In this article, I attempt to throw some light on the basic structure of self-awareness (jikaku), which is one of the central concepts in the philosophy of Nishida, according to his early essay "Logical Understanding and Mathematical Understanding" published in 1912. Nishida puts forward a theory of logical development of experience which can be considered as the prototype of self-awareness. Here we can see Nishida's incorporation of ideas drawn from Rickert's and Sigwart’s logical thinking, Royce's self-representative system and Dedekind's definition of infinity into his own system of self-awareness. We focus on Nishida’s Rickert-interpretation. It is my view that only an infinite self-representative or a self-mirroring system cannot explain all of the aspects of Nishida's self-awareness for missing the intuition into the whole that inherent in this system. This ultimate whole which absolute free will intuits is the totality of being (on) and non-being (me on). I try to clarify its meaning according to Heidegger's interpretation of Kant’s productive imagination (produktive Einbildungskraft). The article is divided into four sections. After a brief introduction of the theme and method of the article (section one), I try to reconstruct Nishida's argumentations in logical understanding (section two) and mathematical understanding (section three). Finally in the last section (section four), I discuss some insights of Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant's productive imagination, and attempt to expound possible horizons opened by Nishida in his discussion of the "Absolute Free Will".

The present study treats political authority as a “command-obedience” relationship. This relationship appears in different “forms,” and each respective form is underpinned by a certain “base.” The author targets the forms and bases of political authority exposed in the chapter “Quanxiu” of Guanzi and finds that morality and law are typical forms of authority. From a more detailed analysis, the legal form is presented in the three distinctive dimensions: legitimate authority, induced authority, and coercive authority. The author further argues that the moral form has a mental base, whereas legal form is based on economy and force.

This paper aims to discuss how Sengzhao, basing on the Buddhist view of “naming of illusory existence”, acquires the insight into the existence of all dharmas and reveals the connotation of ultimate reality. Through this insight, he distinguishes true existence from insubstantial and epistemological existence and opens a thinking path to the “ultimate truth” or “nature of things”. The discussion is based mainly on Sengzhao's works: Treatise of Things Do Not Shift and Commentary to the Vimalakirti Nirdesa-Sutra. The approach focuses on self-reflection and the interpretation of his philosophy. The main conclusions drawn from this research include:(1) The viewpoint taken in Treatise of Things Do Not Shift involving “the nature of things” is a theory which establishes the concept of naming for the insubstantial existence.(2) The theory of “Not Shift” is established on the cognitive framework through which things are distinguished from the phenomena.(3) Although the concept, “Things Do Not Shift” does not imply that it is the ultimate truth, it can be seen as a path of exploring truth.(4) Regardless pro or con towards the views of Sengzhao, one must clearly distinguish the differences between the epistemological and ontological definitions of “Things” in order to discuss the divergent views of “Things Do Not Shift” and to be more convincing.

In Nietzsche’s idea of “God is dead”, man has lost his validity in the origin of value, no longer holds the meaning and truth of constancy and eternity in the world of becoming built on “will to power”, but comprehends the meaning of existence through their relative and temporary validity and value. The present work attempts to seek in Nietzsche’s doctrine of eternal recurrence a possible comprehension and evaluation toward life other than “God is dead” or traditionalmetaphysics, and to create new values from the new way of understanding in the world of becoming. For this, the hypothesis addressed in the present workis: The doctrine of eternal recurrence is the manner of man’s self-evaluation. Its particularity lies in that, through this manner of evaluation, the meaning ofthe world of becoming is reserved on one hand, and the value of existence is created within nihilism and becoming on the other. This manner is presented inNietzsche’s philosophy as a dynamic development from “nihilism” to “laughing”. Beyond all language and rationality, “laughing” has created a new point ofview setting out from the body, and is the meaning of human as super-human.

This paper, taking ideas from history of philosophy, reflects on Wang, Yang-Ming’s criticisms of Chu, Xi. The reflection indicates that these critical ideas are all derived directly from Wang’s interpretation of Dah Xue (The Great Learning). Taking the perspective that nearly all Wang’s works are based on criticizing Chu’s theory, we can say however that Wang is deeply influenced by Chu. Actually, their difference is not that explicit as seen from the generally held distinction in history of philosophy between Cheng and Chu about Li (principle) school on the one hand and Lu and Wang about Xing (principle) school on the other. In fact, according to Wang’s criticisms which concentratedthe limits of Chu’s theory of Kung Fu, we see clearly that the problem originated from Wang’s confusion of Chu’s theory of Kung Fu with Chu’s personal ability of Kung Fu. Moreover, on the Kung Fu theoretical level, Wang’s criticisms confused Chu’s theory of Kung Fu procedure and ontology with pure Kung Fu theory. Consequently this confusion caused the lost of accuracy. Besides, there were other problems relating to criticism based on different interpretations of Pre-Qing Dynasty texts and various views on deviating editions of Dah Xue. This paper however holds the view that these differences caused by referring to ancient texts can be attributed to their differences concerning their attitudes towards the fundamental philosophical problems. It is on this view that this paper argues that the difference between Wang and Chu can be resolved by elaborating their differing problematics.

The remarkable philosophical innovations revealed in the interpretations of the classics, which has on the one hand contributed to the Sinicization of Buddhism and to the development of Neo-Confucianism, and has provided valuable intellectual sources and theoretical models on the other, are probably the reason why metaphysics in Wei and Jin Dynasties played an important role in Chinese philosophy. The essence of Wang Pi’s philosophy consists in three pairs of concepts, being and non-being, root and branch, and substance and function, by which his philosophical innovation can be illustrated. I try to show Wang Pi’s philosophical innovation in three ways: i. from the concept of Being and Non-Being, a new connotation or logic can be found in the ancient concepts. ii, from the concept of root and branch, the logical sequence of the text can be clarified. iii, from the concept of substance and function, the process of rendering brand-new meaning by employing new conceptual categories as framework (or logic) is demonstrated. This essay attempts to show the philosophical innovation in Wang Pi’s philosophy through these three pairs of concepts.

This study is divided into three main parts, and additionally includes an introduction, conclusion, footnotes and bibliography.The first part deals with the historical development of the social philosophy created by the philosophers in the Wei-Chin Period: (220-420A. D.) from the Taoists Ho-Yen (191-249 A. D.), and Wang-bi (226-249 A. D.) through the Confucianists Fu-Hsuen (217-278 A. D.) and Pei-Twei (267-:300 A. D.) to the Confucio-Taoists Gho-Hung (253-333 A. D.) and Tao-Siam (365-427 A.D.). This historcial process reveals the ascension of Taoism and the descension of Confucianism though some philosophers tried to make amalgamation of those two main Streams in that period.The second part is concerned in the essential contents of the social philosophy in the Wei-Chin period. It shows a strong value-changing from the Confucian moral approach to the Taoist mystical one. The search for the Corporeal longevity was the main stream for the Scholars by negligence of the spiritual lifestyIe. The social principle was declined because of lacking interpersonal relation. The confucianists felt in that time without power.Finally, in the third part, we attempt a critique on the values and the limitations of the sosial philosophy in the Wei-Chin period, from the historical of view or the essential significance we maintain that , the Taoism may strenghten the personal individuum, but it neglects the interpersonal relation in the social affair, which may be more important for social philosophy.The philosophical contribution in Wei-Chin period was rare.

I. This paper which is summarizing thoughts of philosophy in the Ch'in Period from 256 B..C. to 206 B.C. was written for writers already dealing with the history of Chinese Philosophy so that they might suipplement the gap in this time. II. Even if the Lüshih Ch'un Ch'iu is one of the most representative materials of philosoply in this period, many thinkers including Hu Shih have neglected and regarded it as miscellaneous thought because of not bieng creative motivation on it. But according to the result of my study, this would rather more synthetical than miscellaneous and the ideology as well as the new political world for coming unification must have been projected. In other words, we should not ignore this product of period which is containing not only purpose but intention, especially in the field of history of philosophy.III. After unification having selected all these conceptions, which was suggested by the Lüshih Ch'un Chiu concerning moralism in Confucianism, the whole-ch'i-ism in the In Yang school and revivalism in Taoism instead of power politics in late stage of the Legalist school for ruling people, the Ch'in would have been the owner of land undoubtedly and made the most utopian era in the political history of China.IV. The important philosophical concepts dealt in this paperis epitomizing the Calendar of Twelve Months (Shih Er Chi) regaeded as the main gist in the Lüshih Ch'un Ch'iu to the political schedule or agriculturallife schedule for common people. Furthermore, the emphasis in this paper is saying that politics and survival should go with the order of universal operation itself so to mean the returning to naturalism and individualism which have ever been enjoyed for primitive agricultural period out of supreme nationalism in the Legalist School. The thought in Unification of the world desired by the Lüshih Ch'uTI, Ch'iu is involving that in opening of the world at the same time to restore everything in its original position and function. So, the main ideal in the Lüshih Ch'un Ch'iu asks for the significance of life and self-importance as a point of view in life. All the beings or behaviors must be exist for the whole life and. virtue of individual life, that is , individual life be the center of all. So to speak, the conversion of value which means that the lifeis self-reliable body and purpose itself was evolved from the individual life being also used to means for whoever had been lord in that period.V. Finally, the political thoughts in the Lüshih Ch'uTl, Ch'iu were not discussed in details. These are going to be dealt with the next.

Menicus has been taken as a great metaphysician. He developes a metaphysics of morality. His theory of mind as being originating from the Heaven, "Ti'en" is an essential part of the metaphysics and ethics. The problems of ethics can be solved from the metaphysics of mind. Hence, the students of Menicus mistakenly believe that the problem of moral choice wiIl be dissolved, if one has a cultivation of the mind. The main topics of this paper are:1. The main concern of the author of Menicus is praxis rather than an establishent of meaphysics of mind.2. The Menicusian theory of mind is a foundation for the universality of moral principles and moral worth of moral actions.3. Menicus‘s theory ef moral decision is founded upon the moral principles rather than that of mind or the conception of "Ti'en".4. Menicus does not derive the principles of moral decision from the metaphysics of mind rather from the practical rules that were estabIised from the "moral genuis" such as the ancient great kings, Yoa and Hsiung.5. Menicusian ethics is not a deontological ethics but a consequential one sinc.e he emphasizes the principle of the greatest utility.6. The way of re-vitalizing the philosophy of Menicus is consisted in a development of a theory of moral decision rather than the Neo-Confucian interpretations of the metaphysics of morals.

This essay attempts to clarify the concept of worldhood in Heidegger's Being and Time. The author suggests that this concept may be interpreted in two different approaches. Firstly, it is called ontological approach. Here, worldhood is the a priori ground for the "presence" of the entities within-the-world. Accordingly, the function of worldhood is "letting-be" of entities which is not Dasein. Secondly, it is called epistemological approach. In this approach, worldhood is the a priori ground for the meaning of the entities within-the-world. Accordingly, the function of worldhood is to give meaning. It is in this approach that Heidegger takes the constitutive of worldhood as significance. But, why does Heidegger adopt the second approach instead of the first one? The author suggests that it is because in Heidegger's analysis of Dasein, which is usualIy treated as existential or ontological analysis, is actually an analysis of the disclosedness of Dasein. If it is correct, then in his interpretation of worldhood, would Heidegger certainly emphasize its role in Dasein's disclosedness. Therefore, I-Ieidegger adopts the second approach.

The first chapter, "Yuan Tao" (原道), of We-Hsin-Del -Lung (文心雕龍) by Liu Hsieh (劉碩) is a classical composition which is highly metaphysical. It maintains that the concept of Tao may be derived through one's experience of beauty. From one's perception of beauty in nature, in fine art, in love, and even in human virtues, one may transcend the boundary of concrete particular beautiful things to the source of all beauty--Tao. Tao, as the ontological foundation of all finite ontic beauty, is understood as the Origin of all things, the Ultimate Oneness, the Infinite Being, the Absolute Spirit. Beauty, in turn, can be understood as the attribute of Tao itself. The Tao of Wen-HsinDel-Lung conforms to that of the Book of Changes.This article is di vided into three sections:I. The Discovery of Tao through One's Awareness of BeautyII. The Three Levels of Beauty: A.. Ontic Beauty: Finite ObJects are Beautiful B. Perceptive Beauty: the Human Subject has the Ability of Appreciating Beauty. C. Ontological Beauty: Tao .is the Source of All BeautyIII. The Meaning of the Concept of Tao: A. In the Book of Changes B. In Wen-Hsin-Del-Lung

What is man? This is a perennial question in philosophy. The author has been interested in Confucius' view concerning this question.. The present paper is an attempt to explicate Confucius theory of man. It is divided into six sections: (1) human. intellect (2) human nature (3) human mind (4) human person (5) historical personalities (6) human virtues. Confucius approach to the problem of man is philosophical, rather than scientific or religious. His basic view is that there is no fixed, unchanging essence of man, and that man's essence is formed by his activities and deeds. In one word, man is what he does.

Phenomenology is a philosophical movement of contemporary western thought. Its founder was Edmund Husserl (1859-1938). Its main purpose was oriented towards a methodological research. In his phenomenological method Husserl tried to find an absolute scientific standpoint for philosophy without any presupposition.This study refers to my two previous articles, namely "The Concept Epoche by Edmund Husserl" (Bulletin of the College of Liberal Arts, National Taivvan University, No. 21,Taipei, June 1972, pp. 203-307) and "A Comparative Study of Laotzu and Husserl--A Methodological Approach" (Analecta Husserliana, Ed. by A-T. Tymieniecka, Vol. XVII, D.Reider Publ. Co. Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster, 1984, pp. 6573) to show the husserlian essential way of researching from the epistemological investigation to the ontological sphere.In the problem of on the methological repistemology, there would be raised the following questions. Namely: What is the thinking subject? What would be the object of thisthinking subject? Furthermore, in the phenomenological study, the instrument method, and process used by the subject become also centres of problems. The relation between subject and object is therefore to be discussed in this article.In the discussion the relation between subject and object Husserl then used his epoché (bracketing) to transcend all the sensible world in the first step, in the second step however he refers the cartesian meditations, in which the cogito seemed to be the genuine and absolute standpoint for the beginning of all sciences. The cartesian ego, cogito, is therefore the transcendental subjectivity for Husserl and his followers to guarantee his methodological beginning.But phenomenology would not satisfy with this subjectivity. Contrarily, it would like to extend its influence on the objective world. That is the method of the husserlianWesensschau through which all the external world would be constituted by the subjective intentional Bewuβtseinsstrom (consciousness-stream).The place in which Husserl overcomes Descartes lies on the refinding of the objective world. Descartes said "cogito, ergo sun", Husserl can even added "cogito, ergo die Welt ist".Phenomenology demonstrates indeed a way from epistemology to ontology.

The topic might indicate what kind of theme will be considered in this paper. I would like to do three things. First, to brief a historical development of the problem of definite descriptions, beginning from 1905, Russell's paper, through 1950, Strawson's rejection of Russell's theory, and 1966, Donnellan's theory of referential use and attributive use,to 1977, Kripke's criticism of Donnellan's theory. Secondly, to do some critical study of Donnellan's theory. And finally, taking the above account as an example to show that aphilosophical study of language is an important method of philosophy as well as one main philosophy in the modern time.