There are presently three broad approaches the project of naturalizing intentionality: a purely informational approach (Dretske and Fodor), a purely teleological approach (Millikan and Papineau), and a mixed informationally-based teleological approach (Dretske again). I will argue that the last teleosemantic theory offers the most promising approach. I also think, however, that the most explicit version of a pure teleosemantic theory of content, namely Millikan’s admirable theory, faces a pair of objections. My goal in this paper is to spell out Millikan’s pure teleosemantic theory; then to present two objections; and finally to ask the question whether a teleosemantic framework can be saved from the objections.

When computing is defined as the causal implementation of algorithms and algorithms are defined as effective decision procedures, human thought is mental computation only if it is governed by mental algorithms. An examination of ordinary thinking, however, suggests that most human thought processes are non-algorithmic. Digital machines, moreover, are mark-manipulating or string-processing systems whose marks or strings do not stand for anything for those systems, while minds are semiotic (or “signusing”) systems for which signs stand for other things for those systems. Computing, at best, turns out to be no more than a special kind of thinking.

In this paper I argue for a computational theory of thinking that does not eliminate the mind. In doing so, I will defend computationalism against the arguments of John Searle and James Fetzer, and briefly respond to other common criticisms.

In the ongoing debate, there are a set of mind-body theories sharing a certain physicalist assumption: whenever a genuine cause produces an effect, the causal efficacy of each of the nonphysical properties that participate in that process is determined by the instantiation of a well-defined set of physical properties. These theories would then insist that a nonphysical property could only be causally efficacious insofar as it is physically implemented. However, in what follows we will argue against the idea that fine-grained mental contents could be physically implemented in the way that functional properties are. Therefore, we will examine the metaphysical conditions under which the implementing mechanism of a particular instance of a functional property may be individuated, and see how genuine beliefs and desires—insofar as they track the world—cannot meet such conditions.

I argue here that sophisticated AI systems, with the exception of those aimed at the psychological modeling of human cognition, must be based on general philosophical theories of rationality and, conversely, philosophical theories of rationality should be tested by implementing them in AI systems. So the philosophy and the AI go hand in hand. I compare human and generic rationality within a broad philosophy of AI and conclude by suggesting that ultimately, virtually all familiar philosophical problems will turn out to be at least indirectly relevant to the task of building an autonomous rational agent, and conversely, the AI enterprise has the potential to throw light at least indirectly on most philosophical problems.

The mere possibility of irrationality has been challenged by a long-standing tradition which strongly supports the normative primacy of ideals of rationality. In this paper, I consider the possibility that a coherent account of irrationality can nonetheless be provided and furthermore that some forms of irrationality may be seen as justifiable on the basis of their functional roles.

Recently, Gilbert Harman has used empirical results obtained by social psychologists to argue that there are no character traits of the type presupposed by virtue ethics—no honesty or dishonesty, no courage or cowardice, in short, no virtue or vice. In this paper, I critically assess his argument as well as that of the social psychologists he appeals to. I suggest that the experimental results recounted by Harman would not much concern such classical virtue theorists as Plato—particularly the Plato of the Republic—because they are pretty much exactly what these theorists would have predicted. The more difficult thesis that virtuous or vicious character traits exist, I do not here argue. Instead, the results of this paper focus on clarifying some of the ways in which character traits are understood by virtue ethicists, especially those who look to the classical philosophers.

Both indignation, and sometimes shame, can be considered moral emotions because whoever feels them needs a sense of moral values and distinctions, and a grasp of what is correct and incorrect, just and unjust, honorable and dishonorable. However, there are differences in the moral aspects associated with each. Shame is related to self-respect and, sometimes, for this to be upheld, something moral is considered necessary. But shame, unlike indignation, is not moral in the sense of being other-regarding. The person who becomes indignant acknowledges the violations of the rights of others and their suffering. The focus here will be on explicating shame and indignation as emotions that require concepts, beliefs and desires related to morality.

Recent discussions on the nature of freedom have suggested that freedom of action depends on freedom of the will and that the conditions for the freedom of the will preclude the possibility of the antecedents of free actions being determined or alternatively require that the agent be responsible for those antecedents. In this paper, it is argued that the first thesis is correct but that the second on either interpretation is wrong. What I argue is that if we take one essential component of the antecedents of action, namely belief, and look at the conditions for freedom of belief, or better, autonomy of belief, we will see that rather than determinism being precluded as a condition for autonomy, a certain sort of determinism would make best sense of that autonomy. It is argued that contrary to oft-cited intuitions, were this form of determinism to obtain, our autonomy would be enhanced.

Eric T. Olson has argued that any view of personal identity in terms of psychological continuity has a consequence that he considers untenable—namely, that I was never an early-term fetus. I have several replies. First, the psychological-continuity view of personal identity does not entail the putative consequence; the appearance to the contrary depends on not distinguishing between de re and de dicto theses. Second, the putative consequence is not untenable anyway; the appearance to the contrary depends on not taking seriously an idea that underlies a plausible view of persons that I call ‘the Constitution View’. Finally, Olson’s own “Biological View of personal identity” has liabilities of its own.

This paper argues that Nonreductive ethical naturalism is a viable approach to normative ethical theory. Central to Nonreductive ethical naturalism is the identification of moral properties with natural ones. Natural properties are objective and pertain to facts. It follows that moral properties are factual in nature. In the proposed theory pain and harm are the natural properties that are also moral in nature. Pain and harm are not identical. Pain is the chief indicator of harm. The concept of harm entails injury. Injury to an individual is both a factual and moral issue. The well-being of individuals constitutes the foundation of morality. Consequently, that which runs counter to an individual's well-being is what we mean by evil. It follows that injury is evil and its intentional infliction upon other people is morally evil. The factual nature of ethical properties provides the basis for universal agreement on which forms of behavior are evil. As such, acceptance of this theory would go a long way in resolving many of the global problems that confront us all at the onset of the 2 1 s t century.

Pragmatic philosophy and discourse ethics are offered as an alternative way to respond to and understand the concerns of philosophical animal ethics and animal welfare science, especially as they relate to ethical decision-making and democratic participation in today's technical animal agriculture. The two major challenges facing philosophical animal ethics and animal welfare are: the acceptability of alienating individual animals from their genetic and social identities through practices that seek to alter their genome or which fail to provide for their respective natures, and the extent to which the former concern will contribute to further deterioration of already fractured human-farm-animal and consumer-producer relationships. This paper considers how we might ethically and strategically rise to the challenge of reshaping conventional animal farming practices in liberal democracies, especially as it applies to making improvements in animal welfare standards and promoting public trust and confidence in science, the production sector and government. I suggest some ways to empower consumers and farmers to realize this end.

One of the many general problems that I wish to examine is that to do with the ethics of health care practice and provision. Consequently, I aim to undertake the following: first, I examine, in the light of Rorty's famous dictum concerning suffering, the current state of international policies on health care resource provision. Second, following Brock, I argue that such policies of allocation are founded on broad utilitarian principles. Third, I lay the foundations for an argument that moral utilitarianism, like economic utilitarianism, is dependent upon a form of calculative reasoning which is a necessary feature of the broad Anglo-American analytic approach to philosophical issues, and as a means of helping us to understand both the complex moral status of persons and the way(s) in which health care policies need to be framed for such persons, that approach is found wanting. Fourth, I propose some alternative approaches to minking about health care which are informed more by the phenomenological tradition. I mention both Heidegger and Levinas, whilst concentrating on the work of Hadot, whose emphasis on spiritual exercises has close affinities to the practical health care work and research undertaken by Bradshaw. Such a phenomenological approach can, I suggest, help to lessen what Bradshaw claims is a current dependence upon a 'contract' view of care, whilst attempting to replace it with what she terms a 'covenant' view.

Our way of seeing things depends upon the state of our minds. We can look at the world through the lenses of love, hate or indifference. What remains largely unquestioned about science is its essence. Scientific objectivity is not free from subjectivity. I argue that objective, scientific knowledge is a partial knowledge based on indifference, the state of mind that constitutes the scientific attitude. Hate does not produce knowledge at all, but reinforces our prejudices. However, love gives the possibility of knowing someone or something fully, and not only as an object. Once we accept that our experiences, thoughts, and feelings are not incommunicable, we can arrive at inter-subjective and non-objective moral knowledge which results from our recognition of others as persons and our affective engagement with the world.

Advocates of particularism in moral philosophy (e.g. Prichard, Dancy, McDowell) hold that moral theory contributes little if anything to moral deliberation, claiming that we do best in moral judgement by relying on our intuitive moral sensitivities to situations rather than on general principles. In this paper I argue that particularism lacks the resources to provide a preferable account of moral deliberation and justification.

I present an analysis of the dialectic relationship uniting concepts of responsibility and loyalty, on the background of the political question of the right to move (immigration, in a very broad sense of leaving one's native community). I present a thorough analysis of the meanings of the categories of responsibility and loyalty, concentrating on the aspects that reveal their mutual antagonism. It is specially claimed that no responsibility is purely individual (however neither is it collective) and in this respect the concept of responsibility is confronted with the concept of guilt. In conclusion, it's claimed that the universal right of settling in a democratic country is a practical solution of the contradiction between the requirements of loyalty and responsibility on the one hand and freedom and justice on the other.

In this paper I will study the theoretical foundations of autonomy and argue that many of the disputes around the principle follow from different understandings of what is "true freedom." My analysis will center on the two notions of liberty introduced by Isaiah Berlin in his "Two Concepts of Liberty" (originally published in 1959). The problem is that there is no unequivocal way to understand the division. In my paper, I will give one interpretation of Berlin's two concepts, and argue that this reading both captures the essence of his essay and explains why there are so many ways of respecting autonomy