D’après l’oracle d’Apollon, Plotin avait une capacité extraordinaire à ne jamais vraiment succomber au sommeil. Porphyre, dans le commentaire qu’il donne de cet oracle, introduit l’idée remarquable d’une double attention, tournée tout à la fois vers l’intérieur et vers l’extérieur. L’éveil de Plotin ne serait donc pas simplement une autre manière de parler de la contemplation, mais engloberait aussi un pôle «pratique», dirigé vers le monde des sens et de l’action. L’étude des Ennéades nous montre que le commentaire de Porphyre s’appuie vraisemblablement sur Plotin lui-même, lequel soutient que l’éveil du sage, fondé dans la contemplation des intelligibles (des Formes que Plotin présente littéralement comme «insomniaques»), s’exprime également à travers l’action. La thématique de l’éveil se révèle ainsi riche en enseignements, en particulier en ce qu’elle nous force à réviser notre interprétation de la vie du sage selon Plotin, une vie qui ne rejette pas l’action, mais fonde bien plutôt celle-ci dans la contemplation.

The epimeleia tês psyches, that is, the formation and purification of the soul, is an important topic in Ancient Philosophy. As the soul is immaterial it can be difficult to understand what is meant by the idea of a formation of the soul. Many philosophers in Antiquity try to explain the meaning of the formation of the soul by using linguistic imagery, that is, similes, metaphors and myths. In this paper some of these images, in particular, the images of the painter and sculptor of the soul, are presented and analysed. The function of these linguistic forms in the logic of the text and the conceptual differences between the image of the painter and the image of the sculptor are discussed.

The paper raises the question of the relationship between the description of the soul as logos and the description of its cognitive activities as logismos in Plotinus’ Enneads V, 1 [10] et IV, 3 [27]. It first offers an interpretation of the definition of the soul as a logos of the intellect in V, 1 [10]. Then it scrutinises the use of the terms logismos and logizesthai in the same treatise and compares it to a similar use of these terms in IV, 3 [27]. In both treatises, these terms refer to two distinct cognitive activities of the soul, one of which is the activity of a soul remaining in the intelligible realm and contemplating the cognitive contents of the divine intellect, while the other one denotes the defective cognitive activity of an embodied soul. In its concluding section the paper deals with Plotinus’ explanation, in IV, 3 [27], 30, of how the accomplished cognitive activity atthe level of the soul as logos of the intellect becomes a defective logismos at the level of an embodied soul. The author stresses the role of the embodied soul’s faculty of representation.

For Plotinus, the human face is that part of the body where the light of intelligibility can be shown through in the best way. It is why the face is beautiful, and, for this reason, it can be compared to the most beautiful things of the world. The stars, for example. But an issue raises immediately: when the face is compared to things of beauty, is not the actual meaning of the human face that could be lost? This question can be thought again in the Christian world, and also, thanks to Emmanuel Levinas, in the contemporary philosophy.

Paradox of the Evil and "Family Ressemblances". The paper tackles the problem of Matter and evil in Plotinus. monistic metaphysics, especially in theperspective of the following aparent inconsistency: if there is no other principle but the Good, then the Good creates the Matter which is the absolute evil. Itfollows that the Good is bad, according to a certain axiom of Proclus, which states that the creator is to a higher degree all what the creature is. The authorshows that, despite what Proclus and then many modern critics believed, Plotinus is consistent within his system. He relies on the axiom that the creature is not all what the creator is, i.e. that the creator also gives what he has not. Therefore, the One gives the Intellect multiplicity and thought which He is deprived of and also gives the Matter the evil which He is also deprived of. The paper also shows that Plotinus developed a logic of ontological procession which is not Aristotelian. This logic does not work by formind classes, but chains of partially intransitive ressemblances. So, the Intellect ressembles the One (the Good), the Soul ressembles the Intellect and the Matter ressembles the Soul; yet the Matter resembles the One no more. Yet, the unity of the world is assured, because of the continuity of the chain. The extreme terms are contrary, though not in the Aristotelian sense of sharing in the same genus. A certain similarty with Wittgenstein's logic of "family resemblances" is striking, which means that not only Wittgenstein, but Plotinus also went beyond the Platonic-Aristotelian Vulgata, even while he was sticking to its linguage.

Plotinus represent a constant reference in all of Šestov's philosophy. For the Russian philosopher Plotinus is, on the one hand, the one who thought up thesynthesis of Greek philosophy, on the other, the one who first broke with that same tradition precisely when it was at its peak. However, Šestov does lift from the Enneadi certain passages which he marries - as if in a sort of contrapuntal rewriting exercise - to others in which Plotinus seems to contradict himself. What interests Šestov are precisely those discontinuities in the thought of the last great philosopher of old in an anti-Greek function. That of Šestov is once again a marked criticism of Rationalism as creator of an autonomous set of ethics that he judges according to an intellect which everything is subject to. Autonomousethics, affirms Šestov, is a fruit of Greek schools of thought to the extent that it shows distrust for what is mutable, unforeseen and arbitrary, of everything which, in short, is irrational, as it is not inserted in the One/All necessitating, justifying, regulating. In the alternative between Athens and Jerusalem, between the Rationalism and the Bible, Šestov opts to assume a stance, in no uncertain terms, on the side Jerusalem, taking with him the Plotinus of the awakening andheading towards a greater reality capable of overturning the throne occupied for too long by reason. That Plotinus who at a certain point was obliged to say thatin this other dimension "the intellect before God represents a reckless, ungodly apostate" (VI.9.5). That Plotinus, who ultimately, in one of those most particularmoments, realized that he was predestined for something loftier with respect to the world of evil and death.

The religious spirit in Plotinus. Lots of studies from last 30 years have shown similar attitudes and spiritual tendencies in early christian and neoplatonic teachings. But we could not forget that we are dealing here with two major rivals on the intellectual scene of Late Antiquity. Despite commun aspects in plotinian and gnostic doctrines, there are some strong critics in Plotinus works, most of them in Enneads II,9, that let no doubt of the distance between the gnostic and neoplatonic positions on some key issues. This article points out four aspects of the plotinian doctrine that clearly break up with some of the main christian religious attitudes. Plotinus had a positive jugement on the sensible world, he had never expressed contempt towards nature, refused any presomption on religious matters and considered the philosophy as the only way to mistical union with the One.

Is the number an absolute intelligible reality? The author investigates the number and its nature in Plotinus. works trying to solve the following question: what number is considered intelligible - the number in general or the number in particular? Three answers are given over this study. Thus, if the number is generally defined as intelligible (as Plotinus sometimes does), than the number in general is an intelligible reality (a general intelligible number, therefore, exists). On the other hand, if we make a distinction between numbers (the plural) and number (the singular), it seems that, for Plotinus, only the particular number could be considered clearly intelligible, while the number as a generic reality is not so. Actually, the final solution comes out from the agreement between these two divergent theses. This agreement is based on the idea of the total number: a number that is in the same time particular and general, a number which is the object of the final part of the present study.

In this article, I discuss Plotinus. critique of the peripatetic idea of the divine intellect as first principle. As I am trying to show, Plotinus accepts the unity of the intellect as self-thinking, and, even more than Aristotle, he emphasizes this unity. Yet, he insists on the necessity of a principle that is even higher and simpler than the intellect. Eventually, intellect proves to be the unity of a plurality, though it is the most unitary being. I discuss the dual nature of the intellect: both as thinking and as being, intellect is both unitary and plural. Starting from this, I analyze Plotinus' arguments of the absolute one as first principle, above intellect.

Iamblichus has long lived under the shadow of Plotinus. One can easily recognize this from the historiography of the Neoplatonic school starting, for example, with J.J. Brucker's Historia critica philosophiae (1742) and continuing with Hegel and 19th century historians like Simon and Vacherot in France, Kroll and Zeller in Germany. But from Praechter on Iamblichus was acknowledged more and more as an original thinker and the real systematizer of the late Neoplatonic School. We can see more clearly now that the inclusion of theurgy into Neoplatonism does not mean a simple abandonment of philosophy or rational discourse, and that the discipline of textual exegesis does not negate the originality of the commentator. In Proclus, for one, these complementary strains are strongly present. In rebuilding the whole Platonic system, Iamblichus - the Chrysippus of Neoplatonism - skillfully incorporated elements like the Chaldean triads which were unknown to Plotinus, and presented a completely new account of the nature of theology. This feat shows a genius no less impressive, albeit of another type, than the one disclosed by Plotinus himself.

The knowledge of the Greek by the Carolingians was well studied by the modern scholars. This article focuses on the third generation of intellectuals from this period, on their attitude towards Greek language and the ways it was used in the classrooms. Despite the negative view of the Greek knowledge by some of his contemporaries, Sedulius Scottus appears to be an intellectual interested in the Greek thought that he collected from the different Latin sources like Macrobius, for instance. His awareness of the definition of the soul by Plato leads him to state some philosophical ideas as an active principle for the essence of beings and things.

Towards the end of the Byzantine Empire many texts of the Latin Fathers were translated into Greek, beginning with the De Trinitate of Augustine. This flurry of translation spurred discussion on the authority of the Fathers. The Greeks were now confronted with the problem of what one should do when the (presumably infallible) Fathers justify apparent heresy (the Filioque) ? This question became crucial after the Council of Florence and the fall of the Byzantine Empire. What is the definition of a Father? A saint? A disciple? Is it possible to honour a Father and yet refuse to follow him on a particular point of doctrine?

Cet article entend montrer comment, quand il expose la doctrine dite Assumptus homo, le philosophe et théologien latin Jean Duns Scot (1265 - 1308) prend appui sur le théologien grec Jean de Damas (c. 675 - c. 749), concernant trois points principaux: dans le Christ, la nature humaine est assumée par la personne du Verbe intégralement; elle est assumée dans un individu, non dans une personne; éternellement et temporellement. Le présent article complète l'étude des rapports entre les deux auteurs, après l'article paru dans le numéro 3-4 la revue Chôra (2005-2006), sous le titre «Jean de Damas et Jean Duns Scot surl'infinité de l'essence divine».

Il est question de l'analogie et de la comparaison selon la démarche dialectique platonicienne, ainsi que des topoi empruntés aux textes anciens: la chasse, le labyrinthe, le vase, la statue intérieure que l'on doit polir, le Soleil pour désigner de manière visible le Bien, ou la caverne pour rappeler la parabole de laconnaissance, mais aussi pour évoquer le lieu de transit de l'âme. Les principaux textes utilisés sont extraits des Discours théologiques de Grégoire de Nazianze. Un passage du Traité sur le Saint Esprit (149 B-C) de Basile de Césarée, cité à la fin, illustre dans un contexte un peu différent le même procédé que celui utilisé par Grégoire. Dans tous ces passages il est question de travailler le langage sous le double aspect ontologique et sémantique, afin de trouver les modalités discursives les plus appropriées à la définition de la substance divine, à la nature de l'unité divine et à la détermination du caractère spécifique des hypostases. La théologie chrétienne se sert donc des moyens de la philosophie et emprunte des figures à la rhétorique, mais se défend de toute confusion avec ces disciplines. Invente-t-elle alors un genre nouveau, le «discours théologique», sur le modèle fourni par les Cappadociens? Encore faut-il savoir si le discours pouvait être perçu au IVᵉ siècle comme un genre approprié à la théologie, ou seulement comme un contrepoint à l'exégèse et au traité: un contrepoint par lequel les Pères ne rechignent pas à faire concurrence aux Sophistes pour les besoins politiques, et subsidiairement polémiques, de l'institution nouvellement créée.