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The Leibniz Review:
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Lea F. Schweitz
Leibniz on the Trinity and the Incarnation
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The Leibniz Review:
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Stefano Di Bella
Possibility, Agency, and Individuality in Leibniz’s Metaphysics
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Ohad Nachtomy
Reply to Stefano Di Bella
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Timothy Crockett
Space and Time in Leibniz’s Early Metaphysics
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In this paper I challenge the common view that early in his career (1679-1695) Leibniz held that space and time are well-founded phenomena, entities on an ontological par with bodies and their properties. I argue that the evidence Leibniz ever held that space and time are well-founded phenomena is extremely weak and that there is a great deal of evidence for thinking that in the 1680s he held a position much like the one scholars rightly attribute to him in his mature period, namely, that space and time are merely orders of existence and as such are purely abstract and occupy an ontological realm distinct from that of well-founded phenomena. In the course of arguing for this interpretation, I offer an account of the nature of Leibnizian phenomena which allows Leibniz to hold the view that space and time are phenomena, while at the same time thinking of them as abstract, ideal orders of existence.
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Stefano Di Bella
The Art of Controversies
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Ursula Goldenbaum
Leibniz’ Marginalia on the Back of the Title of Spinoza’s Tractatus Theologico-Politicus
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47.
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Philip Beeley
The Leibniz-Des Bosses Correspondence
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48.
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Robert Merrihew Adams
G. W Leibniz:
Richerche generali sull’analisi delle nozioni e dell verità e altri scritti di logica
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News from the Leibniz-Gesellschaft
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Robert Merrihew Adams
Leibniz:
An Intellectual Biography
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51.
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Edward Slowik
Another Go-Around on Leibniz and Rotation
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Maria Rosa Antognazza
Leibniz lecteur de Spinoza:
La genèse d’une opposition complexe
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19
Recent Works on Leibniz
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Massimo Mugnai
“On extrinsic denominations” (LH IV, iii, 5a-e, Bl. 15):
Transcription and English Translation
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Marius Stan
Kant’s Early Theory of Motion:
Metaphysical Dynamics and Relativity
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This paper examines the young Kant’s claim that all motion is relative, and argues that it is the core of a metaphysical dynamics of impact inspired by Leibniz and Wolff. I start with some background to Kant’s early dynamics, and show that he rejects Newton’s absolute space as a foundation for it. Then I reconstruct the exact meaning of Kant’s relativity, and the model of impact he wants it to support. I detail (in Section II and III) his polemic engagement with Wolffian predecessors, and how he grounds collisions in a priori dynamics. I conclude that, for the young Kant, the philosophical problematic of Newton’s science takes a back seat to an agenda set by the Leibniz-Wolff tradition of rationalist dynamics. This results matters, because Kant’s views on motion survive well into the 1780s. In addition, his doctrine attests to the richness of early modern views of the relativity of motion.
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Patrick Riley
Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe, Reihe I “Allgemeiner Politischer und Historischer Briefwechsel,” Band 21:
(April – December 1702), (Ed. Leibniz-Archiv Hannover)
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Mogens Lærke
Monism, Separability and Real Distinction in the Young Leibniz
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In this article, I discuss how Leibniz’s first correspondence with Malebranche from early 1676 can shed new light on the notorious “all-things-are-one”-passage (ATOP) found in the Quod ens perfectissimum sit possibile from late 1676—a passage that has been taken as an expression of monism or Spinozism in the young Leibniz. The correspondence with Malebranche provides a deeper understanding of Leibniz’s use of the notions of “real distinction” and “separability” in the ATOP. This forms the background for a discussion of Leibniz’s commitment to the monist position expounded in the ATOP. Thus, on the basis of a close analysis of Leibniz’s use of these key terms in the Malebranche correspondence, I provide two possible, and contrary, interpretations of the ATOP, namely, a “non-commitment account” and a “commitment account.” Finally, I explain why I consider the commitment account to be the more compelling of the two.
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Anja Jauernig
Leibniz on Motion – Reply to Edward Slowik
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Announcement, Acknowledgments, Abbreviations Used in Articles and Reviews
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Philip Beeley
Leibniz und das Judentum
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