The proclamation of God’s death is commonly ascribed to Fridrich Nietzsche and the cultural nihilism of the turn of 19th and 20th centuries. The work on Hegel’s statement of God’s death shows that this is a much older cultural topos, appearing frequently in German (as well as British and French) literature, poetry and philosophy as early as in 18th century and especially in the era of Romanticism. The differences are not only temporal, but especially contextual; while late usage with Nietzschian cultural relativists generally has a diagnostic character, earlier occurrences of the statement relate to different cultural phenomena (old and modern mythology, modern poetry, revolutionary political and religious changes after the French Revolution of 1789, character of transcendental philosophy, and others). Hegel used this statement in his very early polemic with Kant’s and Fichte’s philosophies. He criticized both of them that in their philosophical subjectivism they were promoting the notion that God had died and man had assumed his position. This work shows some relatively little known dimensions of that polemic including the role played by F. H. Jacobi’s critical anti-Kantian position.

The paper deals with the role of irony in the thought of Blaise Pascal. The author proposes to distinguish two types of irony in Pascal’s work. The first type – offensive irony – can be found in The Provincial Letters, Pascal’s polemics with the principles of Jesuit moral teachings. The use of ironic strategy allows Pascal to criticize efficiently the Jesuit argumentation and the problematic consequences of their moral values. In Pascal’s Pensées, the function of irony changes radically. Pascal’s description of the position of human beings can be compared to the irony of situation, represented usually by The Oedipus King by Sophocles. Irony thus becomes a perspective which depicts the paradoxes of human existence and intensifies the emotional impact of Pascal’s work.

Durkheim’s political interest stems from an analysis of anomies of the late 19th century society. He credits the anomies to the changes in the organization of labor division in the society as well as to the fact that man is a being with ever increasing demands. In this respect he appeals to all social classes to abide by the rule of moderateness. – Durkheim poses the question if sociologists can contribute to social reform. In his view the most important contribution is their scientific work, i.e. an analysis and a description of social reality. Such activity does not qualify them as politicians. In politics, a scientist can only act as a citizen or possibly an adviser and an educator.

This paper contains preliminary notes on an interpretation of Hegel’s political philosophy. It concentrates on the last part of The Philosophy of Right, i. e. sphere of the ethical life. A thesis defended in the paper is that it is Hegel’s notion of bureaucracy which is crucial for the interpretation. Concepts are employed of civil society and public sphere by J. Habermas, as well as of habitus by P. Bourdieu in order to highlight fragmented character of the civil society. Therefore, the bureaucracy is given major role in realization of “the concrete universal” by means of both public administration and parliamentary politics. The centrality of bureaucracy in political integration is therefore called administrative nationalism.

The study is about the ontology late Martin Heidegger. The work analyses mainly category Lichtung and category Sein and relation L ichtung and Sein. Lichtung is in Heidegger’s work “The End of Philosophy“ ALETHEIA , also truth in early ancient meaning, mainly in Parmenides trought. Me study anylyses also form good method according to Heidegger.

This year it is 130 years since the birth and 80 years since the death of Karel Vorovka (3/2/1879 – 15/1/1929) as well as 80 years since the publication of his American Philosophy. The author shows the way that led Vorovka to this work: his strong orientation to western thinking, his attendance at the 6th international philosophical congress taking place at Harvard University in Cambridge near Boston (13–17/9/1926) and his personal and professional relationships with Anglo-American philosophers. It presents Vorovka’s “trip reports” from American meetings and the results of his studies: reviews of some Harvard philosophers’ works (R. B. Perry, W. A. Hocking, C. I. Lewis) and journal articles on American neo-realism, personalism and behaviorism, which were eventually included in his American Philosophy.

Kosík’s work Dialectics of the Concrete (1963) attracted great attention both in Czechoslovakia and abroad. Jan Patočka was among those who responded to the book in 1960s. One of the reasons for his interest was the fact that Kosík used elements of Heidegger’s philosophy to overcome dogmatic Marxism. Patočka pointed out that Kosík had not adopted the ontological intention of Heidegger’s analyses of everydayness, which creates a certain tension in his work. Kosík’s dialectics of the concrete, which stems from an analysis of everyday practice, never became, in Patočka’s opinion, a dialectic of real life.

The author of the article contemplates about the selected works of the Slovak philosophers. She focuses on the reflection of their prevailing interest in the domain of art, precisely in the domain of literature. She points out the interconnection of philosophy and art, philosophy and literature; and also discusses the role of a creator and that of a recipient of philosophical and literary texts. The author remarks on the prospective character of uncovering new dimensions for a dialogue between an author and a reader.

The article deals with some problems that concern the reliability of scientific knowledge and the rationality of scientific theories’ acceptance. The central attention is paid to the discussion between realists and instrumentalists and the controversies over literally interpretation of theories and their ontological commitments. The author examines one famous argument for realism (no miracle argument). She engages in the problems to which the argument is exposed (the circularity and the pesimmistic induction) and considers the possibilities to avoid them. The author concludes by claiming that even though no offered strategy is able to withstand effectively the pessimism that arises fromthe history of science, there is no reason to reject the realistic thesis.