Life-world as the world of our concrete experiences is permanently modified by science. All experimental actions even of pure science are just as much scientific practice as a form of life-wordly practice. Above alt it is the technological consequences of science that reorganize life-world, and in such a way that we lack more and more understanding of what they realty are. This paper wants to show that several discrepancies and paradoxes, rising from this fact, contribute to structural changes in our experiences of the world as well as of our own self.

At first I discuss the role of the term "presupposition" in philosophy and linguistics. After introductory considerations to the term of presupposition I will come to the problems correlating with this term (presuppositions - conversational implicatures, the communicative function of presuppositions, presuppositions and conditions of happiness), in a further step some propositions to definitions and classifications of presuppositions will be discussed. Aim ofthe considerations is to extend the term of presupposition. This offers the possibility to put this term into the global context of implicite knowledge and thereafter to reconstruct the background knowledge of Lebenswelt (lifeworld) in the frame of an analysis of presuppositions. In my investigations I concentrate on the question what it means that a sentence/an utterance presupposes a certain background knowledge (J R. Searle). A reconstruction and discussion of the term of presupposition in the "Diskurs"-theory (J. Habermas) marks the end of the investigations.

The term ’Lebenswelt’ appears as such only in Husserl’s later work, but is prepared in his early work: it represents a deepening and concretization of the ’Generalthesis der natürlichen Einstellungf (Ideen I) and is meant to contribute to the improvement of the transcendental reduction. The pretheoretical, elementary, and concretely practeced human world experience that is referred to by Lebenswelt, however; evades a stable fixation, as it always points to something seemingly beyond itself In connection with Husserl’s later cultural criticism and in relation to his manifold usage of the term ’Leben’ cultural-therapeutical expectations arise which can be instrumentauzea for politics, but overstrame Husserl’s concept of science. The widespread use of the word Lebenswelt ’ is certainly motivated by Husserl’s work, although the word appeared in single instances independently of him from 1908 until the 1920s.

The notion of life-world is to be understood as a methodological concept which demands the grounding of scientific statements in the first order constructs of everyday experiences and actions. Whereas the methodological principles proposed by Schütz conceive of these experiences mainly from a subjectivistic point of view, the ’communicative turn' asksfor a reconceptualization of these principles. Taken together; the hermeneutics of the everyday life world, ethnomethodology and grounded theory methodology can account for the methodical and communicative production of scientific statements about everyday constructs and the respective degree of "derivatedness.

Nationalism is an anthropological reality; nations in the German ethnic sense of homogeneous cultural wholes are not. 'Nation’ in this sense is not a 'natural-kind term'. Its defining properties do not co-vary. It does not even correspond to a classical ’ideal type'. Its properties do not tend unidirectionally to a coherent approximative realisation. For natural languages and cultures internal deviations from standard are as constitutive as conformity is. The idea of a homogeneous ’cultural nation' does not justice to the complexity of social diversification. Nationalism is less to be refuted because of its alleged incompatibility with an idealistic universalism than because of its much more painful incompatibility with an empirically adequate particularism. In conclusion: regionalism is a well-founded goal, nationalism is not.

Moral judgements have to be universalizable. There are many problems with this thesis (U). The problems to be dealt with here, are: (i) What is the connection between U and justifiablility? (ii) Is U a logical thesis? (iii) Is U analytically true? (iv) Is U adaquate? (v) Is utilitarianism a logical consequence of U?

According to some critics Carnap's philosophy is "reflectioness", i.e. without epistemic content. In contrast to this assertion this essay will show that in the writings of Carnap's semantical period, especially in "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology", the fundamentals of an epistemology are developed. It may be called linguistic internalism. The exposition of frameworks are interpreted as an epistemological foundation of semantics. Several problems within this project are discussed, e.g. the determination of domains of frameworks, ontological existence sentences, the relation between theories and frameworks and limits of rationality.

There is a plurality of good reasons for action. An adequate theory of practical rationality has to be compatible with it even if it requires certain modifications of our everyday practices of reasoning. Usual theories of practical rationality do not pass this test. It is envisaged how to revise adequately our understanding of practical rationality.

This article argues for the thesis that there is only one basic form of rationality, which is applied in different areas. First of all, there is one meaning of the term "rational" which applies to all situations in which the term is used: "justified." If "rational" means simply "justified", then rationality can be broken down into as many types as there are kinds of justification. Two distinctions between kinds of justification seem particularly plausible: 1. relative vs. absolute justifications and 2. theoretical justifications of opinions vs. practical justifications of actions. Taken together, these two distinctions yield a division into four types of rationality. I maintain, however, that these two distinctions collapse upon more careful examination. In this article I will simply assume that no form of ultimate justification is convincing; thus, the first distinction does not apply. Against the second distinction I try to argue in this paper that theoretical rationality represents a form of practical rationality. The idea of an optimal choice of aims, actions, and opinions, which nonetheless differs from the orthodox model of practical rationality, thus proves to be the comprehensive central ingredient of the concept of rationality.

Some principles of logic-oriented theories of argumentation are discussed. A sharp distinction is drawn between arguments in formal contexts and arguments in non formal contexts. It is argued, that the analysis of colloquial arguments cannot be based on the logic-oriented theories of argumentation. The outline of a more realistic theory of argumentation is given, by using defeasable inferences as a starting point. The model is applied to some everyday arguments.

J. St. Mill's System of Logic (1843) is reexamined from the perspective of present-day analytical philosophy of the social sciences. His naturalistic epistemology, "state", "general/universal laws", "social statics/dynamics" are discussed, as well as his four methods. His nomological-behavioral position is analysed, along with his theoretical approach.

For understanding human action rationality is a fundamental poin of point. A prototheory of social science elaborate the types of social action under the conceptualization of rationalization and human freedom in societies. On this way it must be distinguished two - not interchangeable - concepts of rationalization: the rationality of purpose e.g. the rational choice of means (Zweckrationalität) and the rationality of understanding (Verständigungsrationalität). Language behaviour has for this conceptualization the status of the frametheory. But actions are not identical with language behaviour and are based on language external ressources. The conceptualizations of concepts of rationality are basic-assumptions for the construction of a structure-model of societal rationalization.

Starting from one of the classical criticisms of evolutionary thinking accusing it of being based on tautological reasoning and being unable to predict future events, the authors propose an escape route from this attack by programmatically specifying the notion of fitness with reference to three particular aspects: cultural context, individual choice and social networks. Paralleling recent developments in economics, that try to explain preference formation endogeneously, the authors argue for an endogeneous explanation of the evolutionary fitness landscape to explain the evolution of structural complexity.

The acceleration and qualitative change of West European integration in the 1980s — as evidenced by the Single European Act — were big events of the world political economy of that decade. They not only paved the way for political union, but also altered the competition in the Triad — United States, Western Europe and Japan. This article analyzes the relaunch of the European Community and later European Union in the framework of conflictive evolutionary theory. Two elements of that theory are combined to explain the timing, the forces behind and the actors involved. The arguments are developed from the theory of the rise and decline of societal models and from the theory of competition among governments in the world market for social order and protection. The thesis of an elite argain among European transnational corporations and the EC-Commission is exposed ana briefly confronted with empirical evidence from the author's research. The article also reflects the competitive position of Western Europe in the Triad and draws conclusions for the future structure of the core: no hegemon similar to Britain's and America's position in the past will emerge since the systemic conditions have changed.

Contrary to political rhetorics of market economy and democracy the so-called "transformation " of the former GDR - attempted to start a quick and nevertheless extensive social change - is in reality a change with little room for spontaneous order or self-organization, for social evolution or development. Analyzing this example this essay tries to work out the structural dynamics of social evolution and to demonstrate the diverse control media and alternative steering strategies available in postindustrial societies.

Ascriptive solidarity is a fundamental relationship in human societies. Sociologists have often stated this social fact but they have seldom explained this kind of solidarity. Karl Otto Hondrich has elaborated fundamental social laws which are useful for the explanation of the evolutionary dominance of ascriptive solidarity. In the context of sociological knowledge I intend - following this account - to sketch variations of ascriptive solidarity in an evolutionary perspective and to describe structural problems of social integration in modern societies.