Over the last two decades the practice of applied philosophy has undergone re­surgence. It is now common for philosophers to sit on ethics committees in hospitals, or to provide ethical advice to businesses, and many universities and colleges now offer courses in practical philosophy. Despite this, practical philosophy is subject to increasing criticism, with persons charging that (1) it is philosophically shallow, and (2) it has little to offer persons grappling with concrete ethical problems, either because (a) its techniques or too removed from such problems, or (b) because ethical theory is too abstract. In this paper I develop responses to these criticisms, and offer suggestions as to how practical philosophy should be developed.

This paper argues for an intrinsic connection between Logic-Based Therapy (LBT) and empirical psychology, a connection that suggests the need to employ both philo­sophical and psychological theories in the clinical setting. This link is established by arguing that LBT is conceptually grounded in naturalized epistemology, the view introduced and defended by W. V. O. Quine in the aftermath of his attack on the Analytic-Synthetic dis­tinction. Naturalized epistemology places empirical psychology and logic on the same epis­temic foundation, and, it is argued, it is this foundation that both supports the application of logic in the clinical setting and connects logic to empirical psychology. One consequence of this view is that LBT should be understood as providing a theoretical framework for other forms of philosophical counseling, an idea that establishes the logic-based approach to therapy as the sine qua non of the counseling enterprise.

This response to Taylor’s paper, “The Future of Applied Philosophy” (also includ­ed in this issue) describes Taylor’s understanding of the problems that practical philosophy faces; describes Taylor’s responses to these problems, and offers criticisms of his arguments.

In this essay, I take up the question of whether Gerd B. Achenbach’s ‘beyond-method’ method provides a suitable approach to counseling for the philosophical counselor. Achenbach maintains that the best method to counseling is one that is beyond any one single system. Many scholars have expressed an increasing dissatisfaction with such a methodology. Although these critiques of Achenbach are helpful, I argue that they do not capture the real problem with his counseling method. After I discuss this additional difficulty, I conclude that it is beyond all dispute that the methods of philosophical counseling should be advanced along different lines.

Traditionally we are familiar with at least two forms of courage: physical and moral. But the virtue has other forms which have not been widely recognized. One such form is “psychological courage” required to overcome psychological problems. Another form is “philosophical courage” required for philosophical counseling. In this paper, I argue that whether implicitly or explicitly, both counselor and client need courage, in its form as “philosophical courage,” for successful counseling. Moreover, the degree of such courage in both client and counselor will determine the extent to which issues are brought into question.

Philosophical counseling offers a depathologizing practice that can benefit both the practitioner and the client. Philosopher Michel Foucault’s account of biopower is a useful analytic of the psychopathologization of everyday life, and can show the social signif­icance of philosophical practice. This essay critiques the conflation, by some philosophical practitioners, of the medical disease model and all psychotherapeutic methods. Foucault’s conflation of human normativity and normalization is also critiqued. Historian of science Georges Canguilhem’s alternative account of human normativity within the medical disease model is offered as an antidote to the conflations by these philosophical practitioners and Foucault. Philosophical practitioners ought to give up objectivist claims to value neutrality and acknowledge that the interventions of philosophical counseling in clinical diagnostic discourses are normative, theory-laden, and politically significant.

An increasingly number of patients in Western civilizations suffer from weak authenticity structure which is characterized by a lack of self-realization, autonomy, character strength, stereotype behavior, inability to use (internal) dialogue in order to learn about oneself and defining oneself as a individual, and so on. In this paper a theoretical model of fragile authenticity structure and some suggestions to regain a more authentic attitude are presented.

For what are we born to become as Homo Sapiens? This question is answered in this article on the logotherapy of Dr. Viktor Frankl. This article commences with an exploration of human ontology guided by the philosophy of existentialism. This exploration leads to a continuation of this article by an explanation of logotherapy in theoretical principles and therapeutic processes. This explanation leads to the conclusion of this article by an application of logotherapy in three cases. This article is written with a creative synthesis that engages philosophical thoughts and psychological practices for logotherapists in the 21st Century.

Based on my experience as a philosophical counselor for the last two years, in this paper I attempt to describe the perception of life a young mind carries with him when faced with the challenges of life and the typical approaches adopted by him in order to endure them. Subsequent to this I attempt to build the theory of ‘selfism’ explicating the humanistic essence that each individual is not just responsible for the realization of his aspiration but also possesses the power within him to achieve it. This power within an individual is identi­fied by the survival kit he owns consisting of a rational approach to crisis situation, a central purpose vis-à-vis which all daily actions are aligned to and a strong sense of self-worth.

Many philosophical counselors seem to be counselors who use or point to phil­osophical texts or use abstract indeed logical or rational methods when working with a client. I want to introduce the idea of a counseling philosopher, who uses the client’s own concrete experiences as the basis for philosophizing with the client about the nature of the client’s dilemma - using ‘the between’ (Buber) as that special creative space where one em­ploys the art of philosophizing to the unique situation. Otherwise, the particularity of that client gets subsumed under theory or methods, much like what has happened in psychology and which gave rise to Achenbach’s criticisms of psychology/psychiatry. The dialogical of which Buber and Friedman speak is the give and take between client and counseling philosopher of understanding and expanding perceptions confirmed through the actual relationship. Philosophy as an art (and not a method) helps us restore the trust Buber talks about which allows us to engage the world directly and not through categories of thought grounded in psychological or philosophical texts and theories.

In this essay, I critically analyze Janet Staab’s view of engaged pedagogy, as a basis for philosophical coaching. I argue that Staab’s approach fails to address two major issues faced by counselors within a counseling context. First, Staab’s position does not appreciate the need for an appropriate psychical distance between coach and client, one needed to understand the client’s problems. Second, although Staab addresses the need to handle conflicts that may arise between coach and client, her viewpoint does not recognize the value of how it is possible to empower the client even if the choices and outlooks of the client clash with the coach’s own values.

These comments on Cohen’s paper (IJPP, this issue) focus on the question of whether Cohen’s attempt to derive antidotes from incompatible or contradictory philosophical camps— such as Hume’s subjective theory of beauty, on the one hand, and Augustine’s objectivist account—present a fatal problem for Cohen’s LBT. The paper concludes with suggesting a constructive way around the problem.

This paper shows how Logic-Based Therapy can constructively employ philosophical theories (such as those of Augustine, Aquinas, Spinoza, Hume, and Epictetus) as potent antidotes to the fallacy of Demanding Perfection.

After coining the term “philopsychy” to describe a “soul-loving” approach to philosophical practice, especially when it welcomes a creative synthesis of philosophy and psychology, this article identifies a system of geometrical figures (or “maps”) that can be used to stimulate reflection on various types of perspectival differences. The maps are part of the author’s previously established mapping methodology, known as the Geometry of Logic. As an illustration of how philosophy can influence the development of psychology, Immanuel Kant’s table of twelve categories and Carl Jung’s theory of psychological types are shown to share a common logical structure. Just as Kant proposes four basic categories, each expressed in termsof three subordinate categories, Jung proposes four basic person­ality functions, each having three possible manifestations. The concluding section presents four scenarios illustrating how such maps can be used in philosophical counseling sessions to stimulate philopsychic insight.

This article examines four key metaphysical assumptions of LBT regarding human emotions, human fallibility, reality, and human freedom. By way of examining these assumptions it shows how the theory of LBT systematically integrates philosophy and logic into a cognitive-behavioral approach to philosophical practice.

This paper examines the role of myth and metaphor in Logic-Based Therapy as these pertain to the development and use of philosophical antidotes. It maintains that the use of myth and metaphor in LBT can provide a primer for counselees for constructing antidotes for overcoming the real life problems for which they seek counseling.

In this essay I consider the question of whether Elliot D. Cohen has justified sufficiently the metaphysical basis for his Logic-Based Therapy as presented in his paper on “The Metaphysics of Logic-Based Therapy (IJPP, this issue). Although Cohen discusses four different foundations of his cognitive theory, I focus only on one. It is the most important basis of his theory, viz., that human beings logically deduce the cognitive-behavior com­ponents of their emotions from premises. First, I question Cohen’s analysis of the emotion rules we use to deduce evaluations of actions from. Second, I challenge Cohen’s view that we deduce our evaluations from emotion rules. Although I do not think my challenges completely undermine Cohen’s theory, they do raise serious concerns for a theory faced with a preponderance of causal therapies.

The article offers a brief set of definitions of metaphysical and epistemological principles underlying three distinct theories of consciousness and then relates these paradigms to a triad of contemporary therapeutic modalities. Accordingly, it connects materialism, empiricism, determinism and a passive interpretation of the “mind”=brain to medication interventions and behavioral and cognitive treatments. In this context, the paper proceeds to argue that these treatment approaches are theoretically incapable of addressing the dominant issue of man’s loneliness, and his struggle to escape from it, as the most basic universal drivein human beings. Next, it discusses the dualist, idealist, and rationalist assumptions of an active reflexive, self-consciousness, which has dominated insight-oriented treatment methodologies since Freud. And, finally, it treats the Hesperian and Sartre an phenomenological andexistential descriptions of awareness as grounded in the transcen­dent principle of intentionality emphasizing the aspects of the freedom of consciousness. Lastly, it claims that the first view stresses the temporal present; the second the past; and the third the future.

Despite the readily available discussion on counseling supervision models for over a quarter of a century, there is little attention in the literature with respect to how developmental supervision models align with existential philosophy. One model, The Integrated Developmental Model (IDM), is a robust and well-accepted model of supervision with embedded undertones of existentialism requiring scholarly discussion. The primary goal of this article is to emphasize the parallels between the IDM and Sartre’s philosophical principles of existentialism thereby creating a meaning making framework for supervisors to enhance developmental growth of their supervisees.