A phenomenological reading of Pierre Maine de Brian (1766-1824) offers a valuable understanding of one's own body in relation to the ego's apperceptive effort. As an organic mass, the body follows the double movement of this effort, manifested by an inner and an outer resistance. This movement allows the „constitution” of the world as correlative to the deployment of a force, identified with the apperception of the ego itself. This practical radicalization of the cogito can be viewed as the first outstanding achievement of phenomenology itself, even prior to its historical foundation by Husserl.

In his interpretations of Aristotle (1921-27), Heidegger argues that the ontological model of poiēsis (Herstellung, production, understood as bringing something into being by way of craftsmanship or art) played an essential part in the development of all major concepts of Greek metaphysics. The being of man and nature were understood in the light of the being of the produced things (erga), which Heidegger calls Vorhandensein (ousia). We will show here how Heidegger interprets three central words of Aristotle’s philosophy: technē (the knowledge which guides all steps of production), eidos (the aspect of the thing to be produced) and logos (the uncovering and bringing-together of all the characters which constitute the aspect).

The author argues that in Sein und Zeit Heidegger speaks about knowledge only in negative terms (as Ent-weltlichung) and thus he is missing the possibility of a synthesis between our being-in-the-world and our knowledge of objects. Consequently, the discussion of all instruments, ready-to-hand for knowing something, does not take place. All measuring instruments represent exactly the link between the pragmatic and the theoretical level of human existence. The essay comes to the conclusion, that the lack of any positive description concerning the ontological possibility of the synthesis between existential and categorical analyssis is the reason for the gap between Heidegger’s philosophy and the world of quantifying sciences.

This short autobiographical text evokes the atmosphere of the years which marked the beginning of my friendship with Alexandru Dragomir: i.e. our student years in Bucharest, the circle of Romanian students studying in the 40s in Freiburg i. Br. and the intellectual intensity of Martin Heidegger’s seminars and courses, which influenced both of us for the rest of our lives. From the 15 members of Heidegger’s Oberseminar (dedicated in this period to Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit), three were from Romania: Alexandru Dragomir, Octavian Vuia and the author of these lines. The relationship between Dragomir and I became closer as we translated “Was ist Metaphysik?” into Romanian. Alexandru Dragomir was highly appreciated by Heidegger and beloved by other students for his penetrating spirit, for his spontaneity, but also for his sense of humor. After more than 30 years in which the history thrown us in parallel worlds, we had the joy to meet again in Bucharest. His texts, now published, present him as a brilliant and original thinker.