Akty doradcze polegają na wskazaniu pożytecznych działań, uzupełniających niedoskonałości człowieka. Aktami doradczymi kieruje poznanie praktyczne. Ponieważ działania doradcze nakierowane są na przyszłość istotną funkcję pełni w nich prowidencja. Jest ona poznawczą refleksją przewidującą wykonanie aktów doradczych. Akty doradcze realizują się w kontekście retoryczno-komunikacyjnym, który łączy się z perswazyjnym przekazem treści doradczych. Należąca do kanonu retorycznego inwencja dysponuje czynnikami, wpływającymi na uzasadniające formułowanie treści doradczych. Czynniki inwencyjne wprowadzają uprzedzające determinacje i konkretyzacje treści doradczych. Metodyka inwencyjna na retorycznym poziomie realizuje funkcje przewidujące, które są zbieżne z zadaniami prowidencji w poznaniu praktycznym.

The paper presents the possibility of applying Ricoeur’s models of personal identity: character and keeping one’s word to clarify the dialectic of being oneself and being other. For this purpose, the relations of new models to traditional patterns of identity as being the same and being self are presented. This paper demonstrates the ability of selfhood to transcend the model of sameness, as revealed in the analyses of the character and keeping one’s word, and enabling the constitution of oneself. The role of otherness which transcends the identity aspects of oneself and thus enables the constitution of oneself as another is also analysed.

The idea of the end of history is of philosophical importance and is broadly commented by the representatives of various philosophical traditions. In the following text we present the way in which this idea is understood in the postmetaphysical thought by referring to three of its representatives: Gianni Vattimo, Odo Marquard, and Villém Flusser. In spite of the differences between their accounts of the end of history, one can also see a certain common trait connected mostly with the understanding of history as a metanarrative and with the critical attitude towards metaphysics.

Herman Cappelen in his book Fixing language (2018) proposed a project within conceptual engineering according to which what we revise in concepts is their intension and extension. He undertook a polemic with the ideas in concept engineering according to which we appeal to functions and purposes when revising. In the first part of this paper I describe the aforementioned discussion. In doing so, I refer to Amie Thomasson’s article “A Pragmatic Method for Normative Conceptual Work” (2020). Next, I attempt to defend positions that refer to functions and purposes in conceptual revision. For this purpose, I refer to Michael Prinzing’s article „The Revisionist’s Rubic: Conceptual Engineering and Discontinuity Objection” (2018). In the second part of the article, I intend to describe the method of explication as one of the methods by which we perform conceptual revision. I turn my attention to the explication used by Quine. He proposes to focus when explicating on what function a concept serves.

In my book Tropy i uniwersalia: Badania ontologiczne [Tropes and Universals: Ontological Investigations], I proposed a systematic and historical analysis of the problem of universals. I distinguished three main concepts of universals, understood as common properties, common aspects or common wholes, and then I applied these concepts for a detailed analysis of the theories of Roman Ingarden, St. Thomas Aquinas and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. In this paper, I outline the methodological assumptions of my work, my understanding of universals, and the main results of my interpretations. Next, I briefly review the discussions provoked by my book. Katarzyna Barska and Marek Piwowarczyk questioned my reading of Ingarden’s theory, while Tomasz Tiuryn and Michał Głowala criticized my interpretation of Aquinas’s position. Finally, I analyze a way in which Karol Kleczka interestingly developed an interpretation of the notion of concrete universal within the framework of the contemporary truthmaking theory.

The aim of this paper is to discuss Aristotle’s concept of the universal, and in particular to defend the claim that Aristotle’s concept is different from the modern concept of the universal, which is understood as the entity common to many individuals. For Aristotle, the universal is first and foremost an object which is predicated, is the object of the acts of the intellect, and is the object of the definition. In the text I also show that universals in Aristotle’s theory are causally inert, so they cannot be properties or causes of properties of individuals. This makes them similar to the modern concept of abstract objects such as Frege’s senses. The immediate point of reference for this paper is Paweł Rojek’s book Tropy i uniwersalia. Badania ontologiczne [Tropes and Universals: Ontological Investigations] (2019). I argue here against Rojek’s reading of the classical concept of the universal, and above all, against his interpretation of the theory of Thomas Aquinas.

In the paper, I discuss the interpretation of the Thomistic theory of universals put forward in Paweł Rojek’s book Tropy i uniwersalia. Badania ontologiczne [Tropes and Universals: Ontological Investigations] in the context of the issue of hidden nominalism. My aims are threefold. (i) I suggest a more precise definition of a universal that enables a defence of basic claims by Rojek concerning hidden nominalism; (ii) I show that the interpretation of Aquinas put forward by Rojek does in fact collapse into hidden nominalism; (iii) I offer another interpretation of the Thomistic theory of universals based on the theory of triplex status naturae that seems free from the trap of hidden nominalism.

Analytic philosophers usually believe that the problem of universals they discuss is the same problem that was discussed in antiquity and the Middle Ages. However, historians of philosophy point out that the old dispute on universals involved many different issues and did not focus on the currently debated problem of common properties. In my book Tropy i uniwersalia [Tropes and Universals], I assumed that the concept of universals had more or less the same meaning and I interpreted St. Thomas Aquinas’ position as a kind of contemporary realism. My interpretation raised interesting polemics by historians of philosophy, Tomasz Tiuryn and Michał Głowala. In this paper I attempt to examine the similarities and differences between contemporary and medieval understandings of universals and to answer some of their objections. It seems that there were at least three different notions of universals in the Middle Ages. First, they were understood as common beings, strictly identical in many realizations. This concept of universals is perhaps due to the patristic discussions of the Trinity in the fourth century. Second, universals were defined as entities predicated of the many, that is, as general concepts existing in the intellect. Third, and finally, they were thought, especially in late scholasticism, as entities divided into their realizations. Only the first concept agrees with the contemporary understanding of universals. It follows that the medieval and contemporary dispute over universals partially overlap. Finally, I also try to show that the interpretations of Aquinas’s position proposed by Tomasz Tiuryn and Michał Głowala lead in fact to a peculiar position that combines trope theory and Quine’s ostrich nominalism.

The aim of this article is to compare the three concepts of universals presented in “Tropes and Universals” by Pawel Rojek with theories of truthmaking. Rojek presents three approaches to the problem of unity in multiplicity: (1) specific unity which involves abstract properties, (2) general unity based on undefined aspects, and (3) concrete universals. Rojek proposes to interpret the first two in scope of truthmaking, by invoking the “passionfruit argument” and developing his own version of it. In my paper I follow Rojek's steps by developing his comparison to truthmakers to the concept of concrete universals. That development involves Schaffer’s priority monism and the concept of “the most promiscuous truthmaker”. Finally, I present my own version of the “passionfruit argument” that uses the notion of grounding.

The text is an introduction to the discussion, presenting briefly the book that is its subject Etyka chrześcijańska dla postchrześcijańkiej epoki [Christian Ethics for the Post-Christian Age] by Sebastian Gałecki. The book tries to find an answer to the question of whether it is possible to remerge the three traditions of Christian ethics (natural law, virtues, conscience) to create an ethical system expressed in a language understandable to contemporary culture, which consciously breaks up with his Christian heritage, although in fact he is still thoroughly penetrated by it.

The subject of the article is an assessment of conceptualizations of the theoretical deficits in the doctrine of Christian ethics, both genuine and presumed ones, variously diagnosed by contemporary Christian moral philosophers. The article is a polemic with the theoretical approach to these deficits, as well as an attempt to overcome them, formulated by Sebastian Gałecki in his book Etyka chrześcijańska dla postchrześcijańskiej epoki [Christian Ethics for the Post-Christian Age] (2020). While appreciating the boldness of the theoretical task undertaken in his book, and the theoretical significance of the project of integrating various ethical trends now emerging within Christianity, I point out several serious shortcomings in implementing this commendable venture. I stress, among others, the excessively occidental point of view adopted by the author, questionable operationalization of the category post-Christianity in his diagnosis of contemporary social transformations, his neglect to analyze the causes, endemic to Church institutions, for the people to depart from the Christian ethical canon and the internal inconsistency of the attempt to integrate various theoretical perspectives of the contemporary Christian moral theology.

The article refers to Sebastian Gałecki’s book Etyka chrześcijańska dla postchrześcijańskiej epoki [Christian Ethics for the Post-Christian Age], in which the author proposes the concept of such an ethics, based on a Christian foundation. At its core, it is a metaethical work, for which the prototype and inspiration were the taking of ethics by John Henry Newman, Alasdair MacIntyre and John Finnis. Broadening the research horizon of Gałecki’s book, it should be noted that all ethical systems are a challenge for contemporaries, because not only ethics, but every science conceived classically as theoria has only motivational power for practical life, and in social life it has an impact if it is translated into reliable popularization and effective dissemination of it. The “Christian” adjective merely specifies a particular ethic, determines it in a certain way, but does not modify it. Thus, Christian ethics is a proposal not only for concrete individual and social life, but also for theoretical ethical discussion. Nowadays, in the post-Christian era, argumentative pluralism is of great importance in this discussion. It has its foundation in the fact that the phenomenon of morality is always apprehended in the richness of its aspects, although often some of them are unjustly absolutized.

The title issue is analyzed in the article in the space of co-thinking with Sebastian Gałecki, the author of the book Etyka chrześcijańska dla postchrześcijańskiej epoki [Christian Ethics for a Post-Christian Age]. The question of a model of ethics for contemporary times, which is rightly referred to as post-Christian, is one of the most important issues of contemporary ethical research. The author of the above-mentioned monograph wants to build this model by integrating three, in his opinion remaining in isolation, traditions of ethics: the theory of natural law, the theory of virtues and the theory of conscience, in their contemporary interpretation by J. Finnis, A. MacIntyre and J.H. Newman. Is such a path optimal for the question posed in the title of this article? The doubts and questions raised as a result of reading Gałecki’s dissertation sketch the framework of an answer to this question, drawing at the same time positive paths of reflection on the shape of ethics in the times of late modernity.

In my article, I would like to answer the most important remarks and critiques to my book Christian Ethics for the Post-Christian Age], made in discussion by Adam Chmielewski, Jan Krokos, Krzysztof Stachewicz, and Marcin Zdrenka. I have divided my answers into five groups. First I deal with formal comments. Then I will move to more factual remarks, concerning the relationship between Christianity and post-Christianity, the postulate of making the three traditions of moral inquiry more consistent and the role of metaphors in philosophical writing. Finally, I dealt with the remaining significant critiques that did not relate to any of the above topics.

The article is an invitation to rethink a new and not necessarily original question — the role of metaphor in scientific writing. The immediate pretext is the metaphor of the compass, map, and training, and, in another plan, “old wineskins into which new wine is poured.” These figures are used by Sebastian Gałecki as the culmination of his dissertation Etyka chrześcijańska dla postchrześcijańskiej epoki [Christian Ethics for the Post-Christian Age], confronting the three concepts: ethics of character efficiency (virtue) (Alasdair MacIntyre), conscience (John Henry Newman), and the new theory of natural law (John Finnis). Leaving aside the essence of the content of the dissertation, I try to identify several issues and threats related to the use of metaphors by the authors. In the Umberto Eco terminology, they are regarded as “hot” and methodologically problematic elements of reflection and the way of writing in science. Despite the doubts and reservations about the metaphor as an “unscientific” figure, I would like to defend the right to its correct use in philosophy, especially in ethics. As an example of such use, I consider their use in Sebatian Gałecki’s book.

The article contains the reporting definition for the criterion of identity, a classification of criteria of identity and the general conditions that criteria of identity should meet. The author suggests replacing the binary division of criteria of identity into one- and two-level ones with a ternary division into one level, mixed and two-level criteria. In this suggestion the key role is played by the definition of the range of relation. The article is concluded with a partial solution to the dispute between T. Williamson and E. Lowe over the value of one-level criteria of identity.

Mental meaning (mental contents) is not a particular kind of object, but it is the way a conscious human mind works. By ‘meaning’ the author understands here both the extralinguistic meaning (perceptive, imaginary, etc.) and the so-called linguistic meaning. In both these senses meaning has the following properties: it is translinguistic, general, abstract, regularly interrelated, subject to modifications (extending, complementing and erasing its components), subject to schematization, it may be transferred to various physical foundations, it may be illustrated, it is directly accessible in introspection and accessible for many subjects (intersubjective). When approached negatively, meaning as a way of functioning of a conscious human mind cannot be identified with a physical sign (be it in the sense of specimen, or in the sense of type). It is neither an ideal object, nor a real one. Also, it is no kind of a perception stereotype. It is not an idea associated with a word, if idea is understood as either an image or a visual schema. Mental meaning is not a communication meaning, as the speaker may modify the meanings he found as existing ones, but he cannot create them. The author considers the following theories of meaning as insufficient: the theory, according to which meaning is an idea associated with the word and the theories saying that meaning may be identified with the conditions of truthfulness, the way phrases are used in colloquial language, or with communication meaning. Meaning is also not explained by such theories as semantics of conceptual roles, causal-historical theories, causal and teleological theories. Plato’s theory saying that existence of mental meaning in the mind consists in exemplification in the mind of ideally existing properties is considered a correct one that explains mental meaning. The source of meaning in the mind is existence of ideal qualities outside the mind. A correct solution to the problem of the nature and origin of meaning may also be Aristotle’s theory of obstraction, according to which the mind, beginning with individual objects and their properties, formulates meantal contents (meaning). Both these theories have to assume that the mind is also capable of performing the operation of transformation that converts properties existing (in a real or ideal way) outside the mind into a peculiarly mental mode of existence. In the case of Aristotle’s theory this transformation consists in dematerialization, whereas in the case of Plato’s theory transformation is tantamount to converting an ideal being into a mental existence. Additionally, the author suggests that in order to explain the intersubjective character of meaning one has to refer to a form of metaphysical harmonization of particular minds’ action. From the semantic way of acting of the human mind one may also make inferences concerning its way of existence. Translinguisticallity, generality, abstraction and other features of human semantic consciousness allow the statement that functioning of human mind does not consist in purely material actions. This immaterial character, however, does not have to be understood as a thesis about the existence of some mysterious ‘spiritual material’ of which human mind is made. It seems that immateriality has to be interpreted as radical extra-materiality.