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41. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 20 > Issue: 2
Elliott R. Crozat Does the Purpose Theory of the Meaning of Life Entail an Irrational God?
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In this essay, I address an objection to purpose theory (PT). PT holds that fulfilling the purpose God has assigned for humans is a way for human life to be objectively meaningful. According to the objection, PT entails the absurdity that God is irrational. There are at least two versions. I refer to them as Irrationality Objection-1 (IO-1), raised elsewhere by Thaddeus Metz, and Irrationality Objection-2 (IO-2), which I raise in this essay. I summarize IO-1 and replies to it by Metz. I then articulate IO-2 and support the following thesis: if God has middle knowledge (MK), IO-2 fails.
42. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 20 > Issue: 2
Mark C. Murphy No Creaturely Intrinsic Value
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In Robust Ethics, Erik Wielenberg criticizes all theistic ethical theories that explain creaturely value in terms of God on the basis that all such formulations of theistic ethics are committed to the denial of the existence of creaturely intrinsic value. Granting Wielenberg’s claim that such theistic theories are committed to the denial of creaturely intrinsic value, this article considers whether theists should take such a denial to be an objectionable commitment of their views. I argue that theists should deny the existence of creaturely intrinsic value, and that such a denial is not an objectionable commitment of theism.
43. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 20 > Issue: 2
Timothy Blank The Open Theistic Multiverse
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Recently, some analytic philosophers of religion have argued that if God exists, it is likely that He would create a multitude of universes. This view is called the Theistic Multiverse. More specifically, the view claims that each possible universe has an axiological status and all and only those universes above an objective axiological threshold are created by God and included in the Theistic Multiverse. I point out that in this model of divine creation there is the implicit assumption that Molinism is true. But Molinism is a controversial view, and so this project considers the compatibility of the Theistic Multiverse with a rival model of divine foreknowledge: Open Theism.
44. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 20 > Issue: 2
Christopher W. Love The Argument from Disagreement to Moral Skepticism: A “Worldview” Reply
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This essay begins with the assumption that many of our moral disputes have deeper roots in disagreement over worldview propositions. If this is true, and if there is a fact of the matter about worldview propositions, such that one could know the truth of at least some of them, then this makes it possible for one to maintain one’s moral beliefs, even despite the persistent, pervasive disagreements so common today. I argue that this holds true even when those debates include supposed peers and when the worldview propositions themselves are highly disputed.
45. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 20 > Issue: 2
Travis Dumsday Origen on Demonic Ignorance: And Why It Might Still Matter for the Theology of World Religions
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Historically it has been common for theologians to understand demons as basically on a par with angels in terms of intelligence and access to knowledge (excluding direct communications from God). Yet on this point Origen dissents, suggesting instead that demons might be qutie ignorant, at least with respect to spiritual truths. I explore some of the justifications available to him for entertaining this idea, and consider whether it could contribute to current discussions concerning the theology of world religions. Specifically, I argue that Origen's account of demonic ignorance provides the key ingredients for a plausible (at least for those already open to the reality of the demonic) explanatory model of one root cause of religious diversity: paranormal and “religious” experiences delivering incompatible propositional content.
46. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 20 > Issue: 2
Matthew J. Hart Christian Materialism and Demonic Temptation
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Demons have the power to cause temptations in us, and Christian materialism implies the supervenience of temptations on brain states. This in turn implies that demons bring about temptations by causally interfering with our brains. But if they have such an ability to affect the physical world, it is mysterious why they do not wreak more havoc than they do both to our brains and in the world more generally. Substance dualism provides an elegant solution: demonic temptation is not a species of soul-to-brain causation, but soul-to-soul, and we don’t need to suppose demons have the power to directly affect the physical world. Materialist solutions, in contrast, are ad hoc.
47. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 20 > Issue: 2
Dallas Willard, Brandon Rickabaugh Orcid-ID Intentionality contra Physicalism: On the Mind’s Independence from the Body
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We argue for the mind’s independence from the body. We do so by making several moves. First, we analyze two popular kinds of reasons which have swayed many to adopt the independence of the mind from the body. Second, we advance an argument from the ontology of intentionality against the identity thesis, according to which the mind is identical to the brain. We try to show how intentionality is not reducible to or identical to the physical. Lastly, we argue that, contrary to what many materialists contend, the concept of a mind, understood as an immaterial substance, existing independently of the body is both coherent and empirically evidenced.
48. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 20 > Issue: 2
Victor Reppert Extending the Debate on the Argument from Reason: A Further Response to David K. Johnson
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In our exchange in the book, C. S. Lewis’s Christian Apologetics: Pro and Con, edited by Gregory Bassham, David Kyle Johnson argued that four naturalistic views, property dualism, the identity theory, epiphenomenalism, and eliminative materialism, can all meet the challenge posed by a C. S. Lewis–style argument from reason. I maintain that his response fails to take into account what a consistent naturalism is committed to, and that his defenses of these positions fail to put those positions in the clear.
49. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 20 > Issue: 2
William Hasker Orcid-ID What’s Wrong with Theistic Evolution?
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The volume, Theistic Evolution, brings together objections to an evolutionary account of life’s history, and especially to theistic evolution, developed by scientists, philosophers, and theologians who prefer the perspective afforded by Intelligent Design. I present the main themes of their critique, and also point out that the work done to date falls short of providing a genuine alternative to the prevalent evolutionary account.
50. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 20 > Issue: 2
Benjamin H. Arbour, Gregory E. Trickett Evil Does Not Pose Any Special Problem for Berkeleyan Idealism: An Idealist Response to John DePoe
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John DePoe takes issue with Christians who accept Berkeleyan idealism, essentially arguing that there is a special problem from evil for the Christian idealist. While DePoe’s treatment of idealism is commendable, his argument ultimately fails in one of two ways. It either (1) turns on common misunderstandings of idealism or (2) results in consequences unacceptable to Christians. In our article, we respond to DePoe’s argument by remotivating idealism, pointing out ways in which DePoe misunderstands idealists’ responses to the charge of a special problem of evil, and pointing out problems with DePoe’s proposals of materialist solutions to the problem of evil.
51. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 20 > Issue: 2
David Kyle Johnson Retiring the Argument from Reason: Another Reply to Reppert
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In C. S. Lewis’s Christian Apologetics: Pro and Con, I took the con in a debate with Victor Reppert about the soundness of Lewis’s famous “argument from reason.” Reppert then extended his argument in an article for Philosophia Christi; this article is my reply. I show that Reppert’s argument fails for three reasons. (1) It “loads the die” by falsely assuming that naturalism, by definition, can't include mental causation "on the basic level." (I provide multiple examples of naturalist theories of mind that do exactly that). (2) Physical processes can reliably produce true beliefs. And (3) reasoning isn’t necessarily mental.
52. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 20 > Issue: 2
William Lane Craig A Fortunate Universe: Life in a Finely Tuned Cosmos
53. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 20 > Issue: 2
News and Announcements
54. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 20 > Issue: 2
Lydia McGrew Becoming a Christian: Combining Prior Belief, Evidence, and Will
55. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 20 > Issue: 2
J. P. Moreland Metaphysical Perspectives
56. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 21 > Issue: 1
Angus J. L. Menuge Onward Christian Philosophers
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Christian philosophers have engaged naturalism in three main ways: (1) direct refutation; (2) systematic comparison; and (3) sustained development of compelling alternative accounts. While all of these options have value, I argue that it is (2), and especially (3), that are most likely to win converts, and that we are witnessing an encouraging strategic shift in that direction. Options (2) and (3) bring Christian philosophers into closer dialogue with their naturalistic counterparts, building mutual respect and a greater opportunity for Christian philosophers to gain a full and fair hearing. This points to a bright future for Christian philosophy.
57. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 21 > Issue: 1
Ross D. Inman Editor’s Introduction
58. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 21 > Issue: 1
J. P. Moreland My Retrospective and Prospective Musings on the Evangelical Philosophical Society
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This article reflects on three issues: (1) the past twenty years of the Evangelical Philosophical Society (EPS), (2) ideas for EPS's future, and (3) some words of advice to my younger EPS colleagues. Regarding (1), I identify four values that were central to the rebirth of the EPS and that have guided us for twenty years. Regarding (2), I issue a warning and a challenge. Regarding (3), I provide three words of advice for keeping us on course.
59. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 21 > Issue: 1
Stephen T. Davis Recent Christian Philosophy
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This brief look at Christian philosophy in the United States in recent years considers both our successes and the challenges we face. It also congratulates Philosophia Christi on its excellence in the past twenty years.
60. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 21 > Issue: 1
C. Stephen Evans A Kenotic Theologian’s Response to Andrew Loke’s “Kryptic Model” of the Incarnation
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In this article I compare the kryptic model of the Incarnation, developed by Andrew Loke, with two other models, the “two-minds” model and the kenotic model. All three models succeed in showing the logical coherence of the doctrine of the Incarnation, and I concede that Loke’s model has some of the advantages of both of the other two, while avoiding some perceived disadvantages. However, I argue that Loke’s model also has some of the disadvantages of both of the other models. In conclusion I argue that the alleged superiority of the kryptic model over a kenotic model vanishes if one is willing to question the reliability of our a priori rational intuitions about the nature of God on the basis of a view of the divine nature that seems to fit better with the biblical picture of God.