This paper reflects on the idea that social institutions inform the development and justification of principles of justice. First, I situate this question in the context of contemporary debates in political philosophy. Then, I turn to a particular defense of this idea by looking at the conceptual relation established by John Rawls between the concept and the subject of justice. Finally, I look at works by Paul Ricœur in which he discusses Rawls’s theory of justice. Ricœur insists in various places on the distributive character of social institutions, in a way that helps shed light on the relation between principles and institutions.

The chapter analyzes some examples taken from the different versions of the beehive allegory in political history and political literature, with the aim of exploring the relevance of cognitive and persuasive aspects in this political metaphor. Starting from the Ricœurian theory of metaphor, the analysis of this particular example aims to show, ultimately, a characteristically rhetorical use of metaphorical language. Considering its structure, a metaphor such as the beehive metaphor appears to be fundamentally based on an analogical process hiding a re-description, ultimately based on an argumentative foundation–in this case, on the naturalistic argument. In this sense, this particular political metaphor seems to be persuasive precisely because of its ambiguity and its relative obscurity. Finally, I suggest that the effectiveness (therefore the popularity) of this metaphor in the political field is based on an implicit argumentative structure that has a fundamentally persuasive and strategic purpose, to which any cognitive dimension is subjected.

This article explores the ways in which Ricœur’s philosophy can provide interesting solutions to some of the major critiques that feminists have issued in the last decades against classical theories of justice, and against their universalistic dimensions in particular. Of particular interest is Ricœur’s rereading of John Rawls’s philosophy, as it echoes some notable concerns of feminist theories of justice. While many theories of justice are founded upon abstract notions of an ideal subject, not allowing for questions of structural inequalities, Ricœur’s theory converges with feminist critics that argue for the theorization of the subject in relation to the other. The article particularly highlights Ricœur’s philosophy of recognition as a response to the critiques of the exclusions inherent in theories of universalism up to this point. Ricœur works to create a possible universalism that can be more broadly inclusive, both by the recognition of each individual in his or her own singularity, and by moving beyond the distinction between public and private.