Belief is a mental state, its content being the statement of a certain state of affairs. With respect to the manner they arise, we divide beliefs into spontaneous and reflexive. When we take into consideration their bases, we speak about basic beliefs and beliefs derived from others. The terms “spontaneous belief” and “basic belief” have various meanings, but they are equivalent with regard to their range.Contemporary religious spontaneous and basic beliefs have various forms. In the Christian religion we speak, among other things, about numinous beliefs, as described by R. Otto, and A. Plantinga’s properly basic beliefs. According to Otto, numinous experiences (of that which is tremendum et fascinans) are a source of firm beliefs for man, i.e. he has had contacts with some objective manifestations of divinity. Plantinga (whose thinking belongs to a more “naturalistic” strain) writes about properly basic beliefs, such that arise spontaneously in man (if he is not depraved by sinful life) who remains under respective circumstances. Such beliefs are the grounds for theistic derivative beliefs. The arguments for the truthfulness of the beliefs of the first and second type bring forth a series of questions, and they are constantly discussed by philosophers of religion.

The article presents Richard Kilvington’s interpretation of Aristotle’s views on the concept of justice. Richard Kilvington was a fourteenth century philosopher and theologian who commented on various Aristotle’s works including the Nicomachean Ethics. Kilvington’s commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics was composed in 1325-1326 at Oxford University. It contains, among others, a question Utrum iustitia sit virtus moralis perfecta, which is devoted to the concept of justice. In his investigations Kilvington always uses logic as a major analytical tool, and mathematics as a method to discuss the issues and settle between opposite points of view, which is common for Kilvington’s commentaries. These techniques allow him to indicate all the contradictions in Aristotle’s analyses. Kilvington’s concept of justice clearly points to a twofold order: horizontal and vertical. In the horizontal one Kilvington’s distinguishes the virtue of absolute justice that is a perfect model for all kinds of justice. In the vertical one he presents a model of a just man that is such a man who is ‘perfectly harmonious’. He also indicates the order of justice existing in the world, visible in human relationships, and regulated by three kinds of justice viz. compensatory, distributive and political. Kilvington’s investigations complete Aristotle’s opinions on justice, however they remain in the field of Aristotelian analyses and his concept of morality implemented in society. In this question Kilvington consistently separates the supernatural order and the order of natural reason, and, in his ethics, he never refers to theological issues concerning the relation between God and the created world, which was uncommon for medieval theoretical practice.

The studies on the history of logic in the Polish schools of the Commission for National Education in the period of the Enlightenment that have been published up to date evaluate the educational practice with respect to its accordance to Condillac’s work. His textbook was indeed ordered by the Commission for its schools, and it was also evaluated highly, but it was not published in the Polish language. From the rules of the Commission and its didactic practice, which made use of a series of the most eminent eclectic textbooks on logic then functioning in the European school, we can deduce that the Commission must have evaluated Condillac’s book as too one-sided. Aside to his approach, there functioned in the then Polish school a number of other studies. The Commission exposed a textbook written by the French Jesuit, Claude Buffier, in the first place. Despite the fact that he was close to modern solutions, e.g. Descartes’ and Locke’s, nevertheless he showed respect for scholastic tradition. Accordingly, he presented a group of solutions well-known from the traditional approaches. He only emphasised, in the modern spirit, how important is the veracity of the premises of syllogism as the fundamental condition for the veracity of the conclusion. It follows that the role of the theory of reasoning was limited and at the same time the value of epistemological problems was stressed.

The paper opens with an outline of Roger Bacon’s linguistic interests. He claimed that the knowledge of languages is the propedeuctics of any knowledge because it is formulated in the Hebrew, Greek, and Arabic languages, and no translation can fully render the original text. There are also other reasons for which the knowledge of languages is necessary for the functioning of the Church, e.g. in the Liturgy or for missionary purposes. Bacon distinguished three stages of the command of a language, and the second is the skill of translation postulated for each person that studies philosophical and theological texts. This programme was too idealistic and, if only for the scarcity of original texts, it could not be carried out on a broader scale in medieval universities doomed to use Latin translations. And these translations were so negatively evaluated by Roger Bacon. He referred to his knowledge of some details that showed the translators’ incompetence.Then the paper discusses Bacon’s opinions on medieval translators. It indicates Bacon’s chronological mistakes and his lack of information with reference to many facts about the translator’s movements. It provides some possible reasons for Bacon’s ignorance and his harsh evaluation of that movement. There were the following reasons for that: he distanced himself from some learned information due to the fact that Aristotle had for many decades been condemned in Paris, there were excessive expectations in relation to the alleged astronomic and astrological knowledge of Aristotle, and its lack was painful for this scholar. He failed to be aware of the vagueness of Aristotle’s original text due to, among other things, only a rudimentary knowledge of Greek that Roger Bacon had, and Greek original texts were inaccessible. One may also mention a tendency typical of Bacon to trace causes of mistakes and his fear of being rush in creating authorities.Bacon’s testimony concerning William of Moerbeke is discussed in detail. This was done with a view to show that Bacon conveys some information that is not true and some that can be regarded as trustworthy or hypothetical in further research on the life and literary work of this medieval translator. The unique piece of information is that William of Moerbeke decided to revise the ancient translations of Aristotle’s writings. Bacon’s negative opinion about William’s translator’s skills must be treated as unjust, although contemporary research shows that, despite his indisputable accomplishments, William’s translations have some drawbacks. Accordingly, we cannot completely reject Roger Bacon’s testimony.

The first part of the paper shows two types of the systems of contemporary logic placed in one of J. Bocheński’s works. The second part of the paper contains Boche􀄔ski’s theses concerning contemporary logic. They have been shown against the backdrop of the views held by other authors who discussed some kin issues. In order to supplement Boche􀄔ski’s considerations a division of functors has been added. They are divided into extensional and non-extensional. Much attention has been devoted to the problems of logical constants that is rarely discussed in learned literature. It has been stressed that at least one of Bocheński’s typologies should basically be changed, having taken into account the remarks in the paper that supplement Bocheński’s analyses. The above issues have been discussed against the backdrop of the question of relations that obtain between contemporary logic, mathematics, and philosophy.

In this article the author analyses two polemics against the stoic conception of fate – by Alexander of Aphrodisias and by Chalcidius. Alexander, who wants to show the Aristotelian doctrine of fate, presents the subject against a background of the Stoic conception, pointing out its disadvantages. He deals with the ideas concerning the existence and meaning of possibility in determinism. He also discusses issues referring to the free will of a man, free choices and their consequences. Chalcidius talks about the matters of evil and its beginnings, as he finds the stoics unable to give satisfactory answers to these questions. Not only similarities are there between Alexander and Chalcidius, but many differences as well. They are caused by the different backgrounds of the two critics of determinism. Alexander sees himself as an orthodox peripateticienne, whereas Chalcidius places his conceptions in the context of Platon’s teachings about fate.

The paper shows the elements of the cosmology of light in Bartholomew of Bologna, the Franciscan master of theology of the thirteenth century (d. after 1294). The paradigm of light is the key concept to understand the thought of this Bologna scholar. His views were principally inspired by Robert Grosseteste’s cosmology. According to Bartholomew of Bologna, the universe is not only the Platonic-Aristotelian machina mundi with its heavenly spheres and the spheres of the four elements of the sublunary world. It is also a vision of the cosmos in accordance with traditional theology with its Empyrean or crystalline heaven. In the construction of his picture of the universe he drew on the rich tradition of the Franciscan school.The paper discusses some particular issues contained in the Tractatus de luce by Bartholomew of Bologna, the issues that were widely considered in the Middle Ages. This concerns especially the conception of the multiplication of forms (multiplicatio specierum), the affection of light on the Earth and its effects, the composition of complex and animate bodies, the structure of heavenly bodies, and the conception of the natural place.The doctrine of Bartholomew of Bologna is a meaningful example how to adjust the problems concerning the metaphysics of light derived from Neo-Platonism to the theological Christian problems.

The article discusses the philosophical and theological currents that made their appearance at the university of Paris in the thirteenth century and prepared the rise of the philosophy and theology of John Duns Scotus. The principal rival orientations were newly the following: the new introduction of Aristotelianism, as represented by Roland of Cremona, Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas and his Dominican pupils, Siger of Brabant, and Boethius of Dacia, and the traditional and conservative Augustinianism, which found its defenders above all within the Franciscan order, where two schools of thought can be distinguished before Scotus: the older school culminating in St Bonaventure, and the second school, with Matthew of Aquasparta, William of La Mare, William of Ware, Peter Olivi and others. Due to the heterodox tendencies within the thirteenth-century Aristotelianism 219 of its tenets regarded as erroneous were condemned in 1277 by Church and university authorities, yet this fact did not stop further continuance and development of this current. After this condemnation there appeared syncretistic solutions by Henry of Ghent and Giles of Rome; also mysticism of Pseudo-Dionysian inspiration (Eckhart) made its appearance. Against this background the origin and rise of the doctrine of John Duns Scotus can be explained as one more attempt to steer a middle course between the rival extremes of Aristotelianism and Augustinian Platonism and to include in a comprehensive synthesis the most valuable elements present in both currents.This attempt prepared the way for the new philosophy of the fourteenth century, although at the same time became the target of criticism by its representatives.

The affective knowledge of God is this kind of knowledge that follows human affection. This knowledge comes about on two levels: on the natural human inclination to God and on the religious level of man’s orientation towards God.What is the nature of the affective knowledge of God? What does the passage of ex affectu circa divina in intellectum consist in? It seems that there are three matters:– firstly, since there is a natural inclination towards God in man (desiderium naturale vivendi Deum), man will be “restless” as long as he does not recognise or find God,– secondly, who loves God gains a new and more profound knowledge of Divine matters through con-naturalness and inclination,– thirdly, as a result of meeting with God and unification with Him, man experiences certain subjective states that cannot be expressed in words.

The tsarist authorities dissolved the majority of monasteries in the Kingdom of Poland in 1864. This was one element of repression after the fall of the 1863 uprising. Those monasteries that remained could not enrol noviciates. The repression fell also on capuchins. In 1897 they were allowed, as an exception, to have one noviciate, namely Izydor Wysłouch who received his religious name Antoni. Accordingly, there was a need to educate the candidate in philosophy and theology, so that he could receive the priesthood. On the basis of correspondence between Bl. Honorat Ko􀄨mi􀄔ski and the general we may say what textbooks were used in the Polish Capuchin Province. Before 1864 they studied philosophy from the book Prolegomena universae philosophiae written by the Franciscan Herman Osterrieder (1719-1783), to be precise course books and compendia based on this book. This textbook was principally eclectic in character, it contained some Scotist trends, therefore one may presume that before 1864 Scotism was to a certain degree present in the teaching of philosophy among Polish capuchins.

Question 6: Whether God as infinite is an object of theology from the Prologue to the Commentary on the Sentences written by William of Ware is a polemic with Giles of Rome and Henry of Ghent. The former contends that God is the subject of theology through the specific notion, namely as Saviour, while the latter asserts that God’s infinity is accessible to men’s knowledge only if it is understood as something added to the proper object of theology, i.e. to God. William sharpens Henry’s criticism of Giles and puts forward a thesis claiming that God’s infinity is knowable as the direct object of theology. William’s proof of the cognoscibility of infinity paved the way to John Duns Scotus’s developed conception of infinity as the principal divine attribute.

In the past centuries Maṇḍana Miśra was regarded as the most prominent figure of the advaita school of philosophy, to the extent that the whole system of advaita was frequently described by his name as ‘maṇḍana-matam’ (‘the view of Maṇḍana’). Nowadays advaita is almost exclusively associated, if not identified, with the name of Maṇḍana’s contemporary Śaṇkara. Both thinkers philosophised along advaita lines, their views on the ultimate being, the highest bliss, ignorance etc. were substantially different. The present paper is intended as a bird’s eye view on the whole of Maṇḍana’s legacy, including his Sphoṭasiddhi, being his contribution to the grammatical tradition of Bhartṛhari. It is also aimed at finding the reason why in the hierarchy of eminent advaita thinkers Maṇḍana was eventually supplanted by Śaṇkara and his oeuvre unacknowledged.

The paper is devoted to the question of the principle of individuation in Bl. John Duns Scotus. This question is found in his commentary to Aristotle’s Metaphysics, namely the Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis VII, qu. 13. The first part of the paper discusses problems connected with the chronology and structure of the text, whereas the second one is presented as Scotus’s teaching on individuation.S. Dumont and T. Noone argue today on the traditional thesis about the origin of this question and the remaining philosophical writings from the juvenile stage of Scotus’s philosophical work. They claim that some questions from the In Metaph., including also qu. 13 from the book, were written later or in the same time as the commentaries to Peter Lombard’s Sentences. The authors support their views by indicating the following: 1) the text the In Metaph. is better organised, 2) the vocabulary used with reference to the principle of individuation, especially the term haecceitas, is employed twice in the text In Metaph., 3) the quotations from the later works of Scotus and the works of authors who wrote somewhat later than that date of the In Metaph. hitherto presumed, 4) some stylistic terms indicate that the author of the text was a mature person. The traditional thesis is defended by L. Modri􀃼 on behalf of the Scotistic Commission. Having made a detailed analysis, Modri􀃼 rejected all the arguments from the introduction to the critical edition of the In Metaph. The author of this paper agrees with Modri􀃼’s view. Therefore as long as we do not have a thesis to the contrary we shall hold the traditional opinion about the earlier origin of the In Metaph. in comparison to Peter Lombard’s commentaries on the Sentences.Scotus opens his lecture on individuation with a discussion of various standpoints on this issue. He divides them into positive and negative theories of individuation. This ordering ensures a clear exposition of various views without unnecessary repetitions and vagueness. Eventually, Doctor Subtilis rejects all hitherto views and provides his own solution. The principle of individuation is for him an individuating entity, the ultimate reality of the individual being. In combination with common nature it determines the most individual of possible characterisation of the individuum. This positive individuating entity is called an individual form (forma individualis) in the In Metaph., a degree of entity (gradus entis) and haecceitas. The latter became a technical term to define the Scotist principle of individuation.

The temporal interpretation of modal logic consists in replacing possible worlds with temporal states of the world or any time determinates and the accessibility relation with a relation of passage of time. That issue has been raised by A. N. Prior, who was thinking of propositions as things which could change their truth-values (could become true or become false) with the passage of time. Under such interpretation Prior was reading a formula (□ϕ ) as: it (is and) will allways be the case that ϕ or: it (is and) has always been the case that ϕ . The formula (◊ϕ ) should be read respectively.In the present paper the interpretation in question is examined. Its sources are presented and its consequences are analysed. It is claimed that the interpretation is highly disputable because of its disagreement with the physical meaning of temporal statements, established in the special relativity theory

Ancient Platonists and Aristotelians considered the heuristic method of reasoning to first principles as “analysis.” It was derived from Greek geometrical practice. Plato’s theory of first principles, as we reconstruct it following Aristotle, postulated such an “analytic system.” In this system both sensible things and mathematical objects, ideas and eidetic numbers are gradually reduced to the same principles (ἕν – μέγα – μιχρόν). In the reversal order, from the principles are genetically elicited eidetic numbers and through them numbers, mathematical objects, and sensible things. This is a great analytical system that in fact has a mathematical structure. It transcends the physical explanation of the Timaios and is a broad translation of the nature of things. Our considerations concern a reconstruction and debatable issues, and they follow the following topics: 1. Testimonia Platonica, 2. Analytic theory of principles and agrapha dogmata, 3. Contextual problem and the field of agrapha dogmata, 4. The construction of a system: a procedure from and toward the principles, 5. The alleged paradox: “Good – One.” Ethics or mathematics? 6. Written and unwritten dogmata: dialogue or system?

The article deals with the Greek idea of circular thought and especially with the question of its presence and meaning in the philosophy of Parmenides of Elea. A new interpretation of the fragment DK 28 B 5, which is crucial to this issue, is proposed. It is suggested that the circularity of thought refers to the deductive mode of the arguments in the “Aletheia” and to the proleptic character of some of the Parmenidean statements. Both fragment B 5 (to be placed probably at the beginning of the deduction of the “Aletheia”) and B 8.50-51 (the end of the “Aletheia”) may be successfully interpreted on the basis of this idea. The proposed interpretation makes clear why the circularity of thought does not oppose the linearity of the reasoning and why the logical character of cognition does not contradict its immediacy for Parmenides.

Hildegard of Bingen and her spiritual writings are an interesting example of female thought in the Middle Ages. She was not only the abbess of a convent who had her visions, but also a politically active woman that took an important part in the social life of the twelfth century. Hildegard spoke about controversial problems. It remains true that while preaching she expressed her opinions, described her revelations and proclaimed the will of God. It is no doubt that not only Hildegard herself grew in fame but also her convent, things that we may attribute to her writings. Commonly, Hildegard of Bingen was remembered as a Benedictine nun and as a person who revealed the spiritual knowledge. Her visions were well known. The writings and authority of Hildegard as a prophet intensified so much that in the thirteen century it was used against the Dominican and the Franciscan Order. In this century some false visions were written and attributed to Hildegard herself. Later on one of them was also published against Jesuits. The copy of this print is in the Library of the Jagiellonian University in Cracow.