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281. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 2
Maurice Mandelbaum On the Historiography of Philosophy
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Histories of philosophy represent a relatively new form of historical study» and some observations are made concerning the changes in style that they have tinder gone. A crucial question for the historian of philosophy is "Who is to count as a philosopher?” An answer to this question is suggested. The question of the extent to which historians falsify the doctrines of individual philosophers by viewing them in terms of their predecessors and successors is then raised. In the second section of the paper» monistic views of social and cultural life are re» jected, and a pluralistic approach is developed. This approach» it is contended, allows for emphasis on both originality and continuity in philosophic thought, and shows how philosophy is related to its social and cultural milieu without losing its identity.
282. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 2
William Jacobs What Professor Luckhardt Cannot Regret
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In his recent article "Remorse, Regret, and the Socratic Paradox" (Analysis 35.5 (1975) p.159-166) Professor C.‘ Grant Luckhardt attempted to show why those who deny that there is weakness of will need not be troubled by the phenomenon of remorse or regret. He did this by arguing (1) that contemporary formulations of the Socratic "To know the good is to do the good" principle are unacceptable and must be qualified and (2) that once the Socratic principle is properly qualified remorse and regret will not constitute evidence against the truth of the Socratic principle. In my response I show (1) that Professor Luckhardt's proposed qualifications of the Socratic principle are unnecessary and that if we merely understand what the original principle asserts, then it is clear that the unqualified principle is not subject to the two sorts of difficulties that Luckhardt raises and (2) that even if the Socratic principle is modified in the proposed manner, it is still unable to answer the remorse/ regret objection.
283. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 2
Carl F. Cranor Justice, Respect, and Self-Respect
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The aim of this paper is to evaluate the respect-for- persons theory implicit in John Rawls's A Theory of Justice. It merits evaluation not only as a contemporary contribution to the respect-for-persons literature, but because it provides an essential premise in one of his arguments from publicity for his principles of justice.In sections I and II I discuss the meaning and justification of his respect principle. As it stands it seems unjustifiable. In section III I argue that since it is unjustifiable, it renders one argument from publicity unsound. More generally, it seems that Rawls has misconceived the relationships between justice, respect, and self-respect. Perhaps respect and self-respect should be defined in terms of justice, not conversely.
284. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 2
Robert F. Ladenson Does the Deterrence Theory of Punishment Exist?: A Response to Nozick
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Among the many assaults upon widely held views in social and political philosophy to be found in Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia, is a novel criticism of the utilitarian deterrence theory of punishment. Nozick believes that this criticism is absolutely decisive, and, indeed, in his words, establishes the utilitarian deterrence theory's "non existence." The purpose of this paper is to show that Nozick's criticism rests upon a tacit crucial error about the nature of punishment. This error, while an elementary one, is evidently easy to make since not only Nozick falls prey to it but also some prominent utilitarians themselves. Recognizing the error makes possible a more careful statement of the utilitarian deterrence theory that avoids Nozick's criticism.
285. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 2
Joseph C. Pitt Wilfrid Sellars' Theory of Probability
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Wilfrid Sellars attempts to deflect traditional objections to the straight rule of inductive acceptance by embedding it in a complicated system of levels. This system rests on a theory of probability in which the meaning of "probable" is reconstructed in the context of Sellars' general theory of practical reason. To say a statement is probable means, according to Sellars, that there is good reason for accepting the statement as true. In this paper I examine Sellars' attempt to resuscitate the straight rule and conclude that not only does he fail, but his account of "probable" is circular.
286. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 2
J. H. Wellbank A Bibliography on Rawlsian Justice: 1951-1975
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The aim of this bibliography is to present the most oomplete list of works on John Rawls's theory of justice available to date. The standard philosophical journals have been consulted, as listed in The Philosopher's Index, as well as journals in economics, law and political science. The bibliography contains 255 entries; 18 by Rawls, and 122 not listed in The Philosopher's Index.
287. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 2
Michael Martin Description and Objectivity
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One crucial argument against the objectivity of the social sciences purports to show that the objectivity of the social sciences is compromised by the descriptions social scientists give of social phenomena. The argument is that (1) if social science is objective, then the descriptions social scientists give of social phenomena do not commit them to value judgments. But (2), since the descriptions social scientists give of social phenomena do commit them to value judgments, then (3) social science is not objective. This argument is shown to be unsound. After distinguishing several senses of "commit" it is maintained that various arguments for the second premise fail. Furthermore, it is maintained that even if these arguments were success ful value commitment could be avoided. Finally, it is shown that even if value commitment could not be avoided, the objectivity of the social sciences would not be compromised and consequently the first premise of the argument is false.
288. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 2
P. H. Wiebe Herapel and Instantial Confirmation
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The concept of a positive instance has figured significantly in Hempel's study of confirmation. In fact, Hempel's study has been interpreted as an attempt to explicate the concept of a positive instance. In this paper I examine the concept of an instance and discuss its role in Hempel's study. I show that Hempel's notion of direct confirmation is closely related to that of a positive instance. This fact, however,does not warrant an uncritical identification of Hempel's explicandum with the concept of a positive instance, and I argue that such an interpretation of Hempel's study is grossly inadequate.
289. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 2
Catherine Z. Elgin Analysis and the Picture Theory in the 'Tractatus'
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I argue that the picture theory provides both a common referential hase and a common logical syntax for languages embodying alternative conceptual schemes. I offer an analysis of depiction, explicating the Tractarian concepts of pictorial structure, pictorial relationship, and representational form. Significant failure of reference and the existence of languages with incompatible ontological commitments show that on the molar level depiction is not required for sense. Using three premises, taken to be axiomatic for Wittgenstein, I show that analysis leads to a base of elementary propositions which must depict in order to be significant. There, the relations between pictorial structure, pictorial relationship and representational form are such that reference is secured and conceptual relativity precluded.
290. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 2
Douglas N. Walton The Logic of Ability
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Work on 'can' in Action Theory is dichotomized into two styles of analysis: (1) what I call the indeterministic analysis, whereby for x to be able to do A means that there is no obstacle to x's doing A, and (2) the hypothetical analysis, which asserts that x is able to do A if and only if x will do A if x tries (wants, wills, chooses, etc.). This paper explores the general hypothesis that 'can' is two-ways ambiguous, that a sense of opportunity corresponds to (1) and a sense of ability to something after the pattern of (2), and that a general concept of 'can' of the kind often sought after by action theorists requires a certain kind of integration of both concepts into a unified definition. The two previous most well-worked-out attempts to lay out a program along these lines, those of Sellars and Chisholm, are analyzed in detail in the hope of smoothing out some of the technical differences to provide foundations for further work of this type. An attempt is made to integrate the program with some recent developments in the concept of ability in the social sciences. The applicability of this work to some very vexing and significant problems in the social sciences is suggested.
291. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 2
John L. Lahey Baumer and Glasgow on Ethical Egoism
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In this paper I have investigated the claim that egoism is incapable of being a moral action-guide. Egoism is that normative view in ethics which claims that a person has an obligation to perform or refrain from performing some act, if and only if so doing is in that person's (the agent's) own best interest. William Baumer and W.D. Glasgow have both presented arguments which purportedly show that egoism leads to contradictions and inconsistencies which prevent it from being a moral action-guide. In my refutation of these charges I argue that Baumer's agrument begs the question against egoism by employing a non-egoistic definition of 'right', and that Glasgow's arguments involve various ambiguities and equivocations. I conclude, then, that at least from a logical point of view, egoism is as acceptable a moral action-guide as any non-egoistic view.
292. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 2
Paul Weiss Substance and Process, Today and Tomorrow
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This monograph is divided into four parts: 1. AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY: Unlike the philosophies of other countries today, it does not pivot about a particular authoritative university or school. Most positions, though, agree in acknowledging a plurality of irreducible ultimate principles and realities. 2. PROCESS PHILOSOPHY: This has been of primary interest to theologians, and is occupied mainly with pointing up differences with Thomism. The strength and weaknesses of both these positions is outlined, and alternative views indicated. 3. THE MODAL PHILOSOPHY: A summary account is given, justifying and describing five irreducible, conditioning realities which govern individual substances, severally and together. 4. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS: These have mainly to do with the problem of the One and the Many, raised by the audience. Each finality, it is held, is a One for the Many actualities; each actuality is a One for the Many finalities.
293. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 2
Douglas N. Walton Intensional Action Theory
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The aims of this paper are to survey, explicate, compare, contrast, and critically evaluate a number of (mainly recent and technical) contributions (Kanger, Porn and Áqvist) to the logic of action locutions in connection with their treatment of the concept of an agent's bringing about a state of affairs. The discussion is primarily concerned with practical applications of these formalisms for the action theorist. It is suggested that these systems are best understood as capturing a strategic sense of bringing-about, and not a notion of actual bringing-about, which is merely presupposed by them. It is argued that the developments surveyed open up a new 'intensional' style of action theory, contrasted with the 'extensional' approach of Davidson. Yet because of the treatment of conditionals, they fail to capture a basic notion of 'bringing about' important for action theory. It is concluded that a study of the behavior of 'bringing-about' over non-standard conditionals would be a useful next step for intensional action logic.
294. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 2
Bill Barger Sartre on 'Original Choice'
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The vicissitudes of the concept of original choice illustrate the change, and yet the continuity, of Sartre's existentialist thought as he gradually changed the focus of his attentions from psychological to sociological aspects of "the human condition." The relationship of the doctrine to Sartre's own "existential psychoanalysis" is described. The point at which Sartre explicitly repudiated the earlier doctrine of original choice and the general characteristics of his revised doctrine are explicated. In general, Sartre's current position is that the goal- directed structure of human endeavor is a freely-created variation upon the conditioning imposed by society, aiming at liberation from such external determinism. Sartre continues to reject the notion of a causal determinism, psychological or social, which makes the person a product—a "thing"—and which reduces human freedom to the status of illusion.
295. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 2
Arthur W. Cragg Values and Actions: A Critique of Prescriptivism
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Providing an accurate account of the relation of moral values to actions is a major objective of moral philosophy. One reason for the attractiveness of prescriptivism is that it appears to do just this. The article is designed to determine whether prescriptivism does succeed in this respect. After extended argument, I conclude that the prescriptivist account of the relation of values to actions rules out the possibility that one's actions might be inconsistent with one's moral beliefs. This view leads in turn to the position that it is impossible on logical grounds for one to lie about one's moral beliefs, an implication which I argue is untenable. It follows that a central feature of the prescriptivist account of moral language is faulty.
296. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 2
Dennis E. Bradford A Bibliography on the Topic of Existence
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This is a bibliography on the philosophical topic of existence or being. Nearly all the works listed are in English, and most of them are works that have been published in this century. Many of the works listed also deal with other, but closely related, topics: e.g., identity, truth, essence, substance, predication, intentional objects, properties and relations, reference, quantification, and the ontological argument for the existence of God.
297. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 2
James R. Greenwell A Probabilistic Justification for Abortion
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There appear to be two major areas of uncertainty in the abortion dispute, namely the status of the fetus with respect to personhood and the validity of the doctrine of the double effect, or which of several moral principles takes priority in cases of conflict. This paper attempts to show that one can accept the uncertainty on these issues and yet reach a plausible view on the morality of abortion. This is done by consideration of the various possible combinations of controversial factors and which combinations indicate abortion to be right and which wrong. Probabilities of rightness and wrongness are then generated for several kinds of cases where abortion is usually desired. The conclusion of the paper is that in the absence of certainty in the basic issues, we can make a decision on the strength of the probabilities, in which case abortion is justified in those cases where it has usually been requested.
298. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 2
Mary B. Mahowald On Humans and Butterflies: A Response to Becker
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This article responds to a recent proposal for determining where human life begins on the basis of histological and morphological development of the organism. After examining possible interpretations of the term "human" and relations between "human life," "human being" and "human becoming," I argue that metamorphosis is not a fit analogue for human development. On biological grounds the proposed "metamorphic definition" of "human being" is judged unacceptable.Alternative proposals are then considered, viz., conception, quickening, viability, live birth and personhood. Prom a non- biological standpoint, only the last survives as a candidate for a human being/human becoming boundary. However, every developmental event, including histological and morphological completion of the organism, remains pertinent to moral discourse and decisions concerning human life.
299. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 2
Philip J. Neujahr Subjectivity
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In this article I attempt to sketch a Kantian view of personal identity. Making use of Kant's distinction between perception and conception as necessary components of experience, I argue that experience requires the existence over time of a subject, and that this persisting subject is a condition of experience and hence is transcen- dentally distinct from any object of experience, including the subject's body. This also implies that consciousness, or the appearance of the world to the subject, cannot identified with a brain process or any other object, and thus that central state materialism must be false. The view of subjectivity which emerges from this analysis bears some resemblance, I believe, to Kant's doctrine of the transcendental self. After this very abstract analysis I present a thought-experiment which attempts to illustrate the difference between subjectivity and any objective fact, and to show more clearly the status of the subject as a necessary condition of experience.
300. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 2
Willis Doney Some Recent Work on Descartes: A Bibliography
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In Descartes; A Collection of Critical Essays (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1967), I published a bibliography of works in English relating to Descartes. This is a Supplement to that bibliography and contains references to works in English that have appeared since 1966 through 1975 or that inadvertently were not included in the original bibliography. The Supplement is in three parts: (A) Translations and Reference Works, (B) Books, and (C) Articles. In (C), I have also included chapters of books that can be read independently and that may be of interest to students of Descartes. There were of course borderline cases in which I had to decide whether an article contained enough material about Descartes to be included in the bibliography. On the whole, I believe I have followed a rather liberal policy in making these decisions.