised many critics against the manichean thesis ; but in spite of this critical position, several of his later opponents, from the Donatist and mostly from the Pelagian heresy, often reproached him to have remained a crypto‑Manichean. This paper focuses on working out the original image Augustine had about the manicheism, as providing a coherent answer to some ethical and metaphysical problems, then as being nothing more than a false response he had to break with. This task will then lead us to question his potential residual manicheism, considering his controversy with Julian of Eclanum, in order to identify the arguments by which Julian supports the accusation of augustinian Manicheism, and to assess the extent to which this accusation is or is not admissible.

The Babylonian Poem of Creation Enuma Elish tells the story of Apsu and Tiamat begetting the first generations of gods, of Marduk vanquishing Tiamat and creating from its corps the whole universe. Can the story of this fight be a hint to a dualistic vision of the universe in Mesopotamia ? The author stresses some arguments against this conclusion even if some of the main elements of dualistic cosmologies are present : combatting forces, non‑existence – creation of the universe, male – female opposition.

Before I reply to the account of Gretchen Reydams‑Schils on the theory of matter in the Commentary on Timaeus by Calcidius, I would like to clarify the organization of various topics into the commentary. Nevertheless the first point will deal with the study of dualism in Plato’s dialogue. Then I will show that the cosmos works as a continuum and I will present the ‘symphonic’ composition of the Latin exegesis. About the matter‑hyle, I will try to link it with the soul.

This papers tries to show at first that the dualism Plutarchus attributed in the De Iside et Osiride to most ancient thinkers, mainly «presocratics», has been largely influenced by the doxographical overview given by Aristotle at the beginning of the Metaphysics, which not only assumed that Empedocles was the first to introduce principles of Good and Evil, but also compared the theory of Anaxagoras to the alleged platonic dualism of the One and the Other. If dualities are quite present and important in some of the main theories of the so‑called presocratic philosophers, the question remains to determine in which cases these dualities can be compared to dualism in the sense this word has taken since Hyde. The second part of this article will thus consist to try to answer this question on the ground of three examples of thinkers for whom dualities played a crucial role : Alcmaeon, Parmenides and, chiefly, Empedocles, who had obviously linked Love and Strife to an axiological pattern in his Katharmoi.

In Greek alchemical texts, the dualism plays different roles. This paper’s purpose is to apply the category of “dualism” to the fundamental principle of transmutation, designated by most alchemists as “divine water” or “sulphur water” (theion hudôr). The analysis of this notion highlights the necessary shift from colouration to transmutation, a capital question in alchemy. In fact, it is both one of the most important ambiguities in alchemy and the focus of the relationship between theory and practice.

Gnostic studies in the XXeth century have been influenced by Hans Jonas’ The Gnostic Religion and his existentialist approach of Gnostic movements, until the discovery of the Coptic Nag Hammadi texts, in 1945, gave access to a series of documents coming from the Gnostics themselves. Progressively, the panorama of Gnostic sects and movements deeply changed, calling into question the notion of “dualism” used by the Church Fathers when refuting their Gnostic opponents. If Plotinus criticizes the Gnostic contempt of the world and their life without ethics, the recently commented texts from Nag Hammadi attest the use of the Platonic demiurge understood in the frame of the biblical version of the creation. The beauty of the world is not absent from Gnostic texts. The role of the Gnostic demiurge in documents like the Apocryphon of John or the Valentinian Tripartite Tractate, for example, shows that access to salvation is possible in a philosophical and theological system that is monistic. The heresiological category of “dualism” has too often hindered the study of the Gnostics which does not correspond to what the new documentation brings out.

The discussions about the origin of mazdean dualism are concentrated upon the interpretation of the Gathic stanza Y30.3 which opposes two mental powers called mainiiu and usually translated by «spirit». The divergence of the understandings led to a controversy on the nature of this dualistic opposition : is it philosophical, cosmic or religious ? Do these various distinctions remain relevant now we know that this stanza is not a piece of a sermon, but of a liturgical recitative ?