21.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1972 >
Issue: 2
Ellen-Marie Chen
Individual and Society in Rousseau's Idea of Freedom
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22.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1972 >
Issue: 2
Chung-ying Cheng
On Questions Relating to Philosophy of Mathematics
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23.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1972 >
Issue: 2
Robert E. A. Shanab
A Defense of Tolman's Position Concerning Intervening Variables
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24.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2012 >
Issue: 44
Jih-Ching Ho
何志 青
The Motivational Structure in Practical Reason
實踐理由之動機結構
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A central issue in the contemporary philosophy of action focuses on the relation between reason and motivation: Internalism holds, while Externalism denies, that there is a necessary connection between reasons for action and motivational states. In 1980, Bernard Williams launched a powerful argument against Externalism in his article, “Internal and External Reasons,” which triggered influential debates in ethics, action theory, and theory of reason. Twenty years later Williams published “Some Further Notes on Internal and External Reasons” (2001), in which he refined his Humean theory so as to accommodate the many criticisms he had so far received. More importantly, he classified his major critics, in the past two decades, mainly into two groups, “the Kantian” and “the Aristotelian,” and raised objections to both. This paper explores the later development of the Kantian and the Aristotelian approaches, primarily in terms of the recent works of Christine Korsgaard and John McDowell, and argues to the effect that Williams’ objections are insufficient to refute the two approaches.
有關行動理由的哲學爭辯常聚焦於理由與動機之關連,內在論主張行動 理由與動機事實有必要之聯結,外在論則否認。1980 年,威廉斯發表論文 “Internal and External Reasons”,提出反對外在論的強力論證,引發了倫理 學、行動理論以及理由理論一連串深具影響力的辯論。二十年後,他發表 “Some Further Notes on Internal and External Reasons”(2001),精進他的休謨 理論以回應這些年來其他學者所提出的質詢;更重要的是,他將過去二十多 年來的主要批評歸類為兩種進路:「康德進路」以及「亞理斯多德進路」,並 且對二者提出強烈反對。本文檢視康德進路及亞理斯多德進路近來的可能發 展,其中包括柯思嘉和麥克道爾的哲學論述,以解釋並論證為何威廉斯的最 新論點不足以反駁此二進路。
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25.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2012 >
Issue: 44
Eric M. Peng
彭孟 堯
Why Resemblance is Not a Relation? -Trope Ontology in a Conceptualist Guise
為什麼相似性不是一個關係 ─從概念論看殊性存有論
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It is argued that Trope Particularism need not take trope-level resemblance to be an ontological primitive. The main idea is the appeal to the Arity Principle suggested by Butchvarov. But, this does not mean that “resemblance” is unintelligible. I propose that “resemblance” can be metaphysically reduced to a second order internal relation over two first order internal relations such as “greater than” and “heavier than,” and that the phenomena of similarity should call solely for an epistemological or psychological explanation.
本論文試圖論證:殊性存有論並不需要將殊性之間的相似關係作為其存 有論的原初設定。論證主要依據所謂的「位元原則」。但這不表示「相似」 是一個沒有意義的概念。本論文建議,在形上學裡,「相似」可以化約到介 於兩個一階內存關係之間的二階內存關係,例如「大於」、「重於」;本論文 並且倡議相似現象應該訴求知識論或心理學的解釋。
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26.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2014 >
Issue: 47
Cheng-Hung Tsai
蔡政 宏
Technê and Understanding
技藝與理解
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How can we acquire understanding? Linda Zagzebski has long claimed that understanding is acquired through, or arises from, mastering a particular practicaltechnê. In this paper, I explicate Zagzebski’s claim and argue that the claim is problematic. Based on a critical examination of Zagzebski’s claim, I propose, inconclusion and in brief, a new claim regarding the acquisition of understanding.
人是如何獲得「理解」?德性知識論的代表人物Linda Zagzebski 長久 來宣稱「理解的獲得來自於對技藝的掌握」。在本文中,作者闡釋Zagzebski 的宣稱,並指出這宣稱的問題。透過對Zagzebski 之宣稱的批判性檢視,作 者在文後提供另一修改自Zagzebski 的理解獲得觀點。
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27.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2014 >
Issue: 47
Caleb Liang
梁益 堉
Perceptual Anti-Individualism and Vision Science
知覺的反個體主義與視覺科學
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I discuss the nature of visual perception from an interdisciplinary perspective. The target of investigation is Tyler Burge’s theory of perceptual anti-individualism, according to which perceptual states constitutively depend on relations between perceivers and the external world. Burge argues that this theory is presupposed by vision science. My goal is to argue that perceptual anti-individualism is not the only theoretical choice. First, I consider the notion of homeostasis and suggest how it may cast doubt on the perceptual norms in Burge’s theory. Second, I argue that many phenomena studied by vision science can be explained without positing Burge’s notions of veridicality and singular representation. Third, I consider some empirical theories and argue that vision science does not uniquely favor Burge’s theory. I conclude that perceptual anti-individualism is not the only framework for understanding visual perception.
本文從跨領域的角度探討視覺的根本性質,並以Tyler Burge 的「知覺 的反個體主義」(perceptual anti-individualism)為研究對象。根據這一理論,知覺狀態的本質乃是由知覺者與外在環境的互動關係而定。Burge 提出論證 主張:視覺科學(vision science)預設了這個理論。本文反對這個觀點,並 企圖從三方面來論證:「知覺的反個體主義」不是我們理解視覺的唯一理論 選項。首先,我討論「體內恆定」(homeostasis)的概念,並指出這概念會 使我們對Burge 理論中的「知覺規範」(perceptual norms)產生質疑。第二,我以論證指出:許多視覺科學所研究的現象,可以不必預設Burge 理論中的 「正確性」(veridicality)和「單一表徵」(singular representation)也能得到解釋。第三,我討論一些有關視覺的科學理論並論證:許多視覺科學領域中 的看法其實不支持Burge 的理論。本文的結論是:「知覺的反個體主義」並 不是瞭解視覺本質唯一可選的理論架構。
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28.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2014 >
Issue: 48
Hsiu-Lin Ku
古秀 鈴
The Semantic Theory and the Availability Principle
語意理論與可及原則
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This paper aims to defend François Recanati’s Availability Principle approach to semantics by illuminating and responding to two major challenges from minimalists, in particular from Emma Borg: the first concerns the notion of intuitive content and “awareness-of” presupposed in the Availability Principle, and the second concerns whether the principle makes a semantic theory unfit with normativity and compositionality. I lead the discussion toward the kernel question--the bearer of the semantic content--and show that the Availability Principle is appropriate if we respect the empirical basis of meaning.
本文試圖替François Recanati 回應以Emma Borg 為主的兩面向批評,而 得以闡明並辯護其所主張的可及原則:其一面向是關於可及原則所預設的 「直覺內容」與「意識到」兩概念,其二面向是關於是否滿足可及原則會使 的語意理論無法滿足語言的規範性與組構性。我將引導此爭論至問題核心 ─即語意內容的承載者─重新審視何以一般咸認為語句本身有其客觀、不受脈絡影響而改變的語意內容,並論證若我們顧及意義的經驗基礎,則可及原則是恰當的。
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29.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2014 >
Issue: 48
Tzu-Wei Hung
洪子 偉
Why the Enzyme Model of Modularity Fails to Explain Higher Cognitive Processes
心智模組的酵素模型及其困難
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The enzyme model (EM), inspired by biological enzyme catalysis, is a computational-functional description of information processing and distribution in modular cognitive systems. It has been argued that EM offers advantages in solving both the allocation problem and global computation and thus may play a role in upholding the massive modularity hypothesis (MMH). This paper, however, argues that EM solutions are untenable, as EM avoids the infinite regress of allocation problem only at a high cost and with several critical drawbacks. Moreover, to clarify global processes, EM needs to satisfy two necessary conditions: first to demonstrate that the EM allows cross module communication, and second to be sensitive to not only the syntax but also the semantics of representations. I argue that EM only satisfies the first condition and thus fails to hold.
「酵素模型」指的是借用生物學中酵素催化機制的概念,來說明認知科 學中「大量模組假說」在計算與功能層次上有關資訊處理與分配之模型。酵 素模型的最大優點在於回應了「訊號配置」與「整體計算」兩難題,從而替 大量模組假說提供有利的辯護基礎。但本文之目的,在論證酵素模型的這兩 個回應並不成立。一方面,酵素模型在避免訊號配置的無限後退時會產生新 的困難。另一方面,要說明整體計算至少得滿足兩個必要條件:一是跨模組 的訊號交換是可能的、二在於模組能夠不只是針對輸入訊號的語法結構來處 理訊號。本文將論證酵素模型頂多說明如何滿足第一個必要條件,而沒有釐 清第二個必要條件如何在該模型中實現。換言之,酵素模型對兩難題的回應 不成立。因此,酵素模型無法用以支持大量模組假說。
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30.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2015 >
Issue: 49
Hua-kuei Ho
何畫瑰
Plato’s Treatment of Desire and Eryximachus’ Medicine in the Symposium
理性的慾望:柏拉圖對慾望的看法 與《饗宴》裡厄律克希馬可斯「愛的醫療」
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Confronted with the stereotype of a rationalistic Plato, the paper argues for the value of desire at its own right in Plato. To explore the relation between desire and rationality in Plato, I choose Eryximachus’ medicine in the Symposium as an object of comparison. Eryximachus’ τέχνη, representing the Hippocratic medical knowledge, is in conformity with Plato’s earlier requirement of knowledge, that is, giving a rational account. The medicine achieves the harmony by balancing the good and bad desires. Plato’s philosophy, however, goes beyond the epistemic model of rational science or τέχνη. On the treatment of desire, he does not follow the discrimination of good and bad desires in medicine, nor does he even out the different desire, because as the doctor. Plato’s philosophy needs the strength of desire, because—though desire sometimes becomes irrational—it is the vital strength of the soul to pursue philosophy.
面對一般對柏拉圖「理性主義」的刻板印象,這篇論文試圖論述:對柏 拉圖而言,「慾望」本身具有價值。為進一步探討柏拉圖哲學中慾望和理性 的關係,文中將以《饗宴》裡厄律克希馬可斯的醫學談話,作為比較的對象。 厄律克希馬可斯的「技藝」(τέχνη),即,希波克拉底派的醫學,符合柏拉 圖早期對知識的要求,也就是:知識必須要能提出合理的說明;此外,當時 的醫學是在藉由好慾望與壞慾望之間的平衡,而使人內在各成分達致健康與 和諧。然而,這裡提出的解釋是:柏拉圖的哲學超出了理性科學或技藝的知 識範本;在對慾望的處理上,他不依循醫學對慾望好壞的區分,他的和諧概 念也保留了理性與非理性慾望並存的差異。柏拉圖哲學需要慾望的力量,慾望雖然可能變成非理性,卻也是靈魂追求哲學不可缺少的力量。
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31.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1982 >
Issue: 5
Hsueh-Li Cheng
Mādhyamika, Kant and Wittgenstein
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32.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1982 >
Issue: 5
Pierre Masson
The Way of Thomism
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33.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2017 >
Issue: 53
Wim De Reu
魏家豪
On Goblet Words:
Coexistence and Writing in the Zhuangzi
論巵言─《莊子》之共存與寫作
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This article attempts to reframe the state of research on the notion of goblet words (zhiyan) in the Zhuangzi. Recent studies predominantly view the notion of zhiyan as referring to peculiar stylistic forms exhibited in the Zhuangzi—forms such as dilemmatic questions and paradoxes. In this article, I question the quick identification of these forms as zhiyan. I argue that zhiyan are essentially definite yet provisional simple-form utterances located on the level of everyday interaction and coexistence. On this level, the peculiar stylistic forms do not play their part. However, such stylistic forms do become indispensable in discussing and recommending zhiyan. It is on this meta-level—for the Zhuangzi, the level of writing—that we find these forms employed. Based on structural similarities, we may stretch the label ‘zhiyan’ to include such forms but should keep in mind that any such extension is secondary to the use of language in coexisting with others.
本文嘗試重塑有關《莊子》巵言之研究。近年來,學界大多將巵言視為《莊子》中特殊文體形式,如兩難問題及悖論。本文對於是否能輕易地將這些形式視為巵言存疑,進而試圖論證巵言基本上是簡單形式的言辭,其特色為明確但暫時性的,作用於日常互動與共存上。於此層面,特殊文體形式可謂無用武之地;然而,於探討並進而提倡巵言之時,特殊文體形式便成為不可或缺的一環。正是於此後設之層次─就《莊子》而言,則是寫作之層次─我們發現特殊文體形式之運用。基於結構上之相似度,我們或能將此等文體稱為「巵言」,但同時不應忘記,其乃從屬於與他者共存時所運用之語言。
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34.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2017 >
Issue: 53
Hsiu-Lin Ku
古秀鈴
On the Very Idea of a Minimal Proposition
論極小命題
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Can the idea of a minimal proposition be successfully held? I will first formulate what the minimal proposition is in the minimalist’s mind, taking Emma Borg as the representative. What a minimalist seeks for a minimal proposition is the abstract and skeletal core meaning of a sentence, and this faith is founded on the notion of minimal word meaning—an atomic, code-like, conceptual thing. I show that the problem of this notion of minimal proposition lies in the three features, intuitive read-off, invariantness, and truth-evaluability, that Borg ascribes to it. I shall argue, first, that positing a conceptual-like thing as the invariant minimal content of word cannot support the invariantness of the minimal proposition of a sentence, and second, that the skeletal content, as the minimal proposition of a sentence, is a grammatically analyzed product and thus is hardly truth evaluable. According to the analyses, the idea of a minimal proposition with these three features identified by minimalists cannot be maintained.
本文探討極小命題成立與否的基礎。首先,本文將以Emma Borg 為極小主義之代表,釐清極小主義者所謂的極小命題是種語句本身抽象而結構化的核心意義,並被賦予三種特色:直覺的、不變的、有真假可言的。本文論證具有此三種性質的極小命題是難以成立的。首先針對此主張的基礎─字詞本身的極小內容是一種不可再分、密碼般、概念化的對象─本文論證字詞展現在語句中的意義並非如此不變,因此難以支持極小命題的不變性。其次,本文論證,抽象而結構化的極小命題是邏輯分析後的產物,因此難以有真假值可言。
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35.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2019 >
Issue: 57
Wim De Reu,
C. Lynne Hong
魏家豪
What is the Wheelwright Bian Story About?
輪扁故事旨趣何在?
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《莊子•天道》中輪扁斲輪故事,看似旨在說明技藝之不可言傳性;若 連結到其他論及技藝與語言之《莊子》篇章來看,如此詮釋誠然有跡可循,而在現代學界也確實傾向以此脈絡來理解或應用輪扁之故事。鑒於《莊子• 天道》中,另有其他段落以「書」為題,本文擬從《莊子•天道》整章的脈 絡來探討輪扁故事之旨趣。本文將根據輪扁故事中有關書的問題,分別探 究:書的功能何在?為何批判書?書中少了什麼?依據《莊子•天道》提供 之線索探討上述諸問題時,可以發現輪扁之故事應視為政治論述之一環;換 言之,技藝與語言等議題,或許無關於其宏旨。
《莊子•天道》中輪扁斲輪故事,看似旨在說明技藝之不可言傳性;若連結到其他論及技藝與語言之《莊子》篇章來看,如此詮釋誠然有跡可循,而在現代學界也確實傾向以此脈絡來理解或應用輪扁之故事。鑒於《莊子•天道》中,另有其他段落以「書」為題,本文擬從《莊子•天道》整章的脈絡來探討輪扁故事之旨趣。本文將根據輪扁故事中有關書的問題,分別探究:書的功能何在?為何批判書?書中少了什麼?依據《莊子•天道》提供之線索探討上述諸問題時,可以發現輪扁之故事應視為政治論述之一環;換言之,技藝與語言等議題,或許無關於其宏旨。
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36.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2019 >
Issue: 58
Foong-Ee Pong
馮鳳儀
The Affordance of the Graceful Fish Metaphor:
An Interdisciplinary Approach Exploring the Practical Dimension of the Zhuangzi
從「承給意義」論遊魚之喻
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This article explains Zhuangzi’s philosophy by analyzing the metaphor of the graceful fish. I argue that to discover the essence of the graceful fish metaphor, we have to look into the relationship between the fish and the water in which it dwells. The article consists of five sections. First, I start by a brief review of common readings of the metaphors of the water and the fish and their insufficiency to relate to the idea of Dao/daos in the Zhuangzi. Second, I propose an interdisciplinary approach based on the notion of “affordance”─a substitute for “value/meaning”─that enables us to unveil the underlying key element pertaining to the image of the graceful fish: the ground. Third, an analysis of the graceful fish metaphor is presented after the explanation of affordance. Forth, I draw on the concept of vulnerability to explain the natural ability we are born with but buried due to a dominant completed heart-mind. I explain how vulnerability steers our way by comparing two images found in the Zhuangzi: infants vs. Hundun. Fifth, I sum up my findings and conclude that the Zhuangzi provides pragmatic advices for individuals─especially those who now live in a modern society that embrace social plurality─to live their lives to the fullest within any given social context by constantly adapting to the situation and therefore creatively exploring the limitless possibilities in the social world.
本文透過遊魚之喻以解釋《莊子》哲學。我提出要掌握遊魚之喻的意義,必須要探討魚與水之間的關係。本文共分五節。首先,我就既有的解讀方法,也就是分別論魚與論水的譬喻作一概要說明,並指出此一進路在解釋莊書中「道」的概念上的不足。接著,我提出「承給(承擔、給予)意義」,一個替代「價值/意義」的語辭,來發掘遊魚之喻所隱涵的關鍵:立足之地。在第三節,我循承給意義來進行關於遊魚之喻的解讀。第四節透過「脆弱性」的概念,來解釋我們在成心主導下所失去的一種自然能力。我也透過討論莊書中嬰兒與渾沌這兩個對比形象,來說明脆弱性的導引作用。最後,我總結,莊書提供深具實踐意義的建議,讓人─尤其是身處涵蘊多元價值之現代社會的你我─在所處情境中不懈因應,在任一既定社會脈絡內展開充實的生活,採取具創造性的態度去發掘社會世界中的無限可能性。
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37.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2019 >
Issue: 58
Kok Yong Lee
李國揚
Knowledge and Pragmatic Factors
知識與實用因素
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The stakes-shifting cases suggest that pragmatic factors such as stakes play an important role in determining our intuitive judgments of whether or not S knows that p. This seems to be in conflict with intellectualism, according to which pragmatic factors in general should not be taken into account, when considering whether or not S knows that p. This paper develops a theory of judgments of knowledge status that reconciles intellectualism with our intuitive judgments regarding the stakes-shifting cases. I argue that pragmatic factors affect only our epistemic perspectives, i.e., the ways in which we evaluate S’s epistemic position. Therefore, pragmatic factors only have an indirect impact on our judgments of knowledge status.
在面對風險轉換案例的時候,一般人直覺上覺得,這些案例顯示,諸如風險這類的實用因素(pragmatic factors)對我們判斷某個主體是否擁有知識,扮演非常重要的角色。這個觀察似乎會跟智性主義(intellectualism)的主張有所衝突。根據智性主義,當我們判斷某個主體是否擁有知識的的時候,實用因素並不是需要考量的因素。這篇文章發展一個知識判斷理論,可以調和我們對風險轉換案例的直覺判斷跟智性主義的衝突。筆者將論證,實用因素不會直接影響我們的知識判斷,而只會通過影響我們的知性角度(epistemic perspective),間接地影響我們的知識判斷。
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38.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1983 >
Issue: 6
Chang Ko-chuan
張柯圳
The Problem of Unity in the Philosophy of Plato
從性質團結問題觀點分析 柏拉圖哲學(中女提要)
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性質間結問題, 體統一性的來源問題, 是陳康先生在「性質團結問 題與本質概念˩ (大陸雜誌,第三卷,第五期,蓋北,民國40年9月,第一 頁至第六頁)一篇論文中提出來的哲學問題,用以說明亞里士多德本質概念 是。與康德範疇說的哲學意義。木艾的目的,即依此問題,探討柏拉閏哲學思想 的發展。柏拉問壯年時期,以費多篇及理想國篇為中心的哲學思想,包含以下八項要點:一、感覺現象變動不已,知識的對象為不變的相,問蘇格拉底普遍定義法的對象,亦間(固體統一性的根源。二、相為現象事物變動的內在目的悶,也是在現象事物變動中,保持不變的本質。三、相兵有自間性。攻象事物之自同性,乃也相所具有之自同性而來。四、相為純粹的單一,閃而試成個體統一性之根據。五、具體的相反君主變,因此位體可接受相反性質而不失其統一性。六、費多黨認為,人類心靈非接合體,因此具有同一性與不變性;理想 國篇卸認為,它可分為現性,欲墜與激情三要素,心靈之統一性乃在於此三 要素之和協。七、認識相的主體能力,為心靈或理性。入、至善之相,為一切知識,存有與本質之最高原理,亦為萬有之最高 目的悶,因而它是一切個體統一性之最高原理。費多篇及理想國篇的相論合有以下五項困難:一、相與個別事物的同名性,造成現實的重登。二、目的論把宇宙萬有解釋成價值領城,相的預設,與目的論的動機相遠。三、個別事物不可能由相導入統一性。四、相論無法解釋個別事物之個別性。五、相之單一性,導致相之自毀。柏拉圖晚竿,以巴曼尼得斯鑄及辯士鴛為中心她隨禱:合,把費多篇及理 想理清主徑:還克個反|生質在!固建中治合的可能性祠定的日以發展,探討筍疇 在個體中結合的可能性問題。在巴曼尼得斯瘖寫三部分中,第三道論證展示:唯有範疇彼;地相互結合 ,範禱告(固邊有泊法合方為可白色。第二道論證及其附論指出,若「一」之詞: 疇與「有」之範疇,綺合,則「一」可與其它一切範疇結合。「一」與「有」 之結合,構或最簡幸自台海疇樁合,連接範疇與個別事物,並過渡到個別事物 。第廿道:侖澄頭去: 「一」 與「其它的J 結合, 為中目反性質在個別現象事物 中結合的可能性條件。辯主講以辟二台為例,解澤巴曼尼得斯篇中個別事物的範疇演繹,並進一 步探討「非有」的意義。滸上篇區別可結合與不可結合的範疇,指出「其它 的」可與一切範疇結合,藉以說明個別事物之個別性的來源。
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39.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1983 >
Issue: 6
Denis Hsin-An Tsai
God and the Problems of Evil in Berkeley
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40.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2021 >
Issue: 61
Jerry J. Yang
楊景德
A Response to Rosenthal’s Arguments against the Intrinsic View of Consciousness
對羅森陶反意識本有主義論證之回應
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Rosenthal argues that if consciousness is seen as intrinsic, it will appear to be simple and unanalyzable, and therefore not amenable to scientific explanation, which requires a relational structure involving an extrinsic property of the mind. I shall first criticize Rosenthal's argument against intrinsicalism by way of conceptual analysis. I shall then examine three of his arguments against the intrinsic view of consciousness: the argument from the distinction between transitive and intransitive consciousness, the argument from reporting and expressing, and the argument of the individuation of mental states. I suggest that the content of a mental state can be considered to be an information space, which will allow for an explanation of consciousness. My rejection of Rosenthal's position relies on distinguishing two different forms of intrinsicalism: with and without self-representation. We shall find that both versions have explanatory traction from a naturalistic perspective.
羅森陶指出若意識被當作一種本有性質,它就會是單純與不可分析的,並且因此無法提供科學性的說明,因為科學性說明要求一種具有心靈的外在性質的關係式架構。我首先從概念分析的角度批評羅森陶反本有主義的論證。接著,逐一檢視羅森陶三個反本有主義的論證:及物與非及物意識區分的論證、報告與表達的論證,與個別化心靈狀態的論證。我建議將單一心靈狀態的內容視為一個訊息空間,可以用之來說明意識。我依據兩種不同型態的本有主義來反對羅森陶的立場:一種是包含自我表徵,另一種則不包含。我們將會發現這兩種類型的理論,在自然主義的視角下都擁有解釋的力量。
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