Investigating the metaphysical problem of nature requires engaging with philosophy of science. Arguments in this field, combined with metaphysical underdetermination problems in fundamental physics, have given rise to a sophisticated form of scientific realism called ontic structural realism; and the reconceptualisation of metaphysics in terms of structures. This transforms the problem of nature into the dissolution of the distinction between mathematical andphysical structures (what we shall call the “blurring problem”). To date, there has been an insufficient exploration of this problem in the literature because it has been deemed unscientific. This essay demonstrates that the problem is legitimate, important, and connects with a wider issue in the philosophy of mathematics—namely, the problem of applicability of mathematics to the sciences’ investigation of nature (the Wigner Puzzle).

Many interesting philosophical principles include two kinds of modalities, e.g. epistemic and doxastic, alethic and epistemic, or alethic and deontic modalities.The purpose of this essay is to describe a set of bimodal systems, i.e. systems that include two kinds of modal operators, in which it is possible to investigate some formalizations of such principles. All in all we will consider 4,194,304 logics. All logics are described semantically and proof theoretically. We use possible world semantics to characterize the logics semantically, and both axiomatic systems and semantic tableaux to characterize them proof theoretically. We show that all systems are sound and complete with respect to their semantics and we consider some relationships between the various systems.

The paper analyses three versions of skepticism: (1) the attitude of a general withholding of belief; (2) the attitude of general doubt and (3) the view that all beliefs are unjustified. It is shown on the basis of epistemic logic that only the first of these versions can be deemed not to be self-contradictory.

Skepticism described by Sextus Empiricus faces the persistent charge that it is an inconsistent, self-refuting view. However, recently its consistency hasbeen defended in three important ways: (1) it is a thesis with weak assertion, (2) it is a practice without any assertion, and (3) it is a process developing over time.The first option is not well supported by Sextus’ texts, where even a weak assertion is not allowed. The second option cannot explain the rationality of skeptical arguments. The third option reveals two levels of Sextan skepticism; however, the developing skeptic has to accept the self-refutation charge, and the mature skeptic takes flight from the charge without any rational answer. I claim that Sextus embraces the self-refutation charge. The mature skeptic’s speech acts are pragmatically inconsistent: their content cannot be asserted without contradiction. As a result, the charge of inconsistency is not answered.

I introduce new details in an argument for necessarily existing propositions. The crux of the argument marks out a pathway to the conclusion that necessary truths cannot themselves be necessarily true unless they necessarily exist. I motivate the steps in the argument and then address several standard objections, including one that makes use of the distinction between ‘truth in’ and ‘truth at’. The purpose of the argument is to generate deeper insights into the nature of propositions and the logic of necessity. The argument also gives us a new reason to believe the traditional answer to the question of why there is anything: there is something because the alternative is impossible.

In contemporary analytic philosophy metaphysical nihilism is the thesis according to which there might be nothing, i.e. a possible world with no concreteobjects in it, but that can contain (or must contain) abstract objects. After summarizing the set of premises from which analytic metaphysics deals with nothing, I propose a set of premises that could fit continental metaphysics. Then I propose a new set of premises for the question of nothing that derives from a synthesis of the two above mentioned sets. By means of this new set, I try to show that nothing as a possible world with no objects at all is not a self-contradictory entity and I propose an argument for proving that an empty possible world exists.

The Principle of Continuity (PC) is a major premise in what can be called the “Continuity-Argument for Panpsychism” (CAP): If we, as complex conscious organisms, are the evolutionary products of originally inorganic components and processes, and consciousness is a metaphysically irreducible feature, thenconsciousness must have already been a feature of these fundamental components, assuming there is continuity between the inorganic and the organic. This argument faces one serious objection, based on the possible vagueness of consciousness: If consciousness is a feature of organisms which is gradually gained at some later phylogenetic stage the conclusion of CAP is false. In my paper I defend the assumption that consciousness cannot be vague with the goal of concluding that CAP is sound.

In his final notebook, published posthumously as On Certainty (1969, henceforth OC), Wittgenstein offers a sustained and, at least apparently, fragmentary treatment of skeptical issues. Given the ambiguity and obscurity of some of its remarks, in the recent literature on the subject we can find a number of competing interpretations of OC, particularly of the elusive concept of ‘hinges’, central to Wittgenstein’s last work. In this paper, I will discuss the dominant interpretations of OC in order to show how they fail to represent plausible renderings of his anti-skeptical thought. Finally, I will argue that the analogy between ‘hinges’ and ‘rules of grammar’, correctly understood and developed, can represent a plausible interpretation of Wittgenstein’s thought and, more importantly, a viable anti-skeptical strategy.

Concept Pluralism and Concept Eliminativism are two positions recently proposed in the philosophy and the psychology of concepts. Both of these theories aremotivated by the view that all current theories of concepts are empirically and methodologically inadequate and hold in common the assumption that for any category that can be represented in thought, a person can possess multiple, distinct concepts of it. In this paper, I will challenge these in light of a third theory, Conceptual Atomism, which addresses and dispels the contentious issues. In particular, I contend that Conceptual Atomism, when properly understood, is empirically adequate and can overcome difficulties that plague Pluralism and Eliminativism.

According to Christopher New, prepunishment is punishment for an offence before the offence is committed. I will first analyze New’s argument, along with theepistemic conditions for practicing prepunishment. I will then deal with an important conceptual objection, according to which prepunishment is not a genuine kind of ‘punishment’. After that, I will consider retributivism and present conclusive reasons for the claim that it cannot justify prepunishment without leading to paradoxical results. I shall then seek to establish that from the utilitarian point of view it is possible to provide a plausible justification of this practice. Finally, I shall attempt to defend the claim that the fact that utilitarianism can justify prepunishment in a satisfactory way is clearly a favourable characteristic of this ethical position.

In this paper I present a way of formally representing proper names in accordance with a description theory of reference–fixing and show that such arepresentation makes it possible to retain the claim about the rigidity of proper names and is not vulnerable to Kripke’s modal objection.

In “A Defense of Presentism,” Ned Markosian addresses the problem of singular propositions about non-present objects. The proposed solution uses aparaphrasing strategy that differentiates between two kinds of meaning in declarative sentences, and also distinguishes between two truth-conditions for singularpropositions. The solution, however, is unsatisfactory. I demonstrate that both truth-conditions suffer from the same problems in spite of the examples used to support the claim that one is a proper treatment for singular propositions. Part of the difficulty is in the limited expressivity of logical formalisms, a limitation not unique to the philosophy of time, but one which calls for greater attention.

Kai von Fintel and Anthony Gillies have proposed a revised contextual analysis of sentences that make use of “might” epistemically. On their view, when aspeaker uses an epistemic modal term, several propositions are made available to his conversational partners and, as a result, there are several propositions that may be picked up on by those partners. Because there is no concrete “context of utterance,” there is no one proposition that the speaker could be said to have asserted. This is meant to resolve conflicting truth evaluations by different speakers of a single utterance. I argue that the position is unworkable for two reasons: First, on their view there is no single proposition that counts as being asserted or semantically expressed by a “might” utterance; this has several counterintuitive consequences. Second, their position does not address several of the original problems that led many to abandon a contextual account.

This article compares David Lewis’s understanding of counterfactuals with a Platonic theory of counterfactual truthmakers. By pointing to some weaknesses in Lewis’s theory, it will highlight some of the strengths of the Platonic theory. The article will progress in the following way. First, I present David Lewis’s understanding of counterfactuals, and discuss some problems the theory has. Next, I discuss Platonic truthmakers, in general, and then show how this applies to counterfactuals. Finally, I discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the Platonic theory, and how it is superior to Lewis’s theory.

This paper is devoted to Franz Brentano’s conception of intentionality, and aims to reveal some of its lesser known aspects, like the implications of his studies for our understanding of Aristotle’s psychology. I try to show two “currents” in Brentano’s thought: beside what is widely known as Franz Brentano’s philosophy of mind, I also present the Aristotelian side of his thinking. Each of these currents, which I call A (Aristotelian) and B (Brentanian), makes different assumptions about the ontological status of the soul and God, and from these different conceptions of mental life and its relation to God follow different accounts of immortality. By discussing them in detail I also hope to show Brentano as a philosopher of religion.

The debates about qualia are common in contemporary analytical philosophy, especially in the area of philosophy of mind or epistemology. Notwithstanding the significance of this notion in present-day investigations, there still appears to be a lack of agreement over how to understand the term “quale”. Due to this fact, our goal is to shed light on the concept of quale as it entered the modern history of philosophy. Strictly speaking, our concern shall be devoted to the American pragmatist philosophy of C. S. Peirce and C. I. Lewis. Therefore, we intend to outline the understanding of quale within Peirce's theory of categories at the beginning, and afterwards we shall present Lewis' remarks on quale in the context of his theory of the given. This approach will not only provide the grounds for relating Peirce's and Lewis' views with each other, but also it will let us interpret Lewis' notion of quale within the pragmatic framework.