There have been two prominent ways of thinking about the relationship between phenomenology and naturalism: the first and more traditional way, in continuity with Husserl’s critique of psychologism, exhibits the incompatibility of phenomenology with all forms of naturalism and positivism; the second and more recent interpretive strategy attempts to naturalize phenomenology and make it consistent with current scientific accounts of consciousness and intentionality. In this paper I argue that despite the fact that Heidegger followed the first path and remained critical of naturalism and positivism throughout his career, there are important moments in the late twenties where his project of a phenomenological ontology is challenged by problems pertaining to naturalism. I show how the question of determining the essence of life and animality as well as the overturning of ontology into metontology offer significant methodological hurdles for Heidegger’s fundamental ontology.

In this paper, I explore a number of basic themes surrounding the issue of the last god in Heidegger’s Beiträge. I first examine the significance Heidegger attaches to “questioning” in this regard. Questioning, I suggest, is the ground upon which the preparation for the Ereignis of the last god (“grounding”) is to be exercised. Heidegger sees himself working on the path to a futural thinking (the inceptual thinking), one in which metaphysics would be left behind, but we can see that this task that Heidegger sets before thinking, once taken place, corresponds to a supreme historical moment for the West, namely the other beginning as the passing-by of the last god. Thinking becomes essential only in orienting itself towards such historical possibility. This unique moment of the last god (“passing-by”) grounds its hinting presence that attunes/determines the historical world of the other beginning. I discuss in detail the implications of this perspective laid out in the Beiträge.