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41. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 87 > Issue: 4
Jason T. Eberl Personal Identity and Resurrection: How Do We Survive Our Death? Edited by Georg Gasser
42. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 87 > Issue: 4
Christopher Tollefsen Response to Robert Koons and Matthew O’Brien’s “Objects of Intention: A Hylomorphic Critique of the New Natural Law Theory”
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Robert Koons and Matthew O’Brien have leveled a number of objections against the New Natural Law account of human action and intention. In this paper, I discuss five areas in which I believe that the Koons-O’Brien criticism of the New Natural Law theory is mistaken, or in which their own view is problematic. I hope to show, inter alia, that the New Natural Law approach is not committed to a number of theses attributed to it by Koons and O’Brien; that their own view suffers from many ambiguities and difficulties; that passages from St. Thomas on which they draw to support their own view are in fact fully compatible with the New Natural Law account; and that neither the New Natural Law account of the controversial Phoenix abortion case, nor their account of the casuistry surrounding the acceptance of side-effects, is deficient in the ways asserted by Koons and O’Brien.
43. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 87 > Issue: 4
Michael R. Spicher The Distinct Basic Good of Aesthetic Experience and Its Political Import
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To protect art under the First Amendment, John Finnis claims that art is simply the expression of emotion. Later, to protect aesthetic experience from subjectivity, Finnis claims that aesthetic experience is just a form of knowledge. However, neither of these claims adequately accounts for the nature of their objects nor fully protects them. The expression of emotion—intrinsic to art in Finnis’s view—is not always clear or even present, yet people can still appreciate the work. Equally problematic, aesthetic experience is not mere knowledge. It involves something more: a response or judgment. So, what is the nature and purpose of art and aesthetic experience? I argue that the main purpose of art is to provide the possibility of an aesthetic experience. Further, aesthetic experience is a distinct basic good. This status as a basic good and as the purpose of art provides justification for the state to protect (and occasionally promote) art.
44. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 88 > Issue: 1
Tilo Schabert Reaching for a Bridge Between Consciousness and Reality: The Languages of Eric Voegelin
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The title of this article evokes the problem in the pursuit of which Eric Voegelin, one of the foremost political philosophers in the twentieth century, produced his work. To inquire into what is called here “the movement unto knowing between reality and consciousness,” Voegelin progressively differentiated his language concerning “reality” and “consciousness.” In fact, language itself became for him a central theme. In his late essay The Beginning of the Beginning he added to the notions of reality and consciousness that of “language,” in one and the same “complex”” It is through language, he maintained, that reality becomes present to consciousness. To know reality means to enter into the “story” that reality is. In his quest for a theory of consciousness, the acme of his theory of politics, Voegelin found himself compelled to develop a theory of language.
45. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 88 > Issue: 1
Joseph E. Krylow It Doesn’t Concern You: An Analysis of Augustine’s Argument for the Immortality of the Soul
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In this essay, I present Augustine’s argument for the immortality of the soul in De Immortalitate Animae and critically evaluate it. I claim that the objections previous commentators have brought against the argument do not clearly show it to be problematic. Nevertheless, the argument does face several serious problems. One such problem is that it fails to demonstrate a personal immortality. There are several interesting responses one could make to address this supposed failure, but each such response has an alternate problem of its own.
46. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 88 > Issue: 1
Daniel B. Gallagher Faith Order Understanding: Natural Theology in the Augustinian Tradition. By Louis Mackey
47. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 88 > Issue: 1
Joshua Nunziato In the Self's Place: The Approach of Saint Augustine. By Jean-Luc Marion. Translated by Jeffrey L. Kosky
48. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 88 > Issue: 1
David Rozema Contemplating Religious Forms of Life: Wittgenstein and D. Z. Phillips. By Mikel Burley
49. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 88 > Issue: 1
Dylan Pahman Orthodox Readings of Aquinas. By Marcus Plested
50. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 88 > Issue: 1
William F. Vallicella Hugh McCann on the Implications of Divine Sovereignty
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This review article summarizes and in part criticizes Hugh J. McCann’s detailed elaboration of the consequences of the idea that God is absolutely sovereign and thus unlimited in knowledge and power in his 2012 Creation and the Sovereignty of God. While there is much to agree with in McCann’s treatment, it is argued that divine sovereignty cannot extend as far as he would like to extend it. The absolute lord of the natural and moral orders cannot be absolutely sovereign over the conceptual and modal orders.
51. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 88 > Issue: 1
Jason T. Eberl Catholic Bioethics for a New Millenium. By Anthony Fisher
52. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 88 > Issue: 1
Miroslav Hanke The Analysis of Deductive Validity in Martin Le Maistre’s Tractatus consequentiarum
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The paper focuses on the concepts of truth, truth-making and truth-preservation and their role in defining deductive validity as analysed by the late-medieval nominalist scholar Martin Le Maistre (1432–1481) in his Tractatus consequentiarum. This treatise, examined from the point of view of fourteenth-century British and Parisian influences, can be characterised as a critical adoption of the previous logical tradition and as the analysis of validity in term of truth-preservation. Part of this analysis is a study of self-referential phenomena, in particular, of self-referential inferences which are addressed in terms of a Bradwardinian implicit-meaning analysis of self-reference by Le Maistre. Also, his analysis of “consequentia formalis” summarises the fourteenth-century development of the discussion and compares alternative approaches towards formality.
53. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 88 > Issue: 1
William M. Diem God and Moral Obligation. By C. Stephen Evans
54. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 88 > Issue: 1
Christiaan Jacobs-Vandegeer Reading the Actio of Cognitional Acts in Bernard J. F. Lonergan and Joseph Owens
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Bernard Lonergan argued that a Thomist theory of intellect must begin with advertence to the act of understanding. He distinguished his cognitional theory from a conceptualism that neglects the experience of insight and reflection on it. Early in his career, he explained how the conceptualist approach misinterprets Aquinas and creates problems for the metaphysics of rational psychology. This article explains Lonergan’s position and illustrates the conceptualist alternative by analysing Joseph Owens’s view of cognition. By explaining the metaphysical differences between Lonergan’s and Owens’s opposing views of human knowing in relation to their distinctive readings of Aquinas, this article contributes to a more accurate reading of Aquinas on the act of understanding.
55. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 88 > Issue: 1
Joshua W. Schulz Aristotle and the Virtues. By Howard J. Curzer
56. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 88 > Issue: 1
Steven Baldner Albertus Magnus on Creation: Why Philosophy Is Inadequate
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Albert the Great does not regard the creation of the world as philosophically demonstrable. In this article, it is shown why this is so: because Albert regards the temporal beginning of the world as essential to the meaning of creation, and because he holds that it is impossible to demonstrate the temporal beginning of the world, he concludes that the creation of the world is philosophically indemonstrable. Albert insists that creation must imply a temporal beginning because he thinks that temporal duration can only be created if it is created at a first instant. Albert’s position necessitates a sharp distinction between creation and conservation. Particular attention is given to Albert’s De causis et processu universitatis and Summa theologiae.
57. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 88 > Issue: 1
Gene Fendt Socrates and the Gods: How to Read Plato's Euthyphro, Apology and Crito. By Nalin Ranasinghe
58. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 88 > Issue: 1
David Vessey The Role of the Concept “Person” in Gadamer’s Philosophical Hermeneutics
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Hans-Georg Gadamer joins Martin Heidegger in thinking we need to jettison “subject” and related terms from our philosophical vocabulary. Gadamer thinks the term is problematic for different reasons than Heidegger, though, and thus has a different solution than Heidegger: a recovery of the term “Person.” Here I look at Gadamer’s reasons for rejecting the term “subject,” how Gadamer understands the historical development of the term “person” from the Ancient Greek prosopon through Pope Benedict XVI’s understanding of the Third Person of the Trinity as communio, and finally how Gadamer’s understanding of personhood as being-in-dialogue avoids the problems with the term “subject.”
59. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 88 > Issue: 1
William A. Lauinger Eternity, Boredom, and One’s Part-Whole-Reality Conception
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Bernard Williams famously argued that eternal life is undesirable for a human because it would inevitably grow intolerably boring. I will argue against Williams and those who share his view. To make my case, I will provide an account of what staves off boredom in our current, earthly-mortal lives, and then I will draw on this account while advancing reasons for thinking that eternal life is desirable, given certain conditions. Though my response to Williams will partly overlap with some prior responses to Williams, especially the one offered by J. M. Fischer, my response will also be distinctive in some important ways. For instance, it will be distinctive in that it will discuss the role that one’s part-whole-reality conception plays in fending off boredom, where by “one’s part-whole-reality conception” I mean “one’s conception of his or her place (or purpose) in the whole of reality.”
60. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 88 > Issue: 1
Peter Dillard Ross Revisited: Reply to Feser
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Drawing upon Saul Kripke’s discussion of rules, James F. Ross deduces the immateriality of thinking from the metaphysical determinacy of thinking and the metaphysical indeterminacy of any physical process. It has been objected that Ross does not establish the metaphysical indeterminacy of what function a physical process realizes, that Ross does not show the incoherence of a highly deflationary view of our talk about thinking, and that Ross opens up an unbridgeable gulf between sui generis thinking and behavior. Edward Feser has recently defended Ross’s argument from these objections. The present paper explains why Ross’s argument remains vulnerable to all three objections.