In this paper I argue that members of Oaxacan Indigenous “transborder communities” of Mexico and the United States are entitled to a freedom of movement right between these two countries. First, I explore the vital role that migration across the U.S.-Mexico border plays in maintaining Oaxacan transborder societal culture. Second, I explore the implications of Will Kymlicka’s views on collective rights for this phenomenon. On the one hand, Kymlicka’s argument that just states must protect the societal cultures of minority groups within their territories would seem to support such a right for Oaxacan “transmigrants.” On the other hand, his categorical distinction between “national minorities” and “voluntary migrants” cannot, as it stands, capture the lived experiences of Oaxacan transborder communities and similar transnational groups. However, I argue that there is a reasonable extension of Kymlicka’s view that can, indeed, account for the phenomenon of Oaxacan transborder communities by allowing for this freedom of movement right.

Stewart and Korol (“De-Signing Fat,” International Journal of Applied Philosophy 23.2 [2009]) contend that obesity is benign. In support of their position they have focussed on selected papers that do not take into consideration key realities. Their attempt to minimise the impact of obesity appears to centre on how difficult it can be to lose weight by diet alone (and its risks) and problems with measurements of obesity, while failing to acknowledge the specific and well-documented impact of deleterious biochemical alterations arising from central obesity. Stewart and Korol also do not point out the considerable controversy with the fat but fit (metabolically healthy obesity [MHO]) concept. Whether looping from above or below, nothing changes the biochemical realities of central obesity. Above all, Stewart and Korol never once mention the benefits of obesity prevention, rather focussing on the difficulties of losing weight. Thus, respectfully, a word of caution is put forward on the views of Stewart and Korol regarding obesity.

Hennie Lötter, in his book Poverty, Ethics, and Justice, contends that we have a moral obligation to eradicate global poverty, but does so under the assumption that eradicating poverty is possible under current political and economic policy. Roughly 1.8 billion people (the consuming class) currently consume the majority of the world’s economic production. About 5.2 billion poor people (the non-consuming class) would like to consume at similar levels. Is it possible for the non-consuming class to approach levels of material welfare similar to that of the consuming class? What would be the impact on the global environment if the billions of the non-consuming class started to consume at a reasonable standard? The answers to these questions are rather bleak for the cause of eradicating poverty: discussions on global poverty like Lötter’s fail to cohere with data on the environment and regarding resources constraints. Without radical transformation of current economic and political philosophy, the assumption that the eradication of poverty is possible is a false assumption.

Men often allow their eyes to linger over the least bit of exposed cleavage or uncovered knee. This paper considers the harm done by such looks. Taken individually, male looks may not seem that bad. They need not cause direct harm and need not be done with malicious intent. Like environmental degradation, however, the accumulation of individually imperceptible harms pollutes the moral environment, especially given a long history of gender discrimination. Given the complexity of the gendered environment, I appeal to the virtue ethics tradition and suggest that men should seek to do the right thing at the right time in the right way given the setting and relationship with the particular individuals in question (e.g., friends, co-workers, lovers).

This paper is about the implications of a common view on global justice. The view can be called the Minimalist View, and it says that we have no positive duties to help the poor in foreign countries, or that if we do, they are very minimal. It might seem as if, by definition, the Minimalist View cannot require that we do very much about global poverty. However, in his book World Poverty and Human Rights, Thomas Pogge pointed out that this conclusion is at least up for debate. Although Minimalism countenances very few positive duties to the global poor, it certainly countenances negative duties not to harm. Perhaps one can argue that these negative duties are somehow being violated, and thus even a Minimalist must make substantial compensation to the global poor. However, in this paper I argue that Pogge’s argument about Minimalism does not succeed. The second half of the paper offers ways to revise and improve the argument in order to make the case for assistance to the global poor.