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21. Idealistic Studies: Volume > 35 > Issue: 1
Sara Beardsworth Benjamin, Horkheimer, and Adorno: Modes of Historical Reflection and the Problem of Authoritative Statements
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The paper considers what united and divided Benjamin and Horkheimer-Adorno in terms of their respective confrontations with the question of what it is to articulate the past historically. It presents their shared self-consciousness of the difficult task of responding critically to a problem conceived of as the entanglement of the concept of history with domination. For the problem imbues conceptualization itself and therefore threatens the value of the authoritative statements made in their own critical reflection on it. I show that these thinkers necessarily respond to the problem in confrontation with specific historical contexts: fascism, Soviet communism, German social democracy, and liberal democracy. The challenge they face is how to metabolize thinking in the midst of tendencies that disable it. I compare Benjamin’s solution, the dialectical image, with Horkheimer and Adorno’s solution, the recovery of critical reflection through the fragmentary writing of Dialectic of Enlightenment.
22. Idealistic Studies: Volume > 35 > Issue: 1
Raymun Festin At the Crossroads of Historiography and Metaphysics of History: Gadamer’s Critique of Collingwood
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Gadamer profoundly appreciates Collingwood’s Logic of Question and Answer (LQA). But while he grants its innovative serviceability, he contends that it has not been fully developed, and that its function in historical re-enactment is an exercise in historicism. Attempts have been made to defend Collingwood from Gadamer’s charge of historicism. But they have not documented the source ofGadamer’s alleged misunderstanding of Collingwood. This article will do the task. I will argue that Gadamer came up with a wrong conclusion about Collingwood’s doctrine of re-enactment because he overlooked the context of a passage in The Idea of History where he examined Collingwood’s discussion of Plato’s argument in Theaetetus. I will argue that Gadamer’s lack of perspective of the overall context of Collingwood’s discussion caused him to focus on a wrong aspect of the argument. This is quite unfortunate. Because of this, Gadamer is unable to appreciate more Collingwood’s LQA and its special role in hermeneutics.
23. Idealistic Studies: Volume > 35 > Issue: 1
Tom Rockmore A New Look at Croce’s Historicism
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The aim of this informal paper is to direct (or redirect) attention to the importance of Croce’s historicism. Though he is sometimes described as the best known Italian intellectual since Galileo, and though his influence remains strong in Italy, his impact outside Italy is not as important as it should be. Other than through Collingwood, his only well known English-language disciple, Croce has had very little influence on those writing in English. His theories, including his historicism, on which I will be focusing here, are only infrequently discussed in English, especially by philosophers.Historicism is a doctrine which receives almost no attention in English-speaking lands but looms very large in Italian thought.For purposes of this paper, I will treat Croce’s historicism as arising out of his readings of three very different thinkers, different from himself and from each other, who are committed to varying forms of epistemological historicism, and who are important for the development of his own position, Vico, Hegel and Marx. Croce studies these thinkers early in his very long career in inverse chronological order, beginning with Marx (1900), turning next to Hegel (1907), and then concerning himself later with Vico (1911). In considering Croce’s interpretation of three other historicists, it will be useful to keep in mind that, as an original thinker, he is never only an interpreter of other theories, always in the process of thinking for himself with and against whatever ideas he is interpreting. In each case, he made important contributions to our understanding of these thinkers while continuing to work out his own view.
24. Idealistic Studies: Volume > 35 > Issue: 1
Robert Piercey Gadamer on the Relation Between Philosophy and Its History
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This article asks what Gadamerian hermeneutics can contribute to recent debates about how philosophy is related to its history. First, I explain how Gadamer understands this relation, paying particular attention to his debts to Heidegger and to the role of tradition in the human sciences. Next, I argue that Gadamer’s view raises serious difficulties—difficulties connected with what he calls historicalconsciousness. Finally, I try to respond to these difficulties by distinguishing two different ways of understanding what historians of philosophy do. While my response is in some tension with what Gadamer explicitly says about the history of philosophy, it is, I argue, consistent with the spirit of his work.
25. Idealistic Studies: Volume > 35 > Issue: 2/3
Nicholas Rescher The Absolute: A Concise History
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In one form or another the concept of the Absolute has played a prominent role in Western philosophy from Plato to Hegel and beyond. The present paper addresses in particular the idea of the Absolute as the completion or perfection of the cognitive project of inquiry into the nature of the real. The discussion first traces the historical development of this conception, and then addresses the question of what sort of constructive role such a concept of cognitive absoluteness can continue to play in philosophical deliberation, arguing that it does indeed afford an instrumentality able to accomplish useful work.
26. Idealistic Studies: Volume > 35 > Issue: 2/3
Joshua Rayman Hegel’s Critique of Representation
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Recently, philosophy of language has swept through the community of Hegel scholarship. Since the early 1980s, Hegel scholars, such as John McCumber, Willem De Vries, Rodney Coltman, John Russon, Frank Schalow, Irene Harvey, and Henry Sussman, have imputed to Hegel the notion that the problems of philosophy are problems of language. What these readings ignore is that theessential systematic obstacle in Hegel is representation, not language as such. Hence, any Hegelian resolution of philosophical problems involves the speculative overcoming of representation, rather than the reformation of language, as is clear in the transition from “Revealed Religion” to “Absolute Knowing” in the Phenomenology. By tracing seriously the implications of the fact that the completion of revealed religion is “absolute knowing” and that the limiting form of revealed religion is representation, I will show that representation is the dominant problem throughout the Phenomenology.
27. Idealistic Studies: Volume > 35 > Issue: 2/3
Nathan Andersen Orcid-ID Conscience, Recognition, and the Irreducibility of Difference In Hegel’s Conception of Spirit
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Hegel’s conception of Spirit does not subordinate difference to sameness, in a way that would make it unusable for a genuinely intersubjective idealism directed to a comprehensive account of the contemporary world. A close analysis of the logic of recognition and the dialectic of conscience in the Phenomenology of Spirit demonstrates that the unity of Spirit emerges in and through conflict, and is forged in the process whereby particular encounters between differently situated individuals reveal and establish the emerging character and significance of the stances they uniquely occupy.
28. Idealistic Studies: Volume > 35 > Issue: 2/3
Ido Geiger Orcid-ID Is Art a Thing of the Past?: The Political Work of Art Between Hegel and Schiller
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The claim that art has no role to play in what is of highest significance for modernity is often attributed to Hegel. Against this interpretation, the paper makes the following claims: First, Hegel does not claim that art is simply superseded in modernity by rational reflection. Artistic expression remains an essential human need in modernity. Second, Hegel’s ideal of modern ethical life in which values shape human nature has an essentially aesthetic shape. Third, Hegel describes the foundation of a new shared form of life—in particular, the ideal ethical life of the future—not as a rational act of legislation, but as the politically creative work of art. This idea appears in Hegel’s early thinking and shapes his mature thought of the figure of the world-historical individual. Finally, Hegel turns to art to give life to the tragedy of the foundation of the state in his discussions of Sophocles’ Antigone and Schiller’s Wallenstein.
29. Idealistic Studies: Volume > 35 > Issue: 2/3
Rolf Ahlers Reinhold and Hegel on the Principle and Systematicity of Philosophy
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In the United States the relationship between Hegel and Schelling divides into two camps: The first sees Hegel’s critical remarks in the Phenomenology not directed against Schelling himself but against Schelling’s adherents. I provide here detailed arguments for the minority view: Although Hegel did collaborate with Schelling in the early Jena years even opposing Reinhold, he nonetheless worked with Reinhold’s arguments on the origins and systematicity of philosophy differently than did Schelling: The rift between the two giants really goes back to the very early Jena period.
30. Idealistic Studies: Volume > 35 > Issue: 2/3
Don Morse William James’s Neglected Critique of Hegel
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Although most scholars have ignored it, William James’s critique of Hegel, as developed in his book A Pluralistic Universe, poses a significant challenge to Hegelian thought. While not every argument James levels against Hegel is valid, and some are bogus, at least two of his arguments are highly persuasive—the charge of “vicious intellectualism” and the charge of “false unity.” As a result of leveling these charges, James escapes Hegel’s logic and is able to establish pragmatism as an original position in the history of ideas. He also offers an entirely new and serious critique that modern day defenders of Hegel must contend with—a critique that, unless it is addressed, makes pragmatism seem to be a more reasonable philosophy to adopt than Hegel’s.
31. Idealistic Studies: Volume > 35 > Issue: 2/3
Weimin Shi Hegel’s Real Issue: Judgment, Truth, and the Phenomenological Project
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This paper traces Hegel’s conception of consciousness back to Hölderlin and argues accordingly that the structure of judging, which Hegel links to an attitude of knowing, determines the standpoint of consciousness to be overcome through the Phenomenology of Spirit. Taking Hegel’s texts into consideration comprehensively, it is then argued that a shape of consciousness is concerned withadvancing its own nominal definition of the concept “Truth,” which is a concept reflecting a culture’s way to organize its life. The Phenomenology, accordingly, should be understood as an enterprise demonstrating that, though advancing their own definitions, shapes of consciousness nonetheless participate in the development of one single concept of the Truth.
32. Idealistic Studies: Volume > 35 > Issue: 2/3
G. W. F. Hegel “On Wallenstein” (1800/1801), Werke 1, pp. 618–620
33. Idealistic Studies: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
Daniel Dwyer A Phenomenology of Cognitive Desire
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In this article I articulate how phenomenology can and should appropriate the theme of Platonic cognitive erôs. Erôs has two principal meanings: sexual passion and the desire for the whole that characterizes the philosophical life; in its cognitive sense, it implies dissatisfaction with partial truth and aiming at the givenness of the whole. The kind of lived-experience in which the being-true of the world is presented to and affectively allures the knower is a phenomenological analogue to what in Plato is the contemplative communion with the Good. Cognitive desire is always motivated by the consciousness of the lack of knowledge and the recalcitranceon the part of the world to be fully revealed. Husserlian phenomenology confirms the fact that erotic perception is always beckoned by the world and its states of affairs from the outside, as opposed to physiologically reduced Cartesian wonder and internally motivated striving on the part of Kantian reason.
34. Idealistic Studies: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
James Mensch Politics and Freedom
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True freedom involves choices whose scope is not limited in advance by a particular dogma. When we attempt to understand it, a number of questions arise. It is unclear, for example, how the openness of real choice can fit into the organized structures of political life. What prevents the expressions of freedom from disrupting this life? What sets limits to their arbitrariness? The general questionhere concerns the adaptability of freedom to a political context. In this paper, I argue that freedom is inherently political because its origin is social. It gains its content from the multiple interactions that make up social life.
35. Idealistic Studies: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
Dalia Nassar Reality Through Illusion: Presenting the Absolute In Novalis
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Though Novalis was considered by both his contemporaries and his first critics to have made both an important philosophical as well as literary contribution, his place and significance in the history of philosophy has only rarely been clearly demarcated. It is only with the publication of the Novalis Schriften that an interest in Novalis’s philosophical contribution has arisen. Though the main discussion in the literature focuses on one of the central concepts in Novalis’s thought, that of presentation (Darstellung, Repräsentation), it fails to provide an adequate interpretation of it because it does not directly address a more fundamental concept in his thought, the absolute. After all, for Novalis, presentation is always presentation of the absolute, and the possibliity or impossibility of presentation is determined by the nature of the absolute. This paper attempts to correct the contemporary debate by emphasizing and clearly defining the absolute, examining it in relation to presentation.
36. Idealistic Studies: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
Anthony N. Perovich Jr. On the Mysticism of Fichte’s The Way Towards the Blessed Life
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Fichte’s The Way towards the Blessed Life is a genuinely mystical work that contains several themes characteristic of mystical writing: the opposition of a non-spatio-temporal, non-manifold being to the world as it appears; the ineffability of the Divine; the centrality of union with God and of detachment; and the individual as a conduit for Divine life and love. It must, however, be granted that Fichte conjoins his affirmations of union with denials that the ontological identity of human beings and God is a matter of experience. This is nevertheless an insufficient reason for denying that Fichte’s text is correctly characterized as mystical, for experience of God’s presence is a more adequate criterion of the mystical than the experience of ontological identity or even of union with God, and the experiences that The Way towards the Blessed Life does acknowledge are properly interpreted in terms of Divine presence.
37. Idealistic Studies: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
Luis M. Augusto A Little Idealism Is Idealism Enough: A Study on Idealism In Aristotle’s Epistemology
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Given the evidence available today, we know that the later Middle Ages knew strong forms of idealism. However, Plato alone will not do to explain some of its features. Aristotle was the most important philosophical authority in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, but until now no one dared explore in his thought the roots of this idealism because of the dogma of realism surrounding him. I challenge this dogma, showing that the Stagirite contained in his thought the roots of idealist aspects that will be developed, namely by Dietrich of Freiberg and Eckhart of Hochheim, into a fully idealist epistemology.
38. Idealistic Studies: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
Drew M. Dalton Strange Bedfellows: A Re-Examination of the Work of J. G. Fichte In Light of the Levinasian Critique
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Much has been made within certain philosophic circles of Emmanuel Levinas’s interaction with and critique of Western philosophy in general and German Idealism in particular. What is little recognized, however, is that J. G. Fichte is often the hidden target of this salvo. Indeed, Fichte appears within Levinas’s work as one of the major foils against whom he attempts to define his own insights. Whenexamined in light of Levinas’s attack, however, Fichte’s work actually appears to be in remarkable contiguity with Levinas. The aim of this paper is to illuminate these commonalities by making an apology for Fichte in light of Levinas’s criticism. The result of this examination is the revelation that the German Idealism of such thinkers as Fichte, rather than rivaling Levinas’s work, actually proves to be in many ways its ally and intellectual forerunner.
39. Idealistic Studies: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Michael Futch Leibniz on Time and Substance
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Leibniz’s metaphysics is centered on the claim that ultimate reality is composed of mind-like, immaterial substances, monads. While it is universally agreed that such substances are non-spatial, monads’ relation to time is less clear. In some passages, Leibniz suggests that monads are themselves temporal, yet in others he implies that they have only derived temporal properties in virtue of being connected to phenomenal bodies. This has led to predictable disagreements among commentators, some insisting that monads are intrinsically temporal and some insisting that they are intrinsically non-temporal. In this article, I seek to defend the latter interpretation. To do this, I focus on Leibniz’s account of monadic perception and appetition, arguing that the order of monadic states is given by the intentional content represented therein. This view, I suggest, commits Leibniz to the conclusion that monads are intrinsically non-temporal, having only second-order, derivative temporal properties.
40. Idealistic Studies: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Nectarios G. Limnatis The Canon and the Organon of Thought: Formal Logic and Contradiction In Kant’s Theoretical Philosophy
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This paper looks at the Kantian background in the development of the views on formal logic and contradiction in German Idealism. Assuming the post-Kantian view, I examine what Kant advanced and what he left unsettled, provoking thus the subsequent debate. I start by showing (§1) that already the pre-critical Kant questions the effectiveness of formal logic in philosophical discourse andclaims that the laws of identity and non-contradiction fall short of explaining change, opposition, and contradiction, all these being parts of reality. Turning then to the first Critique, I discuss (§2) the introduction of transcendental logic as the (meta)logic of truth, consider how the tension between formal and transcendental logic is displayed in Kant’s exposition of the antinomy of pure reason (§3), and arrive at the conclusion (§4) that Kant, despite his criticism, and unlike the other great German Idealists, allows formal logic to dominate his exposition of transcendental logic.