It is shown that at least part of the terminology of the theory of speech acts can be methodically introduced within the constructive ortholanguage-programm. There is evidence that a methodical constraint leads the reconstruction of the basic speech-act-types from requests via statements to questions. Moreover there is evidence that requests and questions don't involve "propositional acts".

Any classification of illocutionary acts to be well-founded has to be based on logical principles characteristic of the different types of these acts; and the relevant principles nave to be couched in terms of general action theory. This approach is specified for informatives and directives, and the essential connections between these two (most basic?) types of illocutionary acts are explicated and diagrammed - showing the primacy of informatives. Discussion of why, in talking about communicative acts, some divergence from ordinary language is to be recommended.

The object of this paper is to provide an overview of several concepts of linguistic discourse research. The central question is the relationship between a Speech Act Theory (SAT) on the one hand and a Discourse Theory (DT) on the other, in the first section, Searle’s SAT is compared to Ethnomethodologv against the background of a brief explanation of linguistic discourse research in the 19th century. Following this is a review of two concepts, one which pleads for a ’pure' SAT without any reference to discourse (Motsch), and one which proposes replacing a SAT by a linguistic DT (Weigand). The article concludes with an overview of a range of concepts which attempt to mediate between a SAT and a DT.

Most texts on argumentation theory stress the importance of formal logic for the study of arguments. This paper raises some doubts about the usefulness of logic for the study of argumentation. In fact\ the basic analogy between logical proofs ana arguments in natural language does not seem to hold. There seems to be a basic circularity in everday arguments which cannot be reconstructed by the standard logical tools. Therefore we habe to look for some non-logical forms of representation. Some hints for this new type of argument representation are given.

Aim of the deliberation is to identify the presuppositions for the analysis of use of language on the level of semantic interpretation. Pragmatics has no self-sufficiency semantic core-theory. The requirements of theories in semantic are discussed ana further the consens and disserts of the approaches in semantic analysis is demonstrated. Special references are the problem of analytic and synthetic (W.v.O. Quine. J.J. Katz, S. Haack, H. Pumam, D. Davidson), the debat about B. Russells analysis of denoting and the critics of P.F. Strawson ana K.S. Donnellan. The non-self-sufficiency of the semantic conceptualization on the level of pragmatics is valid even though semantic is deliminated through pragmatics.

This article tries to give a partial answer to the question how to analyse and describe verbal quarreling and squabbling by investigating three types of speech acts: reproaching, insisting and calling someone names. A distinction is being drawn between interaction in conflict and quarreling. Essential features of quarreling-specific speech acts are to be seen in their expressive ana offending quality in connection with certam situational factors. In a methodological perspective the focus is set upon the rules of emotion management in dialogical situations and on the relation of pragmatical linguistics to psychology and sociology.

In part lit will be analysed the genesis of the term "lifeworld" in context of E. Husserl’s philosophy. In the Crisis of European Science Husserl shows that the Doxa has a special significance compared to Episteme. This corresponds with Hussser's thesis that the world of science requires always the lifeworld. The lifeworld is the result of the anonymous cons- titution of the transcentental ego. This constitution should be demonstrated in Husserl’s "ontology of lifeworld".In part II it will be demonstrated the constitution of the lifeworld not in terms of the transcendental philosophy but in terms of the existencial philosophy. It appears that for the genesis of the lifeworld the experience of the confidence Has a constituent function, primary the confidence of the child in its mother. In this relationship the child improves the confidence. If this relationship will be broken so this has negative consequences for the following life.In Kafka’s story "Der Bau" will be demonstrated the situation in which the confidence is broken. The story shows that the lifeworld is the result of the individual experience.

Life-world as the world of our concrete experiences is permanently modified by science. All experimental actions even of pure science are just as much scientific practice as a form of life-wordly practice. Above alt it is the technological consequences of science that reorganize life-world, and in such a way that we lack more and more understanding of what they realty are. This paper wants to show that several discrepancies and paradoxes, rising from this fact, contribute to structural changes in our experiences of the world as well as of our own self.

At first I discuss the role of the term "presupposition" in philosophy and linguistics. After introductory considerations to the term of presupposition I will come to the problems correlating with this term (presuppositions - conversational implicatures, the communicative function of presuppositions, presuppositions and conditions of happiness), in a further step some propositions to definitions and classifications of presuppositions will be discussed. Aim ofthe considerations is to extend the term of presupposition. This offers the possibility to put this term into the global context of implicite knowledge and thereafter to reconstruct the background knowledge of Lebenswelt (lifeworld) in the frame of an analysis of presuppositions. In my investigations I concentrate on the question what it means that a sentence/an utterance presupposes a certain background knowledge (J R. Searle). A reconstruction and discussion of the term of presupposition in the "Diskurs"-theory (J. Habermas) marks the end of the investigations.

The term ’Lebenswelt’ appears as such only in Husserl’s later work, but is prepared in his early work: it represents a deepening and concretization of the ’Generalthesis der natürlichen Einstellungf (Ideen I) and is meant to contribute to the improvement of the transcendental reduction. The pretheoretical, elementary, and concretely practeced human world experience that is referred to by Lebenswelt, however; evades a stable fixation, as it always points to something seemingly beyond itself In connection with Husserl’s later cultural criticism and in relation to his manifold usage of the term ’Leben’ cultural-therapeutical expectations arise which can be instrumentauzea for politics, but overstrame Husserl’s concept of science. The widespread use of the word Lebenswelt ’ is certainly motivated by Husserl’s work, although the word appeared in single instances independently of him from 1908 until the 1920s.

The notion of life-world is to be understood as a methodological concept which demands the grounding of scientific statements in the first order constructs of everyday experiences and actions. Whereas the methodological principles proposed by Schütz conceive of these experiences mainly from a subjectivistic point of view, the ’communicative turn' asksfor a reconceptualization of these principles. Taken together; the hermeneutics of the everyday life world, ethnomethodology and grounded theory methodology can account for the methodical and communicative production of scientific statements about everyday constructs and the respective degree of "derivatedness.

Nationalism is an anthropological reality; nations in the German ethnic sense of homogeneous cultural wholes are not. 'Nation’ in this sense is not a 'natural-kind term'. Its defining properties do not co-vary. It does not even correspond to a classical ’ideal type'. Its properties do not tend unidirectionally to a coherent approximative realisation. For natural languages and cultures internal deviations from standard are as constitutive as conformity is. The idea of a homogeneous ’cultural nation' does not justice to the complexity of social diversification. Nationalism is less to be refuted because of its alleged incompatibility with an idealistic universalism than because of its much more painful incompatibility with an empirically adequate particularism. In conclusion: regionalism is a well-founded goal, nationalism is not.

Moral judgements have to be universalizable. There are many problems with this thesis (U). The problems to be dealt with here, are: (i) What is the connection between U and justifiablility? (ii) Is U a logical thesis? (iii) Is U analytically true? (iv) Is U adaquate? (v) Is utilitarianism a logical consequence of U?

According to some critics Carnap's philosophy is "reflectioness", i.e. without epistemic content. In contrast to this assertion this essay will show that in the writings of Carnap's semantical period, especially in "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology", the fundamentals of an epistemology are developed. It may be called linguistic internalism. The exposition of frameworks are interpreted as an epistemological foundation of semantics. Several problems within this project are discussed, e.g. the determination of domains of frameworks, ontological existence sentences, the relation between theories and frameworks and limits of rationality.

There is a plurality of good reasons for action. An adequate theory of practical rationality has to be compatible with it even if it requires certain modifications of our everyday practices of reasoning. Usual theories of practical rationality do not pass this test. It is envisaged how to revise adequately our understanding of practical rationality.