21.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2012 >
Issue: 43
黃麗 綺
Li-Chi Huang
從「虛無」到「笑」 ─論尼采「永恆回歸」之概念
From “Nihilism” to “Laughing” -on Nietzsche’s doctrine of Eternal Recurrence
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在尼采「上帝已死」的思想中,人失去其價值根源的有效性,在強力意 志所建構的生成世界中,人不再具有不變與永恆的意義與真理,而是由其 相對、暫時的效用與價值來理解存有的意義。本文即嘗試研究在尼采永恆回 歸學說中,是否提供了一種在「上帝已死」、傳統形上學之外對生命的理解 與評價的可能,並且由這個新的理解方式創造出在生成世界之內的新價值。 對此,本文所提出的假說為:永恆回歸的學說是人自我評價的方式,它的特 殊性在於透過此評價方式,一方面保住了生成世界的意義,另一方面在虛無 與生成中創造了存在的價值;而此方式在尼采哲學中呈顯為由從「虛無」到 「笑」的動態發展;在一切言說與理性之外,「笑」創造了一個由身體出發的新視角,它是人作為超人的意義。
In Nietzsche’s idea of “God is dead”, man has lost his validity in the origin of value, no longer holds the meaning and truth of constancy and eternity in the world of becoming built on “will to power”, but comprehends the meaning of existence through their relative and temporary validity and value. The present work attempts to seek in Nietzsche’s doctrine of eternal recurrence a possible comprehension and evaluation toward life other than “God is dead” or traditionalmetaphysics, and to create new values from the new way of understanding in the world of becoming. For this, the hypothesis addressed in the present workis: The doctrine of eternal recurrence is the manner of man’s self-evaluation. Its particularity lies in that, through this manner of evaluation, the meaning ofthe world of becoming is reserved on one hand, and the value of existence is created within nihilism and becoming on the other. This manner is presented inNietzsche’s philosophy as a dynamic development from “nihilism” to “laughing”. Beyond all language and rationality, “laughing” has created a new point ofview setting out from the body, and is the meaning of human as super-human.
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22.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2012 >
Issue: 44
杜保 瑞
Bau-Ruei Duh
對王陽明批評朱熹的理論反省
Reflections on Wang, Yang-Ming’s Criticism of Chu, Xi
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This paper, taking ideas from history of philosophy, reflects on Wang, Yang-Ming’s criticisms of Chu, Xi. The reflection indicates that these critical ideas are all derived directly from Wang’s interpretation of Dah Xue (The Great Learning). Taking the perspective that nearly all Wang’s works are based on criticizing Chu’s theory, we can say however that Wang is deeply influenced by Chu. Actually, their difference is not that explicit as seen from the generally held distinction in history of philosophy between Cheng and Chu about Li (principle) school on the one hand and Lu and Wang about Xing (principle) school on the other. In fact, according to Wang’s criticisms which concentrated the limits of Chu’s theory of Kung Fu, we see clearly that the problem originated from Wang’s confusion of Chu’s theory of Kung Fu with Chu’s personal ability of Kung Fu. Moreover, on the Kung Fu theoretical level, Wang’s criticisms confused Chu’s theory of Kung Fu procedure and ontology with pure Kung Fu theory. Consequently this confusion caused the lost of accuracy. Besides, there were other problems relating to criticism based on different interpretations of Pre-Qing Dynasty texts and various views on deviating editions of Dah Xue. This paper however holds the view that these differences caused by referring to ancient texts can be attributed to their differences concerning their attitudes towards the fundamental philosophical problems. It is on thisview that this paper argues that the difference between Wang and Chu can be resolved by elaborating their differing problematics.本文針對哲學史上王陽明對朱熹批評的意見做反思,指出這些批評意 見,從直接的材料上講,主要都是依據《大學》文本詮釋而來的,從陽明的 哲學創作來講,又多是針對朱熹理論做反對而來,就此而言,王陽明實在是 受到朱熹影響很深,兩人真正的差距,不像是哲學史上將程朱、陸王分為理 學、心學兩派之差異那麼樣的極端。又從實際上王陽明所爭辯的問題來看,則多為朱熹工夫不得力的批評,這就又有屬於朱熹談工夫理論還是朱熹自己 的工夫修養程度兩種問題,陽明亦是混淆此兩者。又從工夫理論的批評來 講,陽明又有哲學基本問題的錯置,將朱熹談於工夫次第及形上學存有論問 題的發言都從本體工夫的形式去批評,以致失去其批評的準確度。此外,還有從不同的先秦典籍之義理依據而做的文本詮釋之批評,以及對《大學》版 本本身的意見不同之批評,但上述批評,還是可以化約到哲學基本問題的不 同所致之批評。本文即以此為進路,說明陽明批評朱熹的意見是有可以被解 消之處,關鍵即在問題意識不同。
This paper, taking ideas from history of philosophy, reflects on Wang, Yang-Ming’s criticisms of Chu, Xi. The reflection indicates that these critical ideas are all derived directly from Wang’s interpretation of Dah Xue (The Great Learning). Taking the perspective that nearly all Wang’s works are based on criticizing Chu’s theory, we can say however that Wang is deeply influenced by Chu. Actually, their difference is not that explicit as seen from the generally held distinction in history of philosophy between Cheng and Chu about Li (principle) school on the one hand and Lu and Wang about Xing (principle) school on the other. In fact, according to Wang’s criticisms which concentratedthe limits of Chu’s theory of Kung Fu, we see clearly that the problem originated from Wang’s confusion of Chu’s theory of Kung Fu with Chu’s personal ability of Kung Fu. Moreover, on the Kung Fu theoretical level, Wang’s criticisms confused Chu’s theory of Kung Fu procedure and ontology with pure Kung Fu theory. Consequently this confusion caused the lost of accuracy. Besides, there were other problems relating to criticism based on different interpretations of Pre-Qing Dynasty texts and various views on deviating editions of Dah Xue. This paper however holds the view that these differences caused by referring to ancient texts can be attributed to their differences concerning their attitudes towards the fundamental philosophical problems. It is on this view that this paper argues that the difference between Wang and Chu can be resolved by elaborating their differing problematics.
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23.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2012 >
Issue: 44
胡 勇
Yong Hu
有無、本末與體用:王弼經典詮釋中的哲學創造
Being and Non-Being, Root and Branch, Substance and Function: The Philosophical Innovation in Wang Pi’s Interpretation of the Classics
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魏晉玄學在中國哲學發展史上的重要性,很大程度上要歸功於其在大量 的經典詮釋活動中所展現出來的強大的哲學創造性,正是這種創造性為後來 印度佛教中國化以及宋明理學的產生提供了十分重要的思想資源和理論範 型。有無、本末和體用是王弼在經典詮釋中最重要的三組概念,也正是這三 個範疇充分體現了王弼哲學詮釋的創造性。這種創造性主要表現為三種形 式:一種為保持原概念的語言形式,卻改變其概念的內在涵義或邏輯,「有 無」是其代表;一種為原概念的形式和內涵保持不變,獲得改變的是其在文 本脈絡或意義結構中的地位,例如從邊緣到中心、從平等到支配,「本末」 是其代表;一種為創造或採用新的概念範疇作為理解框架或詮釋邏輯,從而獲得和先前完全不同的文本意義,甚至創造出新的文本結構,「體用」是最 好的說明。筆者本文擬從有無、本末和體用及其相互關係等四個方面來呈現 王弼哲學中的創造性所在。
The remarkable philosophical innovations revealed in the interpretations of the classics, which has on the one hand contributed to the Sinicization of Buddhism and to the development of Neo-Confucianism, and has provided valuable intellectual sources and theoretical models on the other, are probably the reason why metaphysics in Wei and Jin Dynasties played an important role in Chinese philosophy. The essence of Wang Pi’s philosophy consists in three pairs of concepts, being and non-being, root and branch, and substance and function, by which his philosophical innovation can be illustrated. I try to show Wang Pi’s philosophical innovation in three ways: i. from the concept of Being and Non-Being, a new connotation or logic can be found in the ancient concepts. ii, from the concept of root and branch, the logical sequence of the text can be clarified. iii, from the concept of substance and function, the process of rendering brand-new meaning by employing new conceptual categories as framework (or logic) is demonstrated. This essay attempts to show the philosophical innovation in Wang Pi’s philosophy through these three pairs of concepts.
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24.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1971 >
Issue: 1
都昆如
先蘇格拉底期的「太初」問題探討
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25.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1971 >
Issue: 1
Chung-Ying Cheng
Logical Roles of Models in the Formation and Confirmation of Scientific Theories
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26.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1971 >
Issue: 1
Hsiu-Hwang Ho
A Pragmatic Concept of Translation
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27.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1971 >
Issue: 1
Charles Wei - Hsun Fu
Hare's Prescriptivism
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28.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1971 >
Issue: 1
Ronald Suter
Isenberg's Answer to the Problem of Taste
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29.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1971 >
Issue: 1
Shin-Yun Yeh
Some Notes on the Uses of Description
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30.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1971 >
Issue: 1
劉福增
論證與推演
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31.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1987 >
Issue: 10
.郎昆如
Kun-Yu Woo
魏晉社會哲學之研究
A Study on the Social Philosophy in the Wei-chin Period
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This study is divided into three main parts, and additionally includes an introduction, conclusion, footnotes and bibliography.The first part deals with the historical development of the social philosophy created by the philosophers in the Wei-Chin Period: (220-420A. D.) from the Taoists Ho-Yen (191-249 A. D.), and Wang-bi (226-249 A. D.) through the Confucianists Fu-Hsuen (217-278 A. D.) and Pei-Twei (267-:300 A. D.) to the Confucio-Taoists Gho-Hung (253-333 A. D.) and Tao-Siam (365-427 A.D.). This historcial process reveals the ascension of Taoism and the descension of Confucianism though some philosophers tried to make amalgamation of those two main Streams in that period.The second part is concerned in the essential contents of the social philosophy in the Wei-Chin period. It shows a strong value-changing from the Confucian moral approach to the Taoist mystical one. The search for the Corporeal longevity was the main stream for the Scholars by negligence of the spiritual lifestyIe. The social principle was declined because of lacking interpersonal relation. The confucianists felt in that time without power.Finally, in the third part, we attempt a critique on the values and the limitations of the sosial philosophy in the Wei-Chin period, from the historical of view or the essential significance we maintain that , the Taoism may strenghten the personal individuum, but it neglects the interpersonal relation in the social affair, which may be more important for social philosophy.The philosophical contribution in Wei-Chin period was rare.
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32.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1987 >
Issue: 10
Ah-Yueh Yeh
?當何月
The Theories of the Bodhisattva's "āvaraṇa" 〈障磚) and "kāraṇa" (能作因) in the Madhyānta-vibhāga -bhāṣya
中邊分別論之菩薩 "Āvaraṇa" (障禱) 與“kāraṇa" (能作因) 之學說
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菩薩教義是很有名的大乘佛教的利他主義,中邊分別論,不但是大乘瑜 伽唯識諸論番之一種,也是主張菩薩教義的有名論書。此教義能使我們淨化 心意及諸行慮,以便能於清淨世界中享受平安而愉快的生活。然而,事實 上,尚未到遠比最高目標以前,每人都有很多的煩惱來障磚我們的清淨心; 因此必須了解我們有什腰 "āvarṇa" (障磚)與 “kāraṇa" (能作因〉又如何去克服諸障磚,為了解答比諸問題,於本論文解釋下列五大節曰:(1) Avara 早a 的意義與種類。(2)十善法與其三十障磚、三十能作用的關係。(3)十法與十能作困的理論。(4)菩薩性的出現。(5)菩薩的最高目標。接後於第六章做以下的結論:1. 一般來說, 菩薩與聲問等共有的障磚, 有53種, 此數目是由安慧所介紹的,但是十三學法,不也有十障穗,也有三十種障誨,因此我認為其數目是超過2.kāraṇa活作因〉擁有電"hetu" 及"nimitta" 為同義話, 所以"kāraṇa-hetu" :六四之一種,也含有 "hetu-pratyaya " (因緣)的三種(Svabhava 與Prabheda, 白性與差別) ,這是阿昆達磨及唯議論書中的有名學說,3.內:年?去不;但由十能作因所支持,也出三十能作因所支持,後J于是由安慧所 去以便與三十障時做對比。4.已心(bodhicitta),自善根生而勝於它;其重要力使高J iLj ] f-j- 若現出他 可哩咕,這也是須要經過實踐加行道(等方~J頤決擇分)才' -o } f 坎果。5.為了實現菩薩的最高目標,就是淨化世界s有實行菩薩道的菩薩,頁由 主三十能作國的活動力來克服及消滅三十j幸存36.織做行時識論中所主張的世界和平之學說't 立章,不眼制於深奧的唯識哲學才 其實有很多合於實際的利他主義之有管你因雪如主張與荐友共位,。
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33.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1987 >
Issue: 10
Fu-Tseng Liu
Fu-Tseng Liu
One or Two Wittgensteins?
一個還是兩個維根斯坦?
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認真思考一個還是兩個維根斯坦的人雪必定會承認,維根斯坦的《邏輯 哲學論說》和《哲學探究》都創作了偉大的,而且基本上彼此很不相同的哲 學。不論採認那一邊,他們的根按可能很不同。有些學者認為《探究》的思 想是《論說》的思想的一種否定,但我認為即使這種否定存在實致了也只是表 面和誤認的。實際上,兩個思恕腔、被看成是互補的;而且,在某些重要層面 上,後者是前者的重要發展。本文將主要從形上語言和日的何干令人 觀點,顯示這種互補和發展。我們指出售《論說》中處理的語言主要是一種 形上語言z出《論說》的哲學尤其是國像論徵定的?而《探究》處理的則 是日常語言。這樣,這兩個研究的對象在存況論上(ontologically) 哉{r可進一步指出, 給恨斯坦使用不徵經驗的方法和觀點處理元;自己語言p而使用徵經驗的方法和觀點處理日常語言。由於對象不同,因此不同的!說:站 不應被看成是相反的持題。這樣,維根斯坦不應、被看成在他的《探究》理論 中股棄了國像論。
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34.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1987 >
Issue: 10
金忠烈
Choong-Yiol Kim
秦代哲學思想研究 一一試補中國哲學史上之一漏洞
Thoughts of Philosophy in the Ch'in Period Research fo the Lüshih Ch'iu Ch'inu
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I. This paper which is summarizing thoughts of philosophy in the Ch'in Period from 256 B..C. to 206 B.C. was written for writers already dealing with the history of Chinese Philosophy so that they might suipplement the gap in this time. II. Even if the Lüshih Ch'un Ch'iu is one of the most representative materials of philosoply in this period, many thinkers including Hu Shih have neglected and regarded it as miscellaneous thought because of not bieng creative motivation on it. But according to the result of my study, this would rather more synthetical than miscellaneous and the ideology as well as the new political world for coming unification must have been projected. In other words, we should not ignore this product of period which is containing not only purpose but intention, especially in the field of history of philosophy.III. After unification having selected all these conceptions, which was suggested by the Lüshih Ch'un Chiu concerning moralism in Confucianism, the whole-ch'i-ism in the In Yang school and revivalism in Taoism instead of power politics in late stage of the Legalist school for ruling people, the Ch'in would have been the owner of land undoubtedly and made the most utopian era in the political history of China.IV. The important philosophical concepts dealt in this paperis epitomizing the Calendar of Twelve Months (Shih Er Chi) regaeded as the main gist in the Lüshih Ch'un Ch'iu to the political schedule or agriculturallife schedule for common people. Furthermore, the emphasis in this paper is saying that politics and survival should go with the order of universal operation itself so to mean the returning to naturalism and individualism which have ever been enjoyed for primitive agricultural period out of supreme nationalism in the Legalist School. The thought in Unification of the world desired by the Lüshih Ch'uTI, Ch'iu is involving that in opening of the world at the same time to restore everything in its original position and function. So, the main ideal in the Lüshih Ch'un Ch'iu asks for the significance of life and self-importance as a point of view in life. All the beings or behaviors must be exist for the whole life and. virtue of individual life, that is , individual life be the center of all. So to speak, the conversion of value which means that the lifeis self-reliable body and purpose itself was evolved from the individual life being also used to means for whoever had been lord in that period.V. Finally, the political thoughts in the Lüshih Ch'uTl, Ch'iu were not discussed in details. These are going to be dealt with the next.
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35.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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1987 >
Issue: 10
將信苦海
Denis Hsin-An Tsai
論孟子道德抉擇
On Menicus's Choice
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Menicus has been taken as a great metaphysician. He developes a metaphysics of morality. His theory of mind as being originating from the Heaven, "Ti'en" is an essential part of the metaphysics and ethics. The problems of ethics can be solved from the metaphysics of mind. Hence, the students of Menicus mistakenly believe that the problem of moral choice wiIl be dissolved, if one has a cultivation of the mind. The main topics of this paper are:1. The main concern of the author of Menicus is praxis rather than an establishent of meaphysics of mind.2. The Menicusian theory of mind is a foundation for the universality of moral principles and moral worth of moral actions.3. Menicus‘s theory ef moral decision is founded upon the moral principles rather than that of mind or the conception of "Ti'en".4. Menicus does not derive the principles of moral decision from the metaphysics of mind rather from the practical rules that were estabIised from the "moral genuis" such as the ancient great kings, Yoa and Hsiung.5. Menicusian ethics is not a deontological ethics but a consequential one sinc.e he emphasizes the principle of the greatest utility.6. The way of re-vitalizing the philosophy of Menicus is consisted in a development of a theory of moral decision rather than the Neo-Confucian interpretations of the metaphysics of morals.
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36.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1987 >
Issue: 10
球縈莘
Wing-wah Chan
海德格〈存有與時間〉的世界性概念
The Concept of Worldhood in Heidegger's Being and Time
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This essay attempts to clarify the concept of worldhood in Heidegger's Being and Time. The author suggests that this concept may be interpreted in two different approaches. Firstly, it is called ontological approach. Here, worldhood is the a priori ground for the "presence" of the entities within-the-world. Accordingly, the function of worldhood is "letting-be" of entities which is not Dasein. Secondly, it is called epistemological approach. In this approach, worldhood is the a priori ground for the meaning of the entities within-the-world. Accordingly, the function of worldhood is to give meaning. It is in this approach that Heidegger takes the constitutive of worldhood as significance. But, why does Heidegger adopt the second approach instead of the first one? The author suggests that it is because in Heidegger's analysis of Dasein, which is usualIy treated as existential or ontological analysis, is actually an analysis of the disclosedness of Dasein. If it is correct, then in his interpretation of worldhood, would Heidegger certainly emphasize its role in Dasein's disclosedness. Therefore, I-Ieidegger adopts the second approach.
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37.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1987 >
Issue: 10
關永中
Wing-Chung Kwan
美的形上學一一文心雕龍原道篇
The Metaphysics of Beauty-Wen-Hsin-Del-Lung's "Yuan Tao"
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The first chapter, "Yuan Tao" (原道), of We-Hsin-Del -Lung (文心雕龍) by Liu Hsieh (劉碩) is a classical composition which is highly metaphysical. It maintains that the concept of Tao may be derived through one's experience of beauty. From one's perception of beauty in nature, in fine art, in love, and even in human virtues, one may transcend the boundary of concrete particular beautiful things to the source of all beauty--Tao. Tao, as the ontological foundation of all finite ontic beauty, is understood as the Origin of all things, the Ultimate Oneness, the Infinite Being, the Absolute Spirit. Beauty, in turn, can be understood as the attribute of Tao itself. The Tao of Wen-HsinDel-Lung conforms to that of the Book of Changes.This article is di vided into three sections:I. The Discovery of Tao through One's Awareness of BeautyII. The Three Levels of Beauty: A.. Ontic Beauty: Finite ObJects are Beautiful B. Perceptive Beauty: the Human Subject has the Ability of Appreciating Beauty. C. Ontological Beauty: Tao .is the Source of All BeautyIII. The Meaning of the Concept of Tao: A. In the Book of Changes B. In Wen-Hsin-Del-Lung
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38.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1987 >
Issue: 10
林義正
Yih-jing Lin
孔子論人之研究
A Study on Man in Confucius' Thought
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What is man? This is a perennial question in philosophy. The author has been interested in Confucius' view concerning this question.. The present paper is an attempt to explicate Confucius theory of man. It is divided into six sections: (1) human. intellect (2) human nature (3) human mind (4) human person (5) historical personalities (6) human virtues. Confucius approach to the problem of man is philosophical, rather than scientific or religious. His basic view is that there is no fixed, unchanging essence of man, and that man's essence is formed by his activities and deeds. In one word, man is what he does.
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39.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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1988 >
Issue: 11
郎昆如
Kun-Yu Woo
現象學方法一一從知識論到本體論
Phenomenological Method-from Epistemology to Ontology
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Phenomenology is a philosophical movement of contemporary western thought. Its founder was Edmund Husserl (1859-1938). Its main purpose was oriented towards a methodological research. In his phenomenological method Husserl tried to find an absolute scientific standpoint for philosophy without any presupposition.This study refers to my two previous articles, namely "The Concept Epoche by Edmund Husserl" (Bulletin of the College of Liberal Arts, National Taivvan University, No. 21,Taipei, June 1972, pp. 203-307) and "A Comparative Study of Laotzu and Husserl--A Methodological Approach" (Analecta Husserliana, Ed. by A-T. Tymieniecka, Vol. XVII, D.Reider Publ. Co. Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster, 1984, pp. 6573) to show the husserlian essential way of researching from the epistemological investigation to the ontological sphere.In the problem of on the methological repistemology, there would be raised the following questions. Namely: What is the thinking subject? What would be the object of thisthinking subject? Furthermore, in the phenomenological study, the instrument method, and process used by the subject become also centres of problems. The relation between subject and object is therefore to be discussed in this article.In the discussion the relation between subject and object Husserl then used his epoché (bracketing) to transcend all the sensible world in the first step, in the second step however he refers the cartesian meditations, in which the cogito seemed to be the genuine and absolute standpoint for the beginning of all sciences. The cartesian ego, cogito, is therefore the transcendental subjectivity for Husserl and his followers to guarantee his methodological beginning.But phenomenology would not satisfy with this subjectivity. Contrarily, it would like to extend its influence on the objective world. That is the method of the husserlianWesensschau through which all the external world would be constituted by the subjective intentional Bewuβtseinsstrom (consciousness-stream).The place in which Husserl overcomes Descartes lies on the refinding of the objective world. Descartes said "cogito, ergo sun", Husserl can even added "cogito, ergo die Welt ist".Phenomenology demonstrates indeed a way from epistemology to ontology.
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40.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1988 >
Issue: 11
劉福增
Fu-Tseng Liu
鄧南倫之前之後 一一語言哲學的J 個例示
Before and After Donnellan--An Example of A Philosophical Study of Language
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The topic might indicate what kind of theme will be considered in this paper. I would like to do three things. First, to brief a historical development of the problem of definite descriptions, beginning from 1905, Russell's paper, through 1950, Strawson's rejection of Russell's theory, and 1966, Donnellan's theory of referential use and attributive use,to 1977, Kripke's criticism of Donnellan's theory. Secondly, to do some critical study of Donnellan's theory. And finally, taking the above account as an example to show that aphilosophical study of language is an important method of philosophy as well as one main philosophy in the modern time.
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