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21. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 11 > Issue: 3
Miroslav Hanke Paradox lháře ve světle scholastických klasifikací
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The systematic focus of twentieth century logic and analytic philosophy on semantic paradoxes prompted the rediscovery of the nearly six hundred years of scholastic research devoted to paradoxes. The present paper focuses on the following three branches of scholastic logic: 1. definitions of semantic paradox; 2. basic strategies of solving paradoxes; 3. scholastic classifications of solutions to paradoxes. Scholastic logicians analysed paradoxes from threebasic points of view: the point of view of paradox-generating inferences, the point of view of paradoxical sentence, and the point of view of the theoretical context of paradoxes. These partial analyses can be synthesised into a coherent approach, allowing for analysing different aspects of semantic paradox.
22. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Paul E. Oppenheimer, Edward N. Zalta O logice ontologického důkazu: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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In this paper, the authors show that there is a reading of St. Anselm’s ontological argument in Proslogium II that is logically valid (the premises entail the conclusion). This reading takes Anselm’s use of the definite description “that than which nothing greater can be conceived” seriously. Consider a first-order language and logic in which definite descriptions are genuine terms, and in which the quantified sentence “there is an x such that…” does not imply “x exists”. Then, using an ordinary logic of descriptions and a connected greater-than relation, God’s existence logically follows from the claims: (a) there is a conceivable thing than which nothing greater is conceivable, and (b) if x does not exist, something greater than x can be conceived. To deny the conclusion, one must deny one of the premises. However, the argument involves no modal inferences and, interestingly, Descartes’ ontological argument can be derived from it.
23. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
David Peroutka OCD Suárezova nauka o receptivních potencích a její ohlas u R. Arriagy: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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Receptive potencies are the essence in relation to the act of being (esse) and the matter in relation to the form. Suárez identifies the essence with the existence. A potential essence, according to Suarez, is nothing; therefore it cannot be receptive potency for being (esse). The actuality of an actual essence is its being (esse). Hence, the actual essence does not need to receive any further being distinct from it. Essence does not differ really from being (esse); nevertheless, we can conceive it without being. Essence as “whatness”, quiddity, is closely connected with concept and definition. In this regard we may make some critical remarks on Suarez’s doctrine: If the “whatness” is identical to the being (esse), this fact has to be reflected in the adequate notion of the “whatness”. If it is so, it seems that the essence conceived without being (esse) is not the same essence any more. Furthermore: If essence and existence are identified, what is it to which existence can be non-trivially ascribed? What is the receptive potency for being (esse)? Arriaga follows Suárez in the doctrine of essence and being, in his teaching on the prime matter however he goes even further. Whereas Suárez ascribes to the prime matter its own actuality, Arriaga assigns to it some attributes of substance. In contradistinction to the Suarezian conception of receptive potencies, the Thomistic doctrine of the relation of participation between potency and act permits metaphysics to withstand the threats of mechanicism and the post-fregean trivialization of the notion of being (esse).
24. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Lukáš Novák Anselmův ontologický důkaz očima teorie abstraktních objektů: Úvodní poznámka
25. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Tomáš Machula Les quatre causes de l’être selon la philosophie premiére d’Aristote: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
26. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
David Peroutka OCD K Novákově odpovědi: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
27. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Stanislav Sousedík Základní fenomény lidského bytí očima filosofie. Témata týkající se života každého člověka.: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
28. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Lukáš Novák Problém abstraktních pojmů: Odpověď Davidu Peroutkovi
29. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Stanislav Sousedík Dilinganae Disputationes. Der Lehrinhalt der gedruckten Disputationen an der philosophischen Fakultät der Universität Dillingen.: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
30. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Peter Hoenen SJ Descartův Mechanicismus: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
31. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Rastislav Nemec The Eternity of God. Comparative Study of Bernard Lonergan SJ and Richard Swinburne.: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
32. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
Stanislav Sousedík Člověk a stát: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
33. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
Lukáš Novák Metafyzika jako věda. Ibn Síná a Ibn Rušd ve scholastické diskusi.: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
34. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
Michal Chabada 700-lecie śmierci bł. Jana Dunsa Szkota. Międzynarodowe sympozjum jubileuszowe: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
35. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
Lukáš Novák Ján Duns Scotus. Vybrané kapitoly z jeho epistemológie a metafyziky.: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
36. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
Stanislav Sousedík, Karel Šprunk G. Frege: Dialog s Pünjerem Český překlad s kritickým výkladem
37. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 6 > Issue: 1
Gottlob Frege Funkcia a pojem: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
38. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 6 > Issue: 1
Peter Volek Správa z medzinárodnej konferencie Dôvera v rozum: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
39. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 6 > Issue: 1
Blažena Švandová Aquinas’ Five Arguments in the Summa Theologiae 1a 2, 3: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
40. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 6 > Issue: 1
Vlastimil Vohánka Plantinga a princip slábnoucí pravděpodobnosti: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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Alvin Plantinga wrote a probabilistic critique of historical arguments for the kernel of Christianity. It is based on the fact that, generally, the more complex a conjunction, the lower its probability. The paper provides elementary insights into the epistemology of Plantinga, probability calculus, and the role of this calculus in contemporary epistemology. It introduces a concept of a good argument, explains in which sense and why, according to Plantinga, no good arguments for Christianity exist, and discusses the following replies. The probability that every argument for Christianity fails can be low. Even if Christianity is less probable than its proper propositional parts, it can be still be probable, whether on the same or on some enhanced body of evidence. Finally, there have been detailed probabilistic arguments for Christianity yielding results significantly different from Plantinga’s cursory estimates.