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41. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 21 > Issue: 1
Michael Plekon Before the Storm: Kierkegaard’s Theological Preparation For the Attack on the Church
42. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 21 > Issue: 1
William F. Vallicella Kant Chastened But Vindicated: Rejoinder to Forgie
43. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 21 > Issue: 2
Rebecca Konyndyk DeYoung AQUINAS’S VIRTUES OF ACKNOWLEDGED DEPENDENCE: A NEW MEASURE OF GREATNESS
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This paper compares Aristotle’s and Aquinas’s accounts of the virtue of magnanimity specifically as a corrective to the vice of pusillanimity. After definingpusillanimity and underscoring key features of Aristotelian magnanimity, I explain how Aquinas’s account of Christian magnanimity, by making humandependence on God fundamental to this virtue, not only clarifies the differences between the vice of pusillanimity and the virtue of humility, but also showswhy only Christian magnanimity can free us from improper and damaging forms of dependence on the opinions and standards of others, enabling us toavoid the moral pitfalls of both pusillanimity and presumption.
44. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 21 > Issue: 2
Ryan Nichols MORAL MOTIVATION AND CHRISTIAN THEISM
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John Hare’s central objections to secular theories of motivation arise via his ‘hateful nephew’ example, which, I argue, obscures important issues of scope:Who must be motivated (some/all)?How frequently must they be motivated (most/all of the time)?What is the extent of their motivation (act/tend to act)?Hare must adopt the stronger readings of these questions if his case against secular accounts of motivation is to succeed. But holding any account of motivationto such standards is misguided. Furthermore, Hare’s own theistic account of motivation cannot meet the standards he applies to his primary secular interlocutor. This study opens into wider terrain as I (i) identify which of myriad moral gaps an account of motivation is alleged to bridge; (ii) explain how the dialectic between Hare and Shelly Kagan depends upon unarticulated assumptions about judgment externalism and judgment internalism; and (iii) criticize appeals to motivational versions of ‘ought implies can’ principles.
45. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 21 > Issue: 2
Kenneth Einar Himma HARM, SHARM, AND ONE EXTREMELY CREEPY ARGUMENT: A REPLY TO MARK C. MURPHY
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In a recent essay appearing in this journal, I argued that, even on the assumption that the fetus is a person from the moment of conception, a Christian can consistently hold that while abortion is always murder, it ought to be legally permitted. On the assumption that the ultimate fate of moral innocents is eternal bliss, abortion, I argued, does not result in thesort of harm that ought to be legally prohibited under certain principles of moral legitimacy. Mark C. Murphy published a response to this essay in which he disputes my argument that abortion does not, under such an assumption, result in harm. In this brief essay, I reply to his criticism.
46. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 21 > Issue: 2
Robert T. Lehe A RESPONSE TO THE ARGUMENT FROM THE REASONABLENESS OF NONBELIEF
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According to J. L. Schellenberg’s argument from the reasonableness of nonbelief, the fact that many people inculpably fail to find sufficient evidence for the existence of God constitutes evidence for atheism. Schellenberg argues that since a loving God would not withhold the benefits of belief, the lack of evidence for God’s existence is incompatible with divine love. I argue that Schellenberg has not successfully defended his argument’s two controversial premises, that God’s love is incompatible with his allowing some to remain in doubt that he exists, and that the nonbelief of some agnostics is inculpable. From the standpoint of what Christians believe about God, there are plausible reasons, which Schellenberg has not succeeded in refuting, for thinking that all nonbelief is culpable. I argue also that a loving God could have reasons remaining hidden to some persons, which are consistent with his desire to draw all people to faith.
47. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 21 > Issue: 2
Marilyn McCord Adams CUR DEUS HOMO?: PRIORITIES AMONG THE REASONS?
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From some philosophical points of view, the Incarnation is difficult to motivate. From others, a host of reasons appear, raising the problem of how to choose among and/or prioritize them. In this paper I examine how different substantive commitments and starting points combine with contrasting understandings of method in philosophical theology, to generate different analyses and answers to Christianity’s crucial question: cur Deus homo?
48. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 21 > Issue: 2
J. L. Schellenberg “BREAKING DOWN THE WALLS THAT DIVIDE”: VIRTUE AND WARRANT, BELIEF AND NONBELIEF
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In this paper I argue that moral virtue is sometimes causally necessary both for theistic belief and for nonbelief. I then argue for some further connectionsbetween these results and the Calvinist view, recently revived in the philosophy of religion, according to which theistic belief is typically warranted and all those who dissent from such belief persist in their nonbelief because of sin. Specifically, I maintain that the virtue of belief militates against its being warranted, and that the virtue of nonbelief renders the Calvinist generalization concerning nonbelief and sin implausible.
49. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 21 > Issue: 2
Steven L. Porter SWINBURNIAN ATONEMENT AND THE DOCTRINE OF PENAL SUBSTITUTION
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This paper is a philosophical defense of the doctrine of penal substitution. I begin with a delineation of Richard Swinburne’s satisfaction-type theory of the atonement, exposing a weakness of it which motivates a renewed look at the theory of penal substitution. In explicating a theory of penal substitution, I contend that: (i) the execution of retributive punishment is morally justified in certain cases of deliberate wrongdoing; (ii) deliberate human sin against God constitutes such a case; and (iii) the transfer of the retributive punishment due sinners to Christ is morally coherent. Whatever else might be said for and against such a conception of the doctrine of the atonement, the plausibility of the theory presented here should give us pause in the often hasty rejection of the doctrine of penal substitution.
50. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 21 > Issue: 2
Graham Oppy FAULTY REASONING ABOUT DEFAULT PRINCIPLES IN COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENTS
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Robert Koons claims that my previous critique of his “new” cosmological argument is vitiated by confusion about the nature of defeasible argumentation.In response, I claim that Koons misrepresents—and perhaps misunderstands—the nature of my objections to his “new” cosmological argument. The main claims which I defend are: (1) that the move from a non-defeasible to a defeasible causal principle makes absolutely no difference to the success of the cosmological argument in which it is contained; and (2) that, since it is perfectly well understood that non-theists have many reasons for rejecting the defeasible causal principle, it is pointless to claim that the move to a defeasible principle brings about a shift in the “burden of proof”. (Since some people may have forgotten—or may choose to ignore—the fact that non-theists do have reasons for rejecting the defeasible causal principle, I also provide a discussion of a modest sample of these reasons.)
51. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 21 > Issue: 3
Edward Wierenga Trinity and Polytheism
52. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 21 > Issue: 3
Scott A. Davison Craig on the Grounding Objection to Middle Knowledge
53. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 21 > Issue: 3
Mikael Stenmark Should Religion Shape Science?
54. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 21 > Issue: 3
Brian Leftow A Latin Trinity
55. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 21 > Issue: 3
George Adams Locating the Self In Kierkegaard and Zen
56. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 21 > Issue: 3
Jeffrey E. Brower The Problem with Social Trinitarianism: A Reply to Wierenga
57. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 21 > Issue: 3
Lambert Zuidervaart A Tradition Transfigured: Art and Culture In Reformational Aesthetics
58. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 21 > Issue: 3
Del Ratzsch Stenmark, Plantinga, and Scientific Neutrality
59. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 22 > Issue: 1
David Widerker Agent-Causation and Control
60. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 22 > Issue: 1
William Lane Craig Does the Problem of Material Constitution Illuminate the Doctrine of the Trinity?