In this essay I shall try to offer an outline of an answer to the question of which subject matter and which methodological peculiarities of cosmology caused cosmology only in this century to be transformed into one of the scientific branches of physics in spite of the fact that cosmological considerations on the Universe, and particularly on its origin, are present in the most archaic cultures and so belong to some of the oldest springs of human thought.

The paper explores the extent to which 'postmodernism' has affected our conception of social theory, especially with regard to the normative assumptions involved in cultural and social interpretation. It makes a proposal about how to redefine normativity after the postmodern challenge. Postmodernist theorists engage in the rejection of trans-contextual notions of truth and universalistic moralities. Yet since these efforts themselves involve commitments to truth and normativity, we might be inclined to reject them as inherently incoherent. A different, more promising road would consist in taking seriously the postmodern critique of reason, and to inquire whether, instead of necessarily implying a total rejection of reason, it suggests a reformulation of the scope and nature of truth and normativity. In this paper, I prepare such a reconceptualization with regard to the issue of normativity. The aim is to sketch a theory of normative commitment as built into our interpretive practices, if understood as the dialogical reconstruction—and thus recognition—of the other's beliefs and assumptions. To make the case for this proposal, I first present, by means of a comparison between modern and postmodern conceptions of social science, an interpretation of the relevance of the postmodern challenge with regard to modern social theory. Based on this, I will sketch a fourfold discursive field of positions addressing the justification of normative perspectives after postmodernism. This discussion will serve as a backdrop against which the concept of a hermeneutic competence of dialogical perspective-assumption can emerge as a plausible candidate for grounding our normative intuitions.

In contrast with the development of big theories in the context of social sciences, there is nowadays an increasing interest in the construction of simulation models for complex phenomena. Those simulation models suggest a certain image of social sciences as a kind of, let us say, "patchwork". In that image, an increase in understanding about the phenomena modeled is obtained through a certain sort of aggregation. There is not an application of sound, established theories to all the phenomena of a certain kind, but an aggregation of the structures supposed, and of the results obtained, when particular systems are modeled. The recent case of the "El Farol Bar" problem, and the models built in order to face this problem, are a good example of this. We will analyze that case, trying to make clear what would be implied by the image above mentioned. Special attention will be paid to the need to take seriously the notion of a bounded rationality, linked to the special circumstances generating each decision problem, and to the existence of an irreducible pluralism of models.

Pour l'economiste le plus celebre et le plus influent du vingtieme siecle, John Maynard Keynes (1883-1946), l'economie devrait occuper une place secondaire dans la vie humaine et sociale. La politique et surtout l'ethique devraient etre au poste de commande. L'oeuvre de Keynes, penseur multidimensionnel, s'appuyait sur un socle philosophique, ethique et epistemologique, qui en eclaire tous les aspects. Notre communication souligne en particulier l'influence determinante, dans la vision keynesienne, des Principia Ethica de Moore. A partir de ce livre, et des Principles of Mathematics de Russell, Keynes a engage une reflexion philosophique qui a abouti ä la publication, en 1921, du Treatise on Probability, qui pose le probleme de Taction en contexte d'incertitude radicale, ce qui est le cas de Taction economique. C'est done sur la base d'une reflexion philosophique, encore peu connue, que Keynes condamne le laisser-faire et prone un interventionnisme indispensable pour eviter Tecroulement d'une civilisation menacee par les extremismes.

In meinem Referat werde ich an das philosophische Problem der Ewigkeit der Welt anknüpfen. Wenn wir dieses Problem philosophisch betrachten, müssen wir uns auf das frühe Stadium der Weltevolution ziehen, d.h. auf das „präphysische" Stadium. Als „präphysisch" bezeichne ich das Frühstadium der kosmologischen Evolution, das angesichts der damaligen extremen Verhältnisse durch begründete fundamentale Theorien der gegenwärtigen Physik, wie Quantenmechanik, Relativitätstheorie oder Thermodynamik nicht zu beschreiben oder zu erklären ist. Heute kennen wir nur die obere Zeitgrenze dieses Stadiums, die sog. Plancksche Schwelle, die 10~^3 s. beträgt. Das Hauptproblem im Prozess der ontologischen Charakteristik dieses Stadiums ist der Versuch, seine untere Zeitgrenze festzulegen. Mit diesem Problem ist nämlich eine der ältesten und viel diskutierten philosphischen Fragen verbunden, und zwar das Problem der Ewigkeit der Welt und : (1) das Problem des Zeitraums des „präphysischen" Stadiums (es geht um das Festlegen seiner unteren Zeitgrenze - dauerte es unendlich lang oder aber nur einen winzigen Sekundenteil?), (2) ist der Anfang der Zeit (falls es ihn gäbe) zugleich der Anfang der Welt?, (3) bildet der Grosse Ausbruch den absoluten Anfang der Welt oder nur den Anfang eines von mehreren Stadien in ihrer Evolution, (4) setzt die Möglichkeit des absoluten Anfangs der Welt unbedingt die Kreation Gottes voraus (die supranatürliche Kreation) oder läbt eine Möglichkeit die Entstehung der Welt auf eine natürliche Weise zu (die natürliche Kreation), (5) das Problem des „sonderlichen" Moments. Alle diese Fragen, stelle ich auf der Basis der neueren Errungenschaften der Physik und Kosmologie dar.

Much ink has been spent on Popper's falsificationism. Why, then, am I writing another paper on this subject? This paper is neither a new kind of criticism nor a new kind of defense of falsificationism. Recent debate about the legitimacy of adaptationism among biologists centers on the question of whether Popper's falsificationism or Lakatos' methodology of scientific research programs (SRP) is adequate in understanding science. S. Jay Gould and Richard C. Lewontin (1978) argue that adaptationism is unfalsifiable since it easily invites ad hoc adjustments when it makes false predictions. William A. Mitchell and Thomas J. Valone (1990) argue that adaptationism is a research program, and that the charge of falsifiability does not apply to a research program. Although both sides make use of the theories of scientific methodology proposed by Karl R. Popper (1934, 1957, 1963, 1971) and Imre Lakatos (1965, 1974, 1978), the differences and the similarities between these philosophers are overlooked. The purpose of the present paper is to explicate the differences and the similarities between the two philosophies of science.

On a general level, this paper proposes a critical analysis of one of the attempts to make bridges between economics and moral and political philosophy. A priori, we may expect that formal methods may lead to clearer and more rigorous arguments, and may facilitate practical applications. However, this paper illustrates how precision is bought at the price of becoming tautological. Therefore, the statement that "it is already widely recognized that formal methods derived from economics can contribute to ethics" (Broome 1989: ix) seems hasty. The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses some philosophical background assumptions which underlie a decision theoretic argument in favour of utilitarianism. Section 3 recalls briefly John Harsanyi's decision theoretic arguments in favour of utilitarianism. It then focuses on the crucial assumption of separability in order to show that separability can always be saved as an assumption if one applies the strategy of dispersion. Section 4, finally, shows how the theorem may indeed reconcile the concern for equality and utilitarianism, at the price of becoming futile.

National economies have developed self-reinforcing tendencies and detached themselves from real economic life. In order to understand this phenomenon and find political instruments to control it, systems of national economies can be conceived as virtual realities. This requires a new comprehension of reality. The author suggests different ontological classes, which can be described in terms of the relations among them.

Gideon Rosen proposes a view called "modal fictionalism" which Rosen thinks has all the benefits of modal realism without its ontological costs. Whereas modal realists have a paraphrase r(0) of a modal claim "0", modal fictionalists claim that the correct translation of "0" is rather the result of prefixing "according to the hypothesis of a plurality of worlds" to r(0). Rosen takes the prefix to be primitive and defines other modal notions in terms of it. Bob Hale, however, thinks the fictionalist's project suffers from a "simple" dilemma. The purpose of this paper is to show that Rosen is right in taking the prefix as primitive and Hale is wrong in thinking fictionalism as being threatened by the dilemma.

The authors delineate the nature and neglect of integrity capacity and global business citizenship by world business leaders. They discuss how the philosophical analysis of moral and economic complexity enhances judgment integrity capacity and global business citizenship. Finally, the authors recommend positive action steps to improve global business citizenship and leadership integrity capacity through a balanced and inclusive pluralistic economic philosophy.

La teoria de los derechos de Robert Nozick se funda en los derechos de autopropiedad que cada persona tiene sobre si misma. Esos derechos legitiman que haya una apropiaciön desigual de bienes externos. El Estado debe garantizar las condiciones para transferencia legitima de toda propiedad privada, incluido uno mismo, mediante el mercado. La teoria de Nozick permite que alguien pueda venderse a si mismo como esclavo. A su vez, el modelo de equilibrio general competitivo de la teoria econömica neocläsica no opone ningün argumento contra el contrato de esclavitud entre humanos. AI tratar el factor trabajo como un factor mäs, cualquier restricciön a la libre venta de los servicios futuros llevaria a una situaciön suböptima. Pero ocurre que la esclavizaciön voluntaria es ilegal, y lo es porque el ejercicio del derecho de autopropiedad irrestricto no otorga mäs autonomia substancial, sino menos. Para que las personas puedan ser autönomas deben gozar de derechos de existencia (de ciudadarria, econömicos y demäs) inalienables. La teoria de Nozick y el modelo del equilibrio general competitivo no respetan esta condiciön esencial, lo cual las convierte en normativamente indeseables.

This paper discusses the recent trend in economics to reintroduce consideration of happiness or subjective well-being. The concept of happiness is discussed and a number of uses of "happiness" are distinguished. Several theories regarding the life use of "happiness" are identified. Some of the ways in which happiness is characterized in recent economic literature are discussed and critiqued. Helpful implications of a richer conception of happiness in understanding significant findings in recent studies, as well as the "paradoxes of happiness," are noted.

There are important cases where properties not referred to by expressions from the languages of physics are enabled in certain times and circumstances to get causal control over some kinds of physical events. I will argue that in those cases we would have to transfer to those properties the causal sufficiency to bring about these events. This would offer a principle of causal inheritance in sharp contrast with the inheritance principle for the causal sufficiency of second order properties defended by Jaegwon Kim in his recent discussion of the causal exclusion problem concerning mental properties. The two principles would be very different. Their domains of application would be distinct. Kim's principle would transfer causal sufficiency to the more "concrete" physical properties able to realize mental properties understood as second order properties. Our principle would transfer causal sufficiency to the more "general" properties able to cause the relevant physical effects in the times and circumstances in question. That way, it would be possible to give a quite simple answer to the problem of causal exclusion posed by Kim in relation to mental properties. Our approach also would have very important consequences in relation to ordinary macrophysical causation.

The concept of merit good is a problematic concept in economic theory. The concept was introduced in 1956 by Richard Musgrave. In 1990, on the occasion of an international conference on the concept of merit good, John Head wrote that the concept of merit good raises methodologically difficult and controversial issues. The concept raises doubt about the ultimate normative authority of the consumer sovereignty principle. I will demonstrate that the concept deserves the attention of the philosophical profession for multiple reasons.

This paper discusses the meaning of expressed preference statements. A holistic explanation of preferences is proposed: preference relations between propositions are explained by preference relations over worlds. Only those world-preferences function as explanans which are maximally similar to the actual world, and which are maximally similar to each other. The concept of similarity as intuitive is rejected, and is interpreted instead with reference to causal structure: 'closest to the actual world' is interpreted as compatible with the causal structure of the actual world, and 'most similar to each other' as sharing the same causal background conditions.

This paper critically surveys Adorno's dialectical-philosophical perspective of communication, which addresses a question and a quest for humanity: "How is communication possible?" In my view, any discussion of Adorno's view on communication should start with his distinction of two concepts: mediation and communication. Mediation involves the ideological critique of illusory relations of objectivity. Communication, defined by Adorno as the never-ending confrontation and reconciliation between subjectivity and objectivity, comes after the epistemological critique of objective mediation. Therefore, the quest for communication always involves a never-ending wrestling between subject and object, particular and universal, experience and information. As Adorno would argue, true communication is "a result not an illusion o f (non-) identity of self and others. If any authentic mediated communication is humanly possible, it is because such communication is inscribed in a dialectical-dialogical process and it can only be accomplished momentarily.

In several articles, Putnam claims that the direct reference theory (DRT) he endorses has startling consequence for the theory of necessary truth and essentialism, for if DRT is correct, so he claims, it follows that things belonging to natural kinds have their deep structures necessarily. Inspired by Donnellan, Nathan Salmon tries to spell out what Putnam seems to have in mind when making the claim, and Salmon calls the result "the OK mechanism". Salmon shows, in the OK mechanism, it is not DRT, but some other essentialism-entailing premise, that has the claimed startling consequence. In this paper, I argue that Salmon's OK is not the right interpretation of Putnam's intended mechanism. Instead, I present Putnam's intention as the OK* mechanism, and show that, in OK*, DRT does have the startling consequence for the theory of necessary truth and essentialism when supplemented only with other metaphysically innocent, purely empirically verifiable premises.