The apprehension of the culture industry in its totality, as it is presented in Adorno's Dialectic of Enlightenment, makes it necessary to turn to his Theory of Self-Formation, where the cultural domain of the constellation of society has an explicit formative dimension. The cultural formation, the German Bildung, expresses such a prism. It is not a national peculiarity, but it translates in the experience of delay of the German bourgeois society as the formative dimension of culture, generally hidden in the social constitution, facilitating the basis of immanent criticism. In the State interventionist society that follows the liberal order, with the manipulation of the totalitarian State and the society of mass consumption, the productive process does not tolerate the formative experience of autonomy: there is a social reconstruction of culture as culture industry, which turns out to be a political concept. Here there is not absence, but an eclipse of formation. It is semi-formation: only integration, without autonomy. When universality, instead of residing in ideals formed within culture formation, resides on universalization of given cultural goods, the mercantile ideals only integrate the masses. The culture industry is the chore of what appears as the cultural construction of society, in terms of the integrating semi-formation. The disintegration of the working class and its reconstruction en masse are a result of the formation process of which the culture industry is a part. Formation is concealed because the social construction is confounded with the cultural construction; society is itself ideology. The social organization obstructs the experience of the social formative labor in the integration. Society appears to be an extra-productive socialization.

Ours is a time of dramatic and confusing transformations in everyday life, many of them originating in the social enfranchisement of women that has occurred over the past twenty-five years. Sociologist Arlie Hochschild demonstrates a widespread phenomenon of work-family imbalance in our society, experienced by people in terms of a time bind, and a devaluation of familial relationships. As large numbers of women have moved into the workplace, familial relations of all sorts have been colonized by what Virginia Held critically refers to as the contractual paradigm. Even the mother/child relationship, representing for Held an alternative feminist paradigm of selfhood and agency, has been in large part "outsourced." I believe that an Arendtian conception of speech and action might enable us to assert anew the grounds for familial relations. If we require a new site upon which to address our human plurality and natality, the postpatriarchal family may provide that new site upon which individuals can freely act to recreate the fabric of human relationships. It would seem to be our moral and political responsibility as social philosophers today to speculatively contribute to the difficult yet imperative task of reconfiguring the family. In this paper, I attempt to articulate the basic assumptions from which such a reconfiguration must begin.

This paper argues that: a) philosophy generally, and the dialectical tradition in particular, first emerged in Ancient Greece in response to the nihilism and relativism generated by the development of a market economy; b) despite differences between its 'idealist' and 'materialist' wings, it is possible to speak of a basically unified dialectical tradition extending from Socrates, Plato and Aristotle through the great medieval Aristotelians (Ibn Sina, Ibn Rusd, Maimonides, Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas), up to Hegel, Marx and their interpreters, a tradition unified around the proposition that we can rise by rational means to a first principle which in turn serves as a principle of value and a criterion for ethical norms, thus becoming a standard by which to criticize the market order and argue for an alternative allocation of resources; c) the historic difficulties and current crisis of the dialectical tradition arise from a failure to demonstrate that the universe is a teleological system ordered to the perfection of form or the development of increasing levels of organization; and d) recent developments in the physical, biological and social sciences suggest that we may soon be in a position to remedy this difficulty. This paper criticizes those who say that it is no longer possible to "do philosophy the old way," and argues for the critical importance of philosophy generally and the dialectical tradition in particular for the future of the human civilizational project.

The subject of this paper is social time-the peculiarities of the Past-Present-Future in social processes, and their unbreakable connection. I also focus on the necessity of taking stock of time in human activities and in the societal development. The Past in progress of society signifies the Already-happened which has become the possession of history. This Past exerts an enormous influence on the Present, determining it both directionally and functionally. The Present includes the Present itself, a part of the Past, and some elements of the Future. It represents the only reality for human beings as life is lived in the Present only. The Present creates the material and spiritual preconditions for the Future. Resolution of contemporary global problems is crucial for our Future which runs sequentially in three stages: immediate Future, visible Future and distant Future. All three exert influence on the Present by providing ideological and informational images. Time disciplines our minds and wills, organizes our actions and promotes our cognitions of the Past, the Present and the Future.

Space and time are considered as attributive features of matter's social form movement that allow to incorporate structure into the world political processes. The notions of wholismatic time and space are established to determine world's entering into planetary interconnected condition. Social space and time are considerate in unity being as coordinates of man and civilization's existence. Methodological approaches to East and West civilization cooperation are defined through varieties of spaces being specified in different types of human activity. Man and civilization interaction is shown in context of future social time as well as choice of development type and modernization of society.

The Battered Woman Syndrome, like the Cycle Theory of Violence, helps to illuminate the situation of the person victimized by domestic violence. However, it may also contribute to the violence of the battering situation. In this paper, I explore some of the implications of the Battered Woman Syndrome for domestic violence cases wherein an abused woman kills her abuser. I begin by delineating some of the circumstances of a domestic violence situation. I then discuss the particular moral issue of subjectivity or moral personhood involved in instances wherein a woman victimized by domestic violence responds by killing her batterer. Finally, I argue that the Battered Woman Syndrome and similar alternatives to or qualifications of self-defense are problematic because they strip a woman of her moral subjectivity. I conclude with a brief articulation of a proposal for reform of the criminal justice system specifically aimed at cases wherein there has been a long history of abuse or violence. This reform is unique because it does not rely on a separate standard of reasonableness particular to battered women, but arises out of consideration of the moral implications of legal proceedings involving domestic violence.

We are social animals in the sense that we spontaneously invent and continuously re-invent the social realm. But, not unlike other artifacts, once real, social relations, practices, institutions, etc., obey prior laws, some of which are moral laws. Hence, with regard to social reality, we ought to be ontological constructivists and moral realists. This is the view sketched here, taking as points of departure Searle's recent work on social ontology and May's on group morality. Moral and social selves are distinguished to acknowledge that social reality is constructed but social morality is not. It is shown how and why moral law requiring respect for the dignity and well being of agents governs a social world comprising roles that are real only because of their occupants' social intentions.

I defend the continued viability of Marx's critique of capitalism against Ronald Aronson's recent claim that because Marxists are 'unable to point to a social class or movement' away from capitalism, Marxism is 'over' 'as a project of historical transformation.' First, Marx's account of the forced extraction of surplus labor remains true. It constitutes an indictment of the process of capital accumulation because defenses of capitalism's right to profit based on productive contribution are weak. If generalized, the current cooperative movement, well advanced in many nations, can displace capitalism and thus counts as the movement Aronson challenges Marxists to point to. It will do this, I argue, by stopping capitalist exploitation, blocking capital accumulation, and narrowing class divisions. But in defending Marx by pointing to the cooperative movement, we have diverged from Marx's essentially political strategy for bringing about socialism onto an economic one of support for tendencies toward workplace democracy worldwide.

This paper explores the connection between supererogation and the integrity of ethical agents. It argues two theses: (1) there is a generally unrecognized but crucial social dimension to the moral integrity of individuals which challenges individual ideals and encourages supererogation; (2) the social dimension of integrity, however, must have limits that preserve the individuals's integrity. The concept of integrity is explored through recent works by Christine Korsgaard, Charles Taylor, and Susan Babbitt. A life of integrity is in part a life whereby one 'lives up to' one's own deeply held values. Yet, as one seeks to transcend the realm of the morally customary or the dutiful, one must check one's progress not only against one's own ideals but against the ideals and behavior of the ethical community. To answer affirmatively to one's own ideals is to hear the call of integrity both from within oneself and from without. However, by being free to hear, the freedom to close one's ears inevitably will arise. Only actions displaying such freedom can be actions of moral integrity. Since supererogatory actions are always left to an agent's discretion-that is, are fully optional-they show in paradigmatic fashion the integrity of moral agents. While an ethic of integrity and supererogation provides challenges to members of an ethical community by encouraging them continually to reevaluate their actions and character in reference to postulated ideals, it also leads us to be quite wary of judging individual's moral motives from the outside. A passage by Jonathan Kozol is cited that suggests our society routinely demands supererogatory action from its poorest members. This is illegitimate since they live in conditions that alienate rather than integrate them both with themselves and with the rest of the community.

This paper intends to shed light on the issue of ideology as found in the work of Ricoeur. According to Ricoeur, ideology is not only distortive of social reality; it is as well related to society's power and integration, which in fact changes our way of understanding the entire world. Ideology is an endless and unresolvable problem, since there is no non-ideological place from which to discuss ideology. The phenomenological hermeneutic is employed in an attempt to mediate ideological phenomena in a Ricoeur-like fashion.

David Hume and James Madison believed that a republic can secure domestic tranquility by discouraging the development of factions. Modern computer technology shatters these hopes, which rest on the idea that factions will not grow because great distance makes it difficult for individuals to discover that others share their interests or grievances. Today, technology renders geographical distance increasingly irrelevant to communication with others. If Madison and Hume were right about the effects of distance prior to the current development of computer technology, then we may experience the growth of factions and associated violence that Hume and Madison feared. Increased domestic terrorism made more effective by technologically developed weapons of mass death could be the way of the future. I contend that education can modify such developments by giving priority to Jane Roland Martin's suggestion that we adopt an educational aim intent on securing domestic tranquility. I revise the content of her proposal to include features of communicative rationality as an indispensable element of political dialogue. This provides resources by which factional elements can access and influence political discussion. If we are to enjoy a decent degree of domestic tranquility in the future, we must integrate potentially factious elements into the political process. To marginalize such elements, no matter how repugnant their political views, will merely serve to legitimate their use of terror as the only option available to them for political expression.

I argue that we can find in Marx two objections to exploitation: (i) an entitlement objection according to which it is wrongful because of the unjust distribution of benefits and burdens it generates; and (ii) an expressivist objection according to which it is objectionable because of the kind of social relation it is. The expressivist objection is predicated on a communitarian strand in Marx's thought, whereas the entitlement objection is grounded in a more liberal account of the wrongfulness of capitalist exploitation. I conclude by connecting my analysis to the current debate between proponents and critics of market socialism. While market socialism could be a vehicle for realizing the values associated with the entitlement objection, this is not true for the expressivist objection. Furthermore, because the entitlement objection does not depend on a thick conception of the human good, it is in accord with the liberal ideal of political neutrality whereas the expressivist objection is not.

In this paper I offer an application of the philosophical analysis of meanings of "being" derived from existential phenomenology to the issue of race, distinguishing a static meaning (which I name "color") from a dynamic meaning ("race") by analogy to the sex/gender distinction. I then distinguish a substantialist meaning of race (as facticity, a socio-historically constituted meaning of color) from an existential meaning (race as lived, as intentionality). Finally I briefly explore the risk of this position on "race," how it is an invitation to bad faith, while being nonetheless essential to the struggle against racism.

This paper reviews three social scientific accounts of the civic sector's role in society: the government failure, contract failure, and voluntary failure theories. All three explain the role of nonprofit organizations as compensating for the market's failure to provide certain collective goods. This approach involves a radical misinterpretation of the underlying principles of civic sector organizations. An account is needed that explains their economy in terms of their normative concerns, rather than explaining normative concerns in terms of their economy. I lay a foundation for such an account by examining (1) the self-understanding among civic sector organizations that they should be "mission-driven," and (2) the implications of this self-understanding for the sector as a "social economy." Whereas "mission-drivenness" calls attention to service-provision, resource-sharing, and open communication as the normative core of civic sector organizations, the notion of a "social economy" suggests a recirculation of money into channels where standard economic logic no longer holds. The key to the civic sector's role lies not in responses to market failure, but in the short-circuiting of a money-driven capitalist economy.

Teaching philosophy and critical thinking is one of the main ways to clearly reaffirm the value of human persons and of goodness and freedom. It is not sufficient to propose a philosophical message, but we must teach it systematically (curriculum) with a real synergy between teachers and parents. We must also build a curriculum, which includes an evaluation model based on clear goals and objectives: the intermediate and final evaluation and assessment will enable us to be sure that we have reached our aim. It is also necessary to verify every step, evaluate it and compare it to the criteria (general project, goals, objectives) we put in our mind and use in our teaching. This critical evaluation needs methods and some teaching instruments described herein. The final philosophical education will be much stabler and assure us about our scientific and formative project.

In this paper I examine the text of the Symposium to illustrate two non-philosophical responses to Socrates' pedagogical provocation. While Apollodorus and Aristodemus, two Socratic disciples, demonstrate their erotic commitment to Socrates, they do not practice philosophy. They manifest their non-philosophical behavior in two ways. First, they idolize and imitate Socrates. Second, they constantly tell stories about Socrates. In the first section I analyze Aristodemus' and Apollodorus' emotional attachment to Socrates. While both disciples are genuinely protective of Socrates, their behavior often precludes the practice of philosophy. In the second section, I examine the nuances of the narrative frame of the Symposium. Apollodorus and Aristodemus both express their commitment to Socrates by telling stories about him. While their stories do preserve knowledge about Socrates, they are unpersuasive spokespersons for the philosophical life. They remain mired in their personal love for Socrates. In the third section, I interpret Plato's rhetorical use of anonymity as a strategy designed to mitigate against the dangers of discipleship.

The World Consensus GameTM allows anyone to contribute to the creation of a world consensus on issues that divide people. Participants can look up positions that have been taken on contious topics and contribute to the discussion. Participation is easy. Once you identify a question that interests you, a map is provided that shows the positions previously taken along with definitions of these various positions. You can examine arguments in favor of a given position, including the argument judged best by philosophers and the argument most favored by the general public. You can also express your own position as well as contribute new positions, new arguments, and criticisms of other individual's arguments. The World Consensus GameTM is like a huge symposium of the world's people with you as a participant, and can be used in a classroom setting or by computer.

Augustine's passionate and immensely personal account of his conversion has enthralled readers for centuries. Unfortunately, the passion and personal nature of the writing can stand as a barrier to comprehension, especially when the text is taught at the undergraduate level. Add to this the fact that the work has the character of one long and substained prayer to God, contains many passages that are tediously introspective, and refers to a time and place that are foreign to today's undergraduates, the task of helping students to understand and appreciate the work is daunting, to say the least.

Encouraging students to apply classroom knowledge in their personal, everyday life is a major problem confronting many teachers of critical thinking. For example, while a student might recognize an ad hominem argument in a classroom exercise, it is quite another thing for him or her to avoid the same in interpersonal relations, say with parents, siblings, and peers. One approach to this problem is the creation of interaction software to which students can turn for input on the rationality of their own thinking. Students can then speak to computers rather than instructors about their private lives without having to share confidential information with any other human being, yet still receive relevant feedback. I discuss software technology that actually performs this function. The software in question is an interactive, artificial intelligence program that checks beliefs for faulty thinking ("fallacies"), including inductive and deductive errors. The system "scans" student essays for possible fallacies; asks questions at relevant junctions; provides individualized feedback on fallacies committed; provides summaries of fallacies found; diagnoses thinking problems; issues recommendations; and provides other pertinent information.

This presentation explains how problem-based learning and the World Wide Web (WWW) may be used in collaboration to shift student learning experiences in dramatic ways and to encounter the tasks and concerns of philosophy. We will provide a guided tour of the web site and the problems used in the course, and will describe how these pedagogical strategies may be used to complement traditional classroom venues without making a commitment to offering a course completely on-line for distance learning scenarios. Problem-based learning will also be described and its importance to philosophical instruction will be emphasized. We argue that teaching philosophy by means of problems is more philosophically sound than taking a discrete topical or textual approach. Challenges to this pedagogy are uncovered and discussed.