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21. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 40 > Issue: 1/2
Odysseus Makridis The Confusion of Logical Types in Plato's Parmenides
22. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 40 > Issue: 1/2
Nicholas D. Smith Moral Psychology as the Focus of Early Greek Ethics
23. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 40 > Issue: 1/2
Stefania Giombini Lycophron: a Minor Sophist or a Minor Socratic?
24. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 40 > Issue: 1/2
Jiyuan Yu Moral Naturalism in Stoicism and Daoism
25. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 40 > Issue: 1/2
Alexander P. D. Mourelatos The Gregory Vlastos Archive at the Harry Ransom Center of The University of Texas at Austin
26. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 40 > Issue: 3/4
D. Z. Andriopoulos Raphael Demos Biography
27. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 40 > Issue: 3/4
Nickolas Pappas Two Myths of Philosophy’s Beginnings
28. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 40 > Issue: 3/4
John P. Anton Aristotle on the Nature of Logos
29. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 40 > Issue: 3/4
Theodore Scaltsas Metaphysical Models of the Mind in Aristotle
30. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 40 > Issue: 3/4
Gerasimos Santas Justice, Law, and Women in Plato’s Republic
31. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 40 > Issue: 3/4
Michael Naas Socrates in a Birmingham Jail: The Improbable Dialogue Between Raphael Demos, Jacques Derrida, and Martin Luther King, Jr
32. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 40 > Issue: 3/4
Kevin Crotty “Man is a Breath and Shadow Only—An Image”: Tragedy and Republic 10
33. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 40 > Issue: 3/4
D. Z. Andriopoulos Comments on Aristotle's Theory of Causality
34. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 40 > Issue: 3/4
Christos Y. Panayides Aristotle on Luck and Teleology: A Note on Physics II 5
35. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 40 > Issue: 3/4
Thanassis Samaras The Best City in Aristotle’s Politics
36. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 40 > Issue: 3/4
Paul Schollmeier Aristotle on Comedy
37. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 40 > Issue: 3/4
Dionysios A. Anapolitanos The Problem of Knowledge in the Theaetetus
38. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 40 > Issue: 3/4
Erjus Mezini The Problem of Justice in Plato’s Republic
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Plato’s account of justice in the Republic has been questioned by David Sachs, who charges Plato for committing a fallacy of irrelevance. Sachs’ objection is built on the assumption that Plato has employed two accounts of justice: a vulgar one, and a Platonic one. Insofar as Socrates’ interlocutors hold a vulgar conception, then Socrates should prove to them that being vulgarly just will be benefi cial to them. But Socrates, according to Sachs, never does that. Through emphasizing the dialogues of Socrates with his interlocutors, this essay shows incorrect the assumption that Plato is holding two accounts of justice. The dialogues in the Republic demonstrate that there are vulgar confusions, rather than a vulgar ideology. Furthermore, through defi ning justice as the dominance of reason over humans and politics, and through relating reason to the Good, Plato leaves open the possibility that some vulgar actions conform to his account of justice.
39. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 40 > Issue: 3/4
Raphael Demos Αί Θεμελιώδεις Ἔννοιαι τῆς Μεταφυσικῆς τοῦ Πλάτωνος
40. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 41 > Issue: 1
Dietmar Hübner Three Remarks on “Reflective Equilibrium“: On the Use and Misuse of Rawls’ Balancing Concept in Contemporary Ethics
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John Rawls’ “reflective equilibrium” ranges amongst the most popular conceptions in contemporary ethics when it comes to the basic methodological question of how to justify and trade off different normative positions and attitudes. Even where Rawls’ specific contractualist account is not adhered to, “reflective equilibrium” is readily adopted as the guiding idea of coherentist approaches, seeking moral justification not in a purely deductive or inductive manner, but in some balancing procedure that will eventually procure a stable adjustment of relevant doctrines and standpoints. However, it appears that the widespread use of this idea has led to some considerable deviations from its meaning within Rawls’ original framework and to a critical loss of conceptual cogency as an ethico-hermeneutical tool. This contribution identifies three kinds of “balancing” constellations that are frequently, but inadequately brought forth under the heading of Rawlsian “reflective equilibrium”: (a) balancing theoretical accounts against intuitive convictions; (b) balancing general principles against particular judgements; (c) balancing opposite ethical conceptions or divergent moral statements, respectively. It is argued that each of these applications departs from Rawls’ original construction of “reflective equilibrium” and also deprives the idea of its reliability in clarifying and weighing moral stances.